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 My dissertation explores the nature of ethnic identity in the core region of 
north China during a period of 1,351 years from the beginning of Eastern Zhou (770-
256 BC) to the end of the Northern Dynasties (AD 399-581), these being periods 
commonly perceived as starting in a state of ethnic diversity and conflict, and ending 
with a population that was close to homogeneous in sharing a Huaxia, Hua, or 
Han ethnic identity. The dissertation's key research question is 
whether the conventional analytical framework of progressive ethnic assimilation of 
minority/'barbarian' peoples by a distinct Huaxia/Hua/Han ethnic group is 
supported by a thorough examination of the evidence. My argument, developed 
through a critical study of the construction, evolution, and manipulation of ethnonyms 
in ancient north China, is that the ethnic assimilation framework is untenable in its 
present form. Today, over one billion Chinese citizens know themselves ethnically as 
Han, and millions of descendants of migrant Chinese worldwide know themselves 
ethnically as Hua, together forming an ethnic group regarded as the largest in the 
world. Historians, both Chinese and non-Chinese, routinely assert that the prototype 
for this ethnic group was a Huaxia people whose ethnic identity took shape no later 
than Eastern Zhou. But, contrary to mainstream Chinese scholarly opinion since the 
1940s, there is no record at all of Huaxia being used as an ethnonym rather than a 
toponym at any time between 770 BC and AD 581. While there is inconclusive 
evidence from a single ancient text, Zuoshi Chunqiu, that Hua may have been an 
ethnic identity in sixth-century BC Eastern Zhou, this identity apparently faded from 
ethnic discourse at some time thereafter and was only revived in the third century AD, 
due largely to the growing influence of Zuoshi Chunqiu among the elite. Meanwhile, 
Han was a political, not an ethnic, affiliation that fell out of use in north China after 
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the end of the Eastern Han empire (AD 25-220), and was only reintroduced as an 
ethnonym by the Xianbi people of the Mongolian steppe in the fourth or fifth century. 
The Xianbi relabelled the Hua ethnic group as Han, and further adapted Hua 
from an ethnonym to a supra-ethnic identity based on geography and culture, enabling 
themselves to hold a dual identity as both ethnically Xianbi and supra-ethnically 
Hua. They thereby overcame the Hua/Yi dichotomy of contemporary Confucian 
ethnic discourse (a discourse rooted in Zuoshi Chunqiu), in which barbarians (Yi) 
were inherently inferior and unworthy to rule over the Hua, and in fact appropriated 
this dichotomy for use in their own relations with peoples and regimes outside their 
north Chinese empire. Thus between 399 and 581 there was a Han ethnic group in 
north China for the first time in history, but there is no credible evidence that other 
peoples were giving up their own ethnonyms in favour of Han - even if they were 
adopting Hua as a supra-ethnic identity, or adopting cultural elements previously 
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 For all of the ethnic strife that occurred during the period of division 
after the Han dynasty, this was paradoxically also the period when many of the 
ethnic groups that figured so prominently in ancient Chinese history 
disappeared, and became absorbed in the great unity of the Han Chinese. 
[I]ntermarriage gradually blurred the lines of ethnic distinction. Children of 
the once unmistakably alien northern elite became indistinguishable from 
ethnic Chinese  in fact, became Chinese; and the once multi-ethnic 
populations of both north and south China successfully re-imagined 
themselves together as fellow Chinese. The Chinese tien-hsia [Tianxia] 
absorbed intruders from the periphery of what was still very much a closed 
system, and made one out of many. With some adjustment, China retained 
both its centrality in the East Asian ecumene and its distinctly Chinese 
identity.1 
Thus did the US historian Charles Holcombe summarize the history of a period I call 
Chinas Age of Fragmentation (316-589)2, but his words could easily have been 
translated directly from any general history text published in China within the last 
twenty years, so typical are they of conventional wisdom in the field. In fact they 
could also be used, with very slight modifications, to express the standard historical 
narrative of a much earlier period in Chinese history: Eastern Zhou, also known as the 
Chunqiu (Annals, literally spring-autumn) and Warring States period (770-256 
BC). Despite being nearly six centuries apart, both periods are traditionally viewed as 
                                                
1 Charles Holcombe, Re-imagining China: The Chinese Identity Crisis at the Start of the Southern 
Dynasties Period, Journal of the American Oriental Society 115.1 (1995), 6, 14. 
2 Also known as the Age/Period/Era of Division/Disunion/Disunity, although many historians also 
include the Wei-Jin period (220-420) under those terms. Two other common labels, the Wei, Jin, and 




beginning in a state of ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict, and finally ending in a state 
of ethnic homogeneity and harmony after everybody becomes Chinese  or, in 
modern Chinese terminology, becomes Huaxia华夏 or Han  汉. 
 
 But narratives like Holcombes beg numerous questions for scholars like me 
who are interested in the history of ethnicity in China. Just what do concepts like 
ethnic Chinese or Han Chinese actually mean? What lines of ethnic distinction 
were there, and how exactly do ethnic groups disappear and become Chinese as a 
result of intermarriage  does the child of a mixed marriage naturally reject the non-
Chinese identity of one of its parents, and thereby become indistinguishable from 
its Chinese relatives? What was the distinctly Chinese identity, what adjustment 
did China have to make to it, and how many such adjustments have there been? 
These questions are seldom addressed by historians working on the Eastern Zhou or 
Fragmentation period, largely because the analytical tools for answering them are 
absent  there is as yet no generally recognized analytical framework for studying the 
nature and discourse of ethnic identity in ancient China, and historians tend to proceed 
based on personal or traditional assumptions about what is Chinese (or Huaxia or Han) 
and what is not.3 At the very beginning of this dissertation, therefore, it is necessary to 
clarify what I mean by China and Chinese, as opposed to what other historians 
may mean, and explain why ethnicity has much to do with it. 
 
 
                                                
3 For definitions of the concept of ethnicity and assessments of its applicability to ancient history, see 
Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 16-20; Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners, in 
Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (eds.), Empire at the Margins: Culture, 
Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 
32-35; and for a non-Chinese context, Jonathan M. Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 17-65. 
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Terminology and scope 
 In the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), any citizen is considered a Chinese 
regardless of ethnicity, and the official line is that China has been a unified multi-
ethnic country since antiquity, leading the countrys scholars to object to their 
foreign counterparts habitual use of Chinese as an ethnonym to refer exclusively to 
the Han ethnic majority that makes up over 90% of the PRC population. Because of 
these sensitivities, many scholars outside China have begun calling Chinas ethnic 
majority Han Chinese rather than just Chinese, while still resisting the demand to 
call ethnic minorities Tibetan Chinese, Uighur Chinese, and so on. In the field of 
Chinese history, some historians writing in English now use the categories Han and 
non-Han, but many others have stuck with the traditional use of Chinese (or 
ethnic Chinese) and non-Chinese.4  
 
 The crux of the problem is that Chinese does not correspond to any 
ethnonym ever used by Chinas ethnic groups  therefore, none of these ethnonyms 
should be automatically translated as Chinese. For the sake of precision, this 
dissertation eschews the use of Chinese as a label for any specific ethnic group or 
culture, and uses Chinese and China only in the general sense of the geographical 
and political territory thus designated in the present day. Chinese history thus means 
the history of that entire territorial state, and Chinese historians includes any 
historians who are citizens of it.5 North China in the dissertation title designates the 
                                                
4 For Han and non-Han, see for example Q. Edward Wang, History, Space, and Ethnicity: The 
Chinese Worldview, Journal of World History 10.2 (1999), 285-305. For ethnic Chinese and non-
Chinese, see Holcombe, Re-imagining China  in this article, Holcombe tends to shift inconsistently 
between ethnic Chinese, Han Chinese, and ethnic Han Chinese, but in later work he has generally 
used Chinese rather than Han. 
5 The term Chinese language is used in the Bibliography and Appendix, where I indicate clearly that 
the language commonly thus labelled in English is more accurately known in that language itself as the 
Zhongguo, Hua, or Han language. 
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territory covered by all or part of nine northern provinces in the PRC: Gansu, Shaanxi, 
Ningxia, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, and western and central Inner 
Mongolia. Eastern Inner Mongolia (including the Greater Khingan Mountains and 
Western Liao River), Xinjiang, Qinghai, Jilin, and Heilongjiang never came under 
direct rule of the Western Han (206 BCAD 8) and Eastern Han (AD 25-220) empires 
or the Northern Dynasties (399-581)6, and were only fully incorporated into a Chinese 
empire under the Qing regime (1636-1911). These areas are technically part of north 
China today, but play no significant part in this dissertations historical discussion and 
are therefore excluded from the category north China. For the sake of reader 
accessibility, I will generally refer to geographical regions in terms of present-day 
provinces of the PRC, with a few major exceptions. However, the reader should note 
that provincial and supra-provincial regions bore numerous different names in the 
period under study, very few of which bear any similarity to the present provinces. 
 
 This dissertation explores the nature of ethnicity in that part of north China 
that was known as Zhongguo 中国 (the central state, often loosely translated as 
Middle Kingdom) during a 1,350-year period from the beginning of Eastern Zhou in 
770 BC to the end of the Northern Zhou regime in AD 581.7  This was a formative 
period in the development of concepts of ethnicity in north China, and deserves much 
more attention in that area than it has so far received. But since 1,350 years is a very 
large segment of historical time to analyze, my longue durée approach will be centred 
                                                
6 Many historians place the beginning of the Northern Dynasties at either 386, when the Northern Wei 
regime is founded, or 439, when it conquers the last of its rivals in north China. I favour the alternative 
date of 399, when the Northern Wei king declares himself an emperor and thus officially founds an 
imperial dynasty. 
7 Although the Age of Fragmentation is conventionally seen as ending in 589 with the conquest of the 
southern Chen regime (557-589) by the northern Sui regime (581-618), in the north China context it 
technically ends in 581 when Sui replaces Northern Zhou (557-581), the last of the Northern Dynasties. 
I have therefore chosen to end my study at that year. 
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on ethnic concepts and discourses, bringing specific historical events into the analysis 
only where they either have an impact on or reflect the influence of these concepts 
and discourses. 
Literature review 
The sinification/sinicization framework 
 Most twentieth-century historiography on ethnic groups in ancient Chinese 
history has had as its central narrative the supposed phenomenon of numerous peoples 
being completely absorbed by the larger and more culturally advanced ethnic group 
now known as Han Chinese. Historians writing in English commonly use either 
sinification or sinicization to refer to this phenomenon, and more generally to any 
process by which originally non-Chinese people or ideas adopt enough 
characteristically Chinese cultural elements to qualify to be called Chinese.8 They 
also use these terms to translate the concepts of ethnic assimilation known in 
contemporary Chinese historiography as Huahuà华化 (becoming Hua) or Hanhuà
汉化 (becoming Han). 
 
 The discourse of sinification/sinicization and Huahuà/Hanhuà originated in 
the Republic of China (ROC) in the early twentieth century, and tended to be driven 
by the needs of national historiography and ethnic pride under a new, Han-
dominated nation-state: Ethnically Han historians used it to explain the continuity of 
Chinese (i.e. Han/Hua) civilization despite periods of foreign rule under 
barbarian invaders (most recently the Manchus of the Qing regime), and it became a 
truism that the Han always ultimately assimilate (tonghuà 同化 ) their culturally 
                                                
8 The French and German versions are sinisation and sinisierung. In English-language scholarship, 
the choice between sinification and sinicization (or sinicisation, for British historians) seems to be 
an entirely personal and arbitrary one made by the historian. I use the term sinification in this 
dissertation, except when quoting historians who used sinicization/sinicisation instead. 
6 
 
inferior conquerors in a triumph of civilization over barbarism. Such ideas found a 
ready audience in European sinologists, themselves deeply enthralled by Chinas 
Han cultural traditions; they also spread across the oceans and took root in the fast-
growing field of United States scholarship on Chinese history.  
 
 But in the 1970s, two US scholars studying non-Chinese regimes (or 
conquest dynasties) in Chinese history began using relatively new social sciences 
concepts of ethnicity to question the term sinification/sinicization. John Dardess 
noted that sinification implies the loss of national or linguistic identity by a 
sinified people, and argued that while the Mongol elite of the Yuan regime (1206-
1368) were Confucianized in terms of ethical and political behaviour, they never 
lost their identity as Mongols and were therefore never sinified.9 Ruth Dunnell, 
reviewing Tao Jing-shens The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of 
Sinicization, complained that Tao had failed to break out of the bonds of traditional 
attitudes towards barbarians and sinicization, and advance some fresh and long 
overdue new perspectives on this issue, and [did] not provide the conceptual tools 
with which to analyze and explore the various contradictory trends subsumed by the 
convenient catch-all term of sinicization. Dunnell essentially meant that Taos 
analysis of the Jurchen-ruled Jīn regime (1115-1234) proceeded from the simplistic 
assumption that barbarian rulers in China inevitably got converted to Chinese 
cultural norms and ways of life on account of the inherent superiority of Chinese 
civilization, without giving these rulers credit for a pragmatic use of Chinese 
                                                
9 John W. Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yuan China (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 2-3. Dardess was a professor at the University of Kansas, 
specializing in Yuan history; he later switched to Ming history. 
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elements to enhance their political control.10 A year later, Dardess made very similar 
comments in another critical review of Taos book, emphasizing that there was no 
concrete evidence for Taos assertion that the Jurchen were almost completely 
assimilated by the Chinese in ethnic and cultural terms, and taking issue with Taos 
borrowing of a definition for assimilation that did not fit the Jurchen case at all.11  
 
 Nearly ten years later, Peter Bol followed up on these complaints in an 
influential article about the Jīn regime: 
We need to distinguish the adoption of the institutions and value structures of 
imperial government from the social transformation of the Jurchens as an 
ethnic group originally distinct from the Hans. Sinicization obscures this 
distinction and is thus of questionable analytic value. Maintaining a separate 
identity based on ethnicity could be politically viable, even if many Jurchens 
adopted Han language and customs. 
Bol acknowledged that Dardess distinction between sinification and 
Confucianization was crucial, but proposed a different term for the Jurchen policy 
of adopting imperial institutions, sharing literati culture, and patronizing the literati  
wen 文 (civil order or civilization). Jurchen rulers could claim to be wen 
(participants in civil culture) without sacrificing their separate Jurchen identity and 
prerogatives.12 
 
                                                
10 Ruth Dunnell, Book Review: The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization, Sung 
Studies Newsletter 13 (1977), 77-81. Dunnell was at this time a doctoral candidate at Princeton 
University, working on the Tangut-ruled Western Xia regime (1032-1227).  
11 John Dardess, Book Review: The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization, The 
Journal of Asian Studies 37.2 (1978), 329-330. 
12 Peter K. Bol, Seeking Common Ground: Han Literati Under Jurchen Rule, Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, 47.2 (1987), 483-493. 
8 
 
 Bol did not continue working on the Jurchen and, in the 1990s, the spotlight of 
the academic movement against the sinification/sinicization paradigm shifted to 
studies of the Qing regime. In 1990, Pamela Crossley combined her pioneering work 
on Manchu-language documents with a seminal critique of the ethnocentric 
assumptions underlying beliefs in barbarian sinification, arguing that under the Qing 
regime Manchu identity not only survived but strengthened over time.13 Crossleys 
approach developed into the trend of New Qing History, including important works 
by herself, Evelyn S. Rawski, James Millward, and Mark C. Elliott in 1996-2001.14 
These scholars generally argued that far from being conquered by the irresistible 
charisma of Chinese civilization, the Manchus preserved their own culture and 
identity while deftly employing Han/Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan traditions to 
govern a multi-ethnic empire. Naomi Standen, a young specialist on the Khitan-ruled 
Liao regime (907-1125), was also inspired by Crossleys work to write a long review 
article in 1997 criticizing the persistence of sinicisation theory and entrenched 
assumptions in the recently-published Cambridge History of China volume on Liao, 
Western Xia, Jīn, and Yuan, and perceptively noting the main problem was that the 
fact that sinicisation theory creates a thought-structure in which the Chinese can 
always win is an obvious and continuing attraction, not only to the Chinese of the 
present, but also to some non-Chinese scholars.15 
                                                
13 Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 223-228; Thinking About Ethnicity in Early 
Modern China, Late Imperial China 11.1 (1990), 1-35. 
14 Crossley: The Manchus (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997); A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity 
in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). Rawski: 
Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History, Journal of Asian 
Studies 55.4 (1996), 827-850; The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). Millward: Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, 
and Empire in Qing Xinjiang (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). Elliott: The Manchu 
Way.  
15 Naomi Standen, Alien Regimes and Mental States  Review Article: Cambridge History of China, 
vol. 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 




 Opportunities to bring the critique of sinification theory to earlier periods of 
Chinese history were wasted by a lack of scholars willing to take up the issue. Edwin 
Pulleyblank, the only Western historian writing extensively on early Chinese ethnic 
groups in the 1980s and 1990s, focused largely on their linguistic affinities and 
avoided the theoretical aspects of ethnicity, subscribing to a simplistic linguistic 
version of the sinification framework in which ethnic assimilation naturally results 
after non-Chinese adopt the Chinese language and written script. 16  Charles 
Holcombe, who has written on Chinese identity in the Fragmentation, Sui, and Tang 
(618-907) periods, relies almost unquestioningly on the work of Chinese historians 
who followed the Hanhuà framework  as we saw at the beginning of this chapter.17 
David Honey, the only scholar specializing in the barbarian-ruled regimes of fourth-
century north China, has also shown no interest in breaking out of the sinification 
paradigm. In response to Dardess and Bol, Honey tried to refine the sinification model 
into two types: sinification as legitimation (the expedient and selective use of 
Chinese cultural and political institutions by non-Chinese rulers), and sinification as 
acculturation (the irresistible conversion of nomadic conquerors to Chinese culture). 
But he maintained that the only difference lay in initial motivation, not actual 
process: In the end, nomad conquerors either have to sinify and hence be absorbed, 
exterminate the population in order to survive as an integral alien culture, or be 
themselves exterminated.18 
                                                
16 See the articles collected in Edwin G. Pulleyblank, Central Asia and Non-Chinese Peoples of Ancient 
China (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002). 
17 Holcombe, Re-imagining China, 1-14; The Genesis of East Asia, 221 BC-AD 907 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2001). In the latter work, Holcombe even presents sinification as a meta-
narrative for the history of East Asia as a whole  i.e., China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. 
18 David B. Honey, Stripping Off Felt and Fur: An Essay on Nomadic Sinification (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1992); Sinification as Statecraft in 





 The sole exceptions to this state of affairs were in the field of Northern 
Dynasties history, but even here a breakthrough proved just beyond reach. The 
Australian Jennifer Holmgren, whose research in 1989-1996 was building up to a 
major challenge to the sinificationist understanding of the Northern Wei (386-556) 
regime, chose at that crucial moment to leave the historical profession.19 Cheng Chin-
jen, a Taiwanese historian whose 1976 book on the structure of Northern Wei 
government was refreshingly iconoclastic in its criticisms of the ethnocentric Hanhuà 
paradigm, has not produced any significant research since and has instead retired and 
turned to politics, serving as a historical consultant to the pro-independence 
movement of Lee Teng-hui. 20  Albert Dien, the foremost US expert on Northern 
Dynasties history in the 1990s, made a tentative movement away from the sinification 
paradigm in 1991 by urging scholars not to see the Xianbi鲜卑 rulers of the Northern 
Dynasties only in terms of an inevitable progress toward assimilation, toward 
acculturation, and instead to remain sensitive to their role in the history of China 
and their contribution to that amalgam, that complex we know as Chinese culture. 
Unfortunately, Diens call came just two years before his retirement from active 
academic work, and attracted little attention from younger colleagues.21 
                                                
19 Jennifer Holmgren, Northern Wei as a Conquest Dynasty: Current Perceptions, Past Scholarship, 
Papers on Far Eastern History 40 (1989), 1-50; The Composition of the Early Wei Bureaucratic Elite 
as Background to the Emperor Kao-tsus Reforms (423-490 AD), Journal of Asian History 27.2 
(1993), 109-175; Race and Class in Fifth Century China: The Emperor Kao-tsus Marriage Reform, 
Early Medieval China 2 (1995-1996), 86-117. Holmgren is now a civil servant in Australias 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
20 Cheng Chin-jen, Beiwei guanliao jigou yanjiu (Taipei: Mutong, 1976). 
21  Albert Dien, A New Look at the Xianbei and their Impact on Chinese Culture, in George 
Kuwayama (ed.), Ancient Mortuary Traditions of China: Papers on Chinese Ceramic Funerary 
Sculptures (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1991), 40-59. Xianbi is usually 
rendered as Xianbei in modern historiography, but the case for bi being a more accurate pronunciation 
than bei rests on the fact that the word Xianbi was also transliterated as Xipi and Shibi in early Chinese 
texts. Pulleyblank has reconstructed the original pronunciation as Särbi, and Pearce follows this, but 
Shiratori Kurakichi earlier reconstructed it as Saibi/Sabi. See Liu Xueyao, Xianbi shilun (Taipei: 




 Furthermore, sinification/sinicization still has its champions. In 1998 Ho 
Ping-ti wrote a scathing rebuttal to a 1996 speech by Rawski in which she had 
identified him as a proponent of the obsolete sinification theory. Hos piece, which 
was also directed against Crossleys ideas, insisted that sinification is a long, 
complex, and unending process by which non-Chinese peoples come to identify with 
Chinese norms of behaviour and patterns of thought, notably Confucianism. 
Naturally, Eastern Zhou and the Northern Dynasties figured extensively in his 
narrative of sinification. He also held that sinification did not require the loss of other 
identities, and accused Rawski (and by extension Crossley) of positing a false 
dichotomy between being Manchu and becoming Chinese. Hos point about the false 
dichotomy is a central one in this debate, but most of his arguments were loaded with 
ethnocentric and nationalistic baggage (such as an emphasis on the large-
heartedness of Chinese civilization), and failed to define just what Chineseness 
means  an ethnicity or a supra-ethnic cultural identity?22 
 
 Another major critic of Crossley and Rawski has been the anthropologist John 
Shepherd, who in 1993 (and again in 2003) argued that they were exaggerating the 
amount of ethnocentrism involved in the use of the term sinicization, as well as 
imposing a crude and narrow definition of the term that centres on identity change.23 
Shepherds analytical framework, used mostly on studying the history of Taiwanese 
                                                                                                                                       
of Tai: The origins, evolutions, and historical significance of a community of the Inner Asian Frontier, 
in E.H. Kaplan and D.W. Whisenhunt (eds.), Opuscula Altaica: Essays presented in honor of Henry 
Schwarz (Bellingham, WA: Center for East Asian Studies, 1994), 467. 
22 Ping-ti Ho, In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawskis Reenvisioning the Qing, 
The Journal of Asian Studies 57.1 (1998), 123-155. 
23 John R. Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 362-363, 520-521; Rethinking Sinicization: Processes of 
Acculturation and Assimilation, in Bien Chiang and Ho Ts'ui-p'ing (eds.), State, Market and Ethnic 
Groups Contextualized (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinicia, 2003), 133-150. 
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aboriginal tribes, includes some anthropological concepts that may offer a way out of 
the impasse created by historians inability to agree on what sinification/sinicization 
entails.    
 
The anthropological framework 
 Since the 1930s, the field of anthropology has generally studied ethnic change 
through the framework of three related concepts: acculturation, assimilation, and 
amalgamation. Acculturation is any process by which two or more groups become 
more culturally similar, assimilation is the process by which individuals or groups 
give up their own ethnic identity for another, and amalgamation is the process by 
which two groups are biologically and/or perceptually merged into one through 
intermarriage. Assimilation is the most widely known of these three concepts and has 
clearly been the most controversial, largely due to the ethnically mixed nature of US 
society. Perhaps as a result of such controversy, at least two noted anthropologists 
have tried to reconceptualize assimilation in a way that avoids its emotive 
association with the erasing of ethnic identities. Banton prefers to define 
assimilation in the same way as acculturation  a preference that Holcombe 
adopted.24 Yinger defines assimilation broadly as a process of boundary reduction 
between societies, ethnic groups, or smaller social groups, and sees acculturation 
and amalgamation as subprocesses of assimilation. He proposes two other 
subprocesses: Identification, which is the process of identity change usually termed 
                                                
24 Michael Banton, The Direction and Speed of Ethnic Change, in Charles F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic 
Change (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 32-33; Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 
139. Honey also chooses to understand assimilation as being synonymous to acculturation, 
without explaining why  Honey, Stripping off Felt and Fur, 5n. 
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assimilation, and integration, the process by which ones ethnic origin becomes 
irrelevant to ones social status and interaction with society.25  
 
 Using Yingers framework of subprocesses, we can see that most 
sinificationist historiography depicts sinification/sinicization as a linear progression of 
acculturation!assimilation/identification!integration!amalgamation. The main 
criticism against this is that ethnic groups like Manchus and Jurchen are described as 
sinified when they were really only at the acculturation stage, based on the 
assumption that acculturation inevitably leads to assimilation and amalgamation. As 
early as 1949, Wittfogel and Feng argued that the assimilation stage (which they 
called absorption) never occurred during the rule of a conquest dynasty because 
the rulers perpetuated their dominance by keeping acculturation at a controlled level.26 
Furthermore, the linear model is itself flawed: Yinger points out that one subprocess 
does not necessarily lead on to another  the subprocesses are interdependent but 
separate, they can occur in different orders (or simultaneously) and to different extents, 
and each is reversible.27  
 
 Crossleys approach is to dismiss the need for a word like sinicization when 
less ethnocentric and ideologically-loaded terms like acculturation and 
assimilation are available. 28  Shepherd, on the other hand, prefers to retain 
sinicization as a specific term for acculturative processes in which a non-Chinese 
                                                
25 J. Milton Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 1994), 38-41, 68-69. 
26 Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society  Liao (907-1125) (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1949), 4-16. 
27 Yinger, Ethnicity, 69. 
28 Mote makes a similar case for acculturation being more suitable than sinification in describing 
Khitan cultural change under the Liao regime  see F.W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 42-44. 
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group adopts elements of the Chinese culture with which it is in contact, while 
stripping it of any relation to identity change (assimilation) as well as any assumptions 
about why and which Chinese cultural elements are adopted. 29  Melissa Brown, 
another anthropologist studying Taiwanese aborigines, has advocated separating the 
ethnocentric conception of sinicization from the processes Shepherd uses the term to 
describe, by relabeling these processes as the phenomenon of becoming Chinese. 
But Brown still reached a familiar quandary eventually: Is becoming Chinese a 
change in culture or a change in ethnic identity? Her original answer  that the two 
kinds of change are interdependent but have no direct causal relationship  was 
equivocal because she, too, could not decide if acculturation without assimilation 
constitutes becoming Chinese. 30  But in her more recent work, Brown provides 
ethnographic evidence of Taiwanese aborigines who became culturally Han but 
failed to achieve assimilation to Han ethnic identity because they did not practice 
footbinding, and thereby implies that acculturation alone was not sufficient for them 
to cross the border to Han. She now also argues that Han ethnic identity and 
Chinese national identity should not be conflated into a notion of Chinese ethnic 
identity or Chinese culture, and the concept of becoming Chinese (as opposed to 
becoming Han) has therefore become irrelevant to her.31 
 
 Browns recent studies of ethnic identity in southwestern Hubei seem to have 
led her to the realization that while sinicization and Chinese may be convenient 
terms to use in writing about Taiwanese aborigines who can relatively easily be called 
                                                
29 Shepherd, Rethinking Sinicization, 133. 
30 Melissa J. Brown, On Becoming Chinese, in Melissa J. Brown (ed.), Negotiating Ethnicities in 
China and Taiwan (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1996), 41-43. 
31 Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?  The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing 
Identities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 1, 22-34, 91-94; see also her Ethnic 
Identity, Cultural Variation, and Processes of Change: Rethinking the Insights of Standardization and 
Orthopraxy, Modern China 33.1 (2007), 91-124. 
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non-Chinese (notwithstanding the probable objections from PRC nationalists), they 
are a world of trouble for historians writing about ethnic groups in mainland China. If 
ethnic identity is the determinant of Chineseness, then which kind of self-
identification should be translated as Chinese? Conversely, if Chineseness is 
determined by culture, then what are the defining traits of Chinese culture and must 
all of these traits be adopted for a person to become Chinese? Even if answers to 
these questions could be found for the case of Taiwan, it would be unwise to assume 
that they apply in all regions of China and throughout history. For this reason, I agree 
with Crossley that the discourse of sinification/sinicization has prevented a more 
rigorous analysis of ethnic identity in Chinese history, and should be discarded in 
favour of the anthropological lexicon. Although, as mentioned earlier, there is no 
complete consensus over the definition of assimilation, I have chosen to follow the 
standard anthropological understanding of the assimilation process as a change in 
ethnic identity, rather than the redefinitions by Banton and Yinger. 
 
 The only historian to apply anthropological theories of ethnicity to ancient 
Chinese ethnic groups in any concerted manner has been the Harvard-trained 
Taiwanese Wang Ming-ke. Since the 1990s, Wang has been developing a theoretical 
model in which Chinese (Huaxia or Han) identity historically expanded to its 
present extent through the efforts of frontier peoples to seek social advantage by 
claiming legendary Chinese ancestors and thereby assimilating into the Chinese 
ethnic group.32 Wangs model works like a watered-down version of the sinification 
paradigm, but is equally flawed in resting solely on the unproven assumption that 
claiming a Chinese ancestor invariably leads to ethnic assimilation - I will examine 
                                                
32 Wang Ming-ke, Huaxia bianyuan: Lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong (Taipei: Yunchen, 1997); Yingxiong 
zuxian yu dixiong minzu: Genji lishi de wenben yu qingjing (Taipei: Yunchen, 2006). 
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this problem further in Chapter 5. Wang, like many other historians, also perceives 
Huaxia and Han as ethnonyms originating in Eastern Zhou and the Han empires 
respectively  a misconception that I will attempt to refute in Chapters 2 and 5. 
 
The Chinese Marxist framework of minzu ronghe 
 Since the 1980s, PRC historians writing about ethnic change in ancient 
Chinese history have used the term Hanhuà interchangeably with the more politically-
correct amalgamation of nationalities (minzu ronghe 民族融合). Minzu, usually 
translated as nationality or nation in English, is derived from the Russian concept 
of nation, natsiya, and usually defined according to four criteria set by Stalin in 
1913. Stalin defined a nation as having a common language, a common territory, a 
common economic life, and a common culture; he also held that nations were a 
product of capitalism, and pre-capitalist (i.e. slave and feudal) societies only had 
peoples (narodnost). While the Soviet Union later retreated from this strict definition 
and used the category narodnost, not natsiya, to classify its ethnic groups33, the PRC 
chose to stick to Stalins criteria in the 1950s and classify Chinas ethnic groups as 
minzu. This stirred up a big debate among historians: The influential Fan Wenlan 
argued in 1954 that the Han people had been a minzu since the Qin and Han empires, 
while other historians insisted that the Han were only a buzu 部族 (the Chinese 
translation for narodnost) before the Opium War brought capitalism to China. 34 
Eventually, a compromise was reached. Peoples in pre-capitalist China could be 
                                                
33 Nation and Nationality, in Encyclopedia of Russian History, at 
http://www.answers.com/topic/nation-and-nationality (accessed 11 May 2007). 
34 Fan Wenlan, Zi Qinhan qi Zhongguo chengwei tongyi guojia de yuanyin, Lishi yanjiu 1954(3), 22-
36; for the counter-arguments, see Lishi Yanjiu Bianjibu (ed.), Han minzu xingcheng wenti taolunji 
(Beijing: Sanlian, 1957). 
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called either buzu or gudai minzu (ancient nations), while peoples in the capitalist 
and socialist stage were xiandai minzu (modern nations).  
 
 During the buzu-minzu debate, Fan Wenlan asserted that the Han nation grew 
to its present size by amalgamating (ronghe) all its conquerors, from the Xianbi to 
the Manchus.35 Tang Changru also began using the term ronghe alongside Hanhuà 
and tonghuà in his influential 1955-1956 articles on Fragmentation-period ethnic 
groups and the Northern Wei regime. Tangs ronghe referred to the assimilation of 
different ancient buzu to a common identity and culture, and he argued that various 
buzu like the Xiongnu and Jie were gradually ronghe into the Xianbi before the 
Xianbi were themselves completely ronghe or tonghuà into the Han people (i.e. 
Hanhuà) under the Sui empire. He stuck cautiously to the then-official line that in 
ancient China there were only buzu, not minzu, but also tentatively introduced the 
term minzu da ronghe (great amalgamation of nationalities) at the end of his 1956 
article Tuobazu de Hanhuà  guocheng (The sinification process of the Tuoba 
people).36  
 
 Ma Changshou, a specialist on ancient Chinese ethnic groups, followed Tangs 
terminology in his books on the Wuwan/Wuhuan, Xianbi, and Xiongnu peoples, 
although gudai minzu had become an acceptable term by this time (1962). He 
alternated erratically between buzu and minzu, and used both ronghe and Hanhuà as 
well as tonghuà.37 Ma clearly came to see minzu ronghe as a central principle for 
studying ethnic change in history, but he reframed the concept in Marxist terms by 
                                                
35 Fan, Zi Qinhan qi, 36. 
36 Tang Changru, Weijin zahu kao and Tuobazu de Hanhuà guocheng, in Weijin Nanbeichao 
shiluncong (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu, 2000), 368-432, 587-612. 




asserting that the most basic law of minzu ronghe was that economically 
backward (i.e. nomadic) peoples should adopt the economic life of a more 
economically advanced (i.e. agrarian) people.38 
 
 However, the confirmation of minzu ronghe as a paradigm in PRC 
historiography would have to wait another 20 years, because the Cultural Revolution 
soon made it impossible for any historian to focus on ethnicity rather than class 
struggle. Historians were finally able to reintroduce ethnicity to their analyses in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, and again chose to use Tang Changrus analytical framework as 
a guideline. Through the influence of Huang Lie, Feng Junshi, Miao Yue, Zhu Dawei, 
Wan Shengnan, and Wang Zhongluo, all of whom were specialists in Fragmentation-
period history, minzu ronghe was quickly accepted as the standard non-ethnocentric 
euphemism for what was commonly seen as the acculturative process by which 
various minzu were assimilated into a Han ethnic identity throughout Chinese 
history.39  Hanhuà and tonghuà were still used, but sparingly to avoid giving the 
impression that the government was promoting the forced assimilation of minority 
minzu to a Han identity. Huang Lie, in a 1985 article, took care to differentiate 
between forced assimilation and voluntary assimilation, and to emphasize that 
Hanhuà in Chinese history was mainly of the latter kind.40  
 
                                                
38 Ma, Wuhuan yu Xianbi, 4-5. 
39 Important works by these authors that used the term minzu ronghe include: Huang Lie, Guanyu 
Qianqin zhengquan de minzu xingzhi, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 1979(1) ; Weijin Nanbeichao minzu 
guanxi de jige lilun wenti, Lishi yanjiu 1985(3); Feng Junshi, Jin Nanbeichao shiqi beifang de minzu 
ronghe, Jilin Daxue xuebao 1978(1); Miao Yue, Luetan Wuhu Shiliuguo yu Beichao shiqi de minzu 
guanxi, in Zhongguo Weijin Nanbeichao Shixuehui (ed.), Weijin Nanbeichao shi yanjiu (Chengdu: 
Sichuansheng Shehuikexueyuan, 1986); Zhu Dawei, Nanchao shaoshu minzu gaikuang jiqi yu Hanzu 
de ronghe, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 1980(1); Wan Shengnan, Weijin Nanbeichao shilungao (Hefei: Anhui 
Jiaoyu, 1983); Wang Zhongluo, Weijin Nanbeichao shi (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin, 1980). 
40 Huang, Weijin Nanbeichao minzu guanxi; 86-99. 
19 
 
 But Huang Lie also noticed a serious contradiction between the usage of minzu 
ronghe as a synonym for Hanhuà, and its meaning in Chinese translations of 
canonical Marxist writings. Lenin wrote that an inevitable amalgamation of nations 
(ge minzu de biran ronghe) would arise from the liberation of oppressed nations and 
their receiving the right of self-determination. Stalin, probably to forestall ethnic 
separatism in the Soviet Union, later clarified that Lenin meant that the erasing of 
national differences (minzu chabie xiaowang) and amalgamation of nations would 
take place only after the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established all over 
the world. This was obviously a different process from the minzu ronghe of Hanhuà, 
but Huang Lie justified the PRC usage by arguing that tonghuà could not fully 
encapsulate the process by which the Han assimilated other peoples but might also 
adopt some minor elements of their culture.41 In other words, Huang was defining 
minzu ronghe as People A absorbing Peoples B and C and becoming People A(bc). 
From an anthropological perspective this logic is flawed, since the adoption of the 
identity A by Peoples B and C is a matter of assimilation, while People As adoption 
of the cultural elements (b) and (c) could be a completely separate matter of 
acculturation. But PRC scholars, having no training in non-Marxist anthropological 
concepts, have tended to perceive cultural hybridization as just a by-product of the 
initial stages of assimilation, rather than a process in its own right. 
 
 Today, minzu ronghe remains the orthodox framework for all PRC analyses of 
ethnic acculturation and assimilation in pre-modern Chinese history, much like 
sinification was in English-language scholarship before the 1990s. This has 
prevented PRC historians from borrowing useful concepts from Western 




anthropology, such as ethnic group and acculturation - translated as zuqun 族群
and hánhua 涵化 respectively.42 As a result, PRC scholarship on ancient Chinese 
history is generally characterized by an inability to analyze ethnic relations creatively 
and rigorously. Perhaps most disconcerting is the continued reliance on the Marxist 
canon to justify the correctness of sinificationist thinking. Marx and Engels had a 
relatively unsophisticated understanding of ethnicity, but two of their pronouncements 
on barbarism and civilization have become cornerstones of the Hanhuà/minzu ronghe 
approach to conquest dynasties. One of them is from Engels Anti-Dühring (1877-
78): [I]n the immense majority of cases where the conquest is permanent, the more 
barbarian conqueror has to adapt himself to the higher economic situation as it 
emerges from the conquest; he is assimilated by the vanquished and in most cases he 
has even to adopt their language. The second is Marxs comment in The Future 
Results of British Rule in India (1853): Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had 
successively overrun India, soon became Hindooized, the barbarian conquerors being, 
by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their 
subjects.43 Since Marx himself described the civilizing of barbarians as an eternal 
law of history, Marxist sinificationist historians could confidently pronounce 
Hanhuà to be an inevitable process independent of human will.44 
 
Research questions 
 In light of the three frameworks reviewed above, it seems to me that 
sinification/sinicization and minzu ronghe are both deeply flawed concepts, and only 
                                                
42 On differences between the concepts ethnic group and minzu, see the debate between Li Shaoming 
and Stevan Harrell: Li Shaoming, Cong Zhongguo Yizu de rentong tan zuti lilun  Yu Hao Rui 
(Stevan Harrell) jiaoshou shangque, Minzu yanjiu 2002(2), 31-38; Hao Rui/Stevan Harrell, Zaitan 
minzu yu zuqun  Huiying Li Shaoming jiaoshou, Minzu yanjiu 2002(6), 36-40. Also Hao Shiyuan, 
Ethnos (minzu) he Ethnic Group (zuqun) de zaoqi hanyi yu yingyong, Minzu yanjiu 2002(4), 1-10. 
43 New-York Daily Tribune, August 8, 1853. 
44 For example Wang, Weijin Nanbeichao shi, 617.  
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the anthropological method of analysis shows promise of providing a more accurate 
understanding of ethnicity in Chinese history. However, a major weakness that has 
prevented anthropologists from writing credibly about ancient China is their 
inadequate command of ancient source material and resultant reliance on dubious 
secondary sources.45 Thus any thorough anthropology-based analysis of the 770 BC  
AD 581 period would benefit much from a more careful study of what that periods 
texts reveal about ideas of ethnic identity and ethnic difference, with some 
anthropological concepts applied to correct past misconceptions created by inaccurate 
or subjective ethnocentric readings of these texts. This dissertation is intended as such 
a study, and has been written with the following key research questions in mind: 
1) Chinese, Huaxia, and Han are frequently used as ethnic categories in the analysis 
of ancient Chinese history, but is this usage historically accurate? 
2) If not, how did the ethnic majority in north China identify itself in relation to other 
ethnic groups between 770 BC and AD 581? 
3) Was there any significant change in the nature of that ethnic identity, and if so, 
when and why? 
4) Is there any reliable textual evidence of the majority ethnic identity being adopted 










                                                
45 A notable example, which has remained influential despite its serious flaws, is Thomas J. Barfield, 
The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
Barfields reliance on the inaccurate and highly sinificationist work of Wolfram Eberhard, Gerhardt 





The Eastern Zhou Worldview: Zhongguo, Tianxia, and the Barbarians 
 
Zhongguo/Zhuxia as the centre of the civilized world 
 The name Zhongguo is today synonymous with the entire state known 
internationally as China, mainly because the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1616-
1911) regimes both used it to refer to their vast empires; the ROC and PRC then 
inherited sovereignty over much of the Qing empires territory, as well as the usage of 
Zhongguo as a label for it.46 However, the concept of Zhongguo in the period 770 BC 
 AD 581 only included a part of north China  specifically, the lower alluvial 
floodplain of the Yellow River in present-day Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. 
This fact is well known to Chinese historians, but the interests of national 
historiography have forced many of them to support a perception that from antiquity 
there was also a Greater Zhongguo - or, in ROC and PRC terminology, a Zhonghua 
nation (Zhonghua minzu 中华民族) - encompassing the maximum extent of the Qing 
empire, with numerous ethnic groups unified by cultural and economic interactions 
and, occasionally, a common government. In this way, the current China can be 
legitimized as an organic nation-state, rather than a product of imperial aggression and 
expansionism.47   
 
 In fact, a concept slightly similar to Greater Zhongguo did exist in ancient 
times but was called Tianxia 天下 (All under Heaven), and included all regions that 
                                                
46 Gang Zhao, Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National 
Identity in the Early Twentieth Century, Modern China 32.1 (2006), 3-30. Zhaos insightful argument 
is marred slightly by his confusing use of the italicized China to translate Zhongguo, and his failure to 
recognize the geography-based nature of the original Zhongguo concept. 
47 For a recent study of early ROC discourse on the Zhonghua minzu, see James Leibold, Competing 
Narratives of Racial Unity in Republican China: From the Yellow Emperor to Peking Man, Modern 
China 32.1 (2006), 181-220. For a typical statement of the Greater Zhongguo doctrine, see Tan 
Qixiang, Lishishang de Zhongguo he Zhongguo lidai jiangyu, in Changshiui cuibian (Shijiazhuang: 
Hebei Jiaoyu, 2000), 3-22. 
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had ever been civilized (huà 化, literally transformed) by the enlightened rule of a 
Son of Heaven (tianzi 天子)  a sage-king (dì 帝) or emperor (huangdì 皇帝) with a 
divine mandate to rule and bring order to the world through his superior virtue. 
Between the first and eighteenth centuries AD, Tianxia tended to be defined according 
to the maximum boundaries of the Western Han empire, not including its protectorate 
in Xinjiang - this civilized world was therefore centered on Zhongguo but extended 
far beyond it, roughly equivalent to how the Roman empires Oikoumene concept was 
centered on Rome but included all lands under civilized Roman rule. 
 
 The concept of Zhongguo as the centre of Tianxia is enshrined in the classics 
of Confucianism dating from the Eastern Zhou period (770-256 BC), which began 
when the royal court of the Zhou kingdom (c. 1046-256 BC) was driven from Hao 
(west of present-day Xian, Shaanxi) to Luoyi (Luoyang, Henan) by western Rong 
barbarians. Prior to 770 BC, the Zhou heartland was the Wei River valley in Shaanxi, 
later known as Guanzhong 关中 ([land] within the passes), and Zhongguo was just 
a label for the former territory of the Shang kingdom (c. 1600  c. 1046 BC), which 
the Zhou king Ji Fa had conquered nearly three centuries before. The Eastern Zhou 
court, having lost Guanzhong to the Rong and moved to Zhongguo, began identifying 
its entire kingdom as Zhongguo  a practice that spread to its increasingly autonomous 
feudal states in Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. 48  These states also called 
themselves Zhuxia 诸夏(the various Xia [states]), a name apparently originating 
from the fact that during its war against Shang, the Zhou kingdom had presented itself 
                                                
48 Chen Zhi, Yixia xinbian, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 2004(1), 3-22. An alternative explanation, based 
purely on etymology, identifies the original Zhongguo as the royal domain of the Zhou king in 
Guanzhong - see Chun-shu Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1: Nation, State, and 
Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.-A.D. 8 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 
293. Having considered the textual evidence Chen raises, I find his explanation more convincing. 
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as an heir of the Xia kingdom (c. 2070  c. 1600 BC) as a way of strengthening its 
political and cultural legitimacy.49 Zhongguo and Zhuxia, as well as the composite 
term Zhongxia中夏, thus became labels for all the territory that remained under the 
nominal rule of the Eastern Zhou Son of Heaven. 
 
 The state of Qin which deposed the last Zhou king, conquered six other 
surviving feudal states in 230-221 BC, and then established the first centralized 
bureaucratic empire in Chinese history, was based in Guanzhong and therefore not 
considered part of Zhongguo. Similarly, the subsequent Western Han empire also had 
its capital in Guanzhong. Yet the idea of Zhongguo centrality had taken root firmly, as 
seen from the fact that the Western Han court identified itself as Zhongguo in its 
dealings with foreign countries and peoples.50 The Han elite saw Zhongguo as the 
centre of learning, culture, and the agrarian economy, and Guanzhong as little more 
than an administrative and military headquarters. This Zhongguo-centric perspective 
was further reinforced by the Eastern Han empire, which had its capital at Luoyang 
from 25 to 190. The Qin and Western Han empires conquered south China, Vietnam, 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Liaoning, northern Korea, and the Ordos plateau and settled 
them with convicts, soldiers, and colonists, but even in late Eastern Han these regions 
                                                
49Chen, Yixia xinbian. Xia was never based in Guanzhong and had been conquered by Shang nearly 
600 years before, but the Zhou kingdoms need for legitimacy may have been especially great if, as a 
longstanding theory holds, it was itself originally one of the Rong tribes. Evidence for this, however, 
remains inconclusive. For examples of the Rong origin theory, see Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of 
Statecraft in China, Volume 1: The Western Chou Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970), 59-60, 196; Edwin G. Pulleyblank, The Chinese and Their Neighbours in Prehistoric and Early 
Historic Times, in David N. Keightley (ed.), The Origins of Chinese Civilization (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1983), 419-422; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 191-225; Zhou Weizhou, 
Zhouren, Qinren, Hanren he Hanzu, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 1995(2), 12. 
50 SJ, 100:2887-2890, 113:2967-2969, 116:2995; HS, 94b:3803-3819. Chang believes that Zhongguo 
became a name for the Han empire, that is, the name of a whole country in early Western Han, but 




were still generally perceived in Zhongguo as peripheral territories largely inhabited 
by strange and often hostile barbarian peoples. 
 
 Several alternative versions of Zhongguo, Zhuxia, and Zhongxia seem to have 
become popular sometime after the end of the Eastern Han empire.51 Some of these - 
Zhongyuan中原 (central plain), Zhongzhou中州 (central provinces), and Zhongtu
中土  (central land) - were variations on Zhongguo. Two others, Huaxia and 
Zhonghua, were derived from the use of the word Hua as a synonym for Zhongguo in 
Zuoshi Chunqiu, a classic fifth/fourth-century BC text that was very influential in the 
post-Han period.52 Huaxia and Zhonghua steadily gained popularity in elite discourse, 
and remain common synonyms for Zhongguo today - Zhonghua is the actual word for 
China in the official names of the ROC and PRC - and have therefore suffered the 
same problem of being translated as China regardless of context.  
 
 While the Eastern Zhou classics left no doubt that Zhongguo was the centre of 
Tianxia, the boundaries of Tianxia were hazier. A vague notion gradually developed 
that the world was bounded by four seas (eastern, southern, western, and northern53), 
and consisted of nine Provinces (zhou州). Various texts dating from middle to late 
Eastern Zhou claim that Yu, the founder of the Xia kingdom, was overlord of these 
Provinces by virtue of having brought peace and order to them in his earlier career as 
a flood control expert. The texts do not entirely agree on the names of the nine, but 
                                                
51 As seen from SGZ (e.g. 35:930, 36:941, 44:1067) and JS (e.g. 61:1675, 62:1694-1695, 98:2573). 
Similar examples abound in SS, SLG, and WS.  
52 On which see Chapter 3. 
53 The eastern and southern seas were the East China Sea and South China Sea respectively, but the 
identities of the two other seas are more ambiguous. The Western Han empire eventually labeled Lake 
Qinghai as the western sea and Lake Baikal as the northern sea, but by this time it was clear that there 
was still a lot of world beyond Lake Qinghai. Chang argues that Han scholars later identified the 
Persian Gulf as the western sea  see Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, 263-264. 
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they invariably cover not only Zhongguo and Guanzhong but also south China, 
Sichuan, northern Shanxi, and southern Gansu. The Provinces outside Zhongguo were 
populated by barbarians who supposedly paid a tribute of exotic items to Yu, as 
narrated in the Yugong (tributes of Yu) chapter of the Confucian classic Shangshu 
(Documents).54 Historians now generally agree that the Nine Provinces were merely a 
utopian fantasy reflecting the known world of Eastern Zhou times.55 But scholars in 
imperial China never doubted the veracity of the Nine Provinces story, and used it as 
a model of the complete Tianxia over which a Son of Heaven should hold sway.  
 
Yi/Rong/Man/Di: The mysterious barbarians  
 The Shang and Western (i.e. pre-770 BC) Zhou kingdoms both had methods 
of classifying foreigners and labeling foreign lands, but very little is now known about 
them besides names inscribed on oracle bones and bronze vessels.56 In contrast, the 
influence of the Eastern Zhou system has been perpetuated throughout Chinese 
history by virtue of its being recorded in the revered Confucian classics. In this system, 
the foreigners were morally and culturally inferior barbarians on the margins of 
Tianxia, who tended to be aggressively warlike and thus a danger to civilization if not 
kept out of Zhongguo/Zhuxia. The civilization-versus-barbarism discourse, often 
called the Hua/Yi dichotomy or Yi/Xia dichotomy (Huayi zhibian华夷之辨/Yixia 
zhibian夷夏之辨) in later Confucian texts, was particularly intense in the first two 
centuries of Eastern Zhou, when the feudal states and sometimes Luoyi itself were 
                                                
54 Shangshu, 3: Yugong. 
55 Li Xiaojie, Tiguo jingye  Lidai xingzheng quhua (Changchun: Changchun, 2004), 3-5. Gu Jiegang 
more radically suggested in 1935 that the Yugong chapter was written in early Western Han and 
reflected the legacy of Qin imperialism  see Gu Jiegang, Zhanguo Qinhanjian ren de zaowei yu 
bianwei, in Gushibian zixu (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu, 2000), 140-141. 
56 For a discussion of one such name, Xianyun, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The 




frequently attacked by barbarian tribes and kingdoms from the west, north, and south. 
Each barbarian people probably had its own spoken language, but none had a 
writing system as far as we know. We have no reliable record of what they called 
themselves, and they are known to history only by a simple though imprecise 
classification system that Eastern Zhou elites gradually developed: Western Rong戎, 
northern Di狄, southern Man蛮, and eastern Yi 夷.57 These labels were also at times 
combined in generic ways, such as Rong-Di, Man-Yi, or Yi-Di.  
  
 After the fall of Hao, western Rong tribes dominated Guanzhong, except for 
the area held by the Qin state, and also migrated into the environs of Luoyi. White Di, 
Red Di, and Mountain Rong groups occupied much of northern Shaanxi, Shanxi, and 
Hebei, and made raids into Shandong and Henan. Chu, a powerful Man kingdom in 
Hubei, also expanded into Henan, annexing some Zhou states and forcing others into 
vassalage.58  In contrast, the Yi, a group of peoples with a distinct and advanced 
material culture in Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu, were in no position to threaten 
anyone - Shang and Western Zhou armies had already invaded and subjugated most of 
them, and the numerous small Yi states left in Shandong served the local Zhou states 
of Qi and Lu as dependencies while the surviving Yi tribes in Anhui-Jiangsu had 
become vassals of Chu. The various groups of Yi occasionally rebelled against their 
overlords or warred with one another, but remained military and political 
                                                
57 Woefully little is known about the cultures of these peoples, even from archaeology. Pulleyblank 
tentatively suggests that the Rong, Man, and Yi spoke Tibeto-Burman, Miao-Yao, and Austro-Asiatic 
languages respectively, and rightly points out that the common assumption the Di spoke an Altaic 
language has no actual basis. See Pulleyblank, The Chinese and Their Neighbours, 416-442, 446-448. 
58 The main sources for these events are ZS and SJ, 110:2883. 
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lightweights.59 Ironically, their ethnonym was eventually used to represent all four 
groups as a whole, with the term Four Yi (siyi 四夷). 
 
 Conversations recorded in Zuoshi Chunqiu and Guoyu (fifth century BC) 
suggest that Eastern Zhou statesmen of the 600s and 500s BC tended to see the Rong 
and Di as jackals and wolves  insatiable pack predators with whom it was 
impossible to co-exist peacefully. 60  But by 525 BC, the major Zhou states had 
regained the upper hand, vanquishing and enslaving nearly all tribes and kingdoms of 
the Rong and Di. In the fourth century BC, as warfare between the leading Zhou states 
grew ever more intense, the greatest danger to Zhongguo was instead increasingly felt 
to be Qin, which had by far the strongest army and seemed set on pushing eastwards 
to conquer the other states. The old barbarian motif was then turned into a propaganda 
tactic: The Zhongguo states began demonizing the Qin people as having been 
culturally barbarized by living in close proximity to the Rong for centuries.61 
 
 Chu remained a major power in the south, but was increasingly accepted as 
one of the Zhou states, albeit not part of Zhongguo - this qualified acceptance was 
probably helped by the Chu elites adoption of many elements of Zhou culture, 
                                                
59 Edwin G. Pulleyblank, Zou and Lu and the Sinification of Shandong, in P.J. Ivanhoe (ed.), Chinese 
Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivision and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 39-57. A 
popular theory holds that the Shang were themselves a Yi people who defeated and conquered the Xia, 
but there is no solid evidence for this. For a recent survey of the controversy over Shang origins, see 
Zhu Yanmin, Shangzu qiyuan yanjiu zongshu, Hanxue yanjiu tongxun 24:3 (2005), 13-23. 
60 ZS, Min 1; Guoyu: Zhouyu. 
61 For changing attitudes towards Qin, as well as changes in Qin attitudes towards Zhongguo, see 
Gideon Shelach and Yuri Pines, Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity: 
Change and Continuity in the State of Qin (770-221 B.C.), in Miriam T. Stark (ed.), Archaeology of 
Asia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 202-232. For a common argument that the Qin ruling house was 
ethnically Rong in the first place, see Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 218-219. Another influential theory, 
based on the surname of the Qin rulers, holds that their ancestors were eastern Yi immigrants  see 
Luan Fengshi, Taihao he Shaohao chuanshuo de kaoguxue yanjiu, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 2002(2), 7-8. 
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including learning to speak and write in the Zhou language. 62 Zhongguo states were 
also on friendly terms with a rising Man kingdom, Wu (present-day Jiangsu-Zhejiang), 
that constantly warred with Chu for dominance of Anhui-Jiangsu. By 480 BC, the Wu 
king had even convinced the states to recognize his family as a long-lost senior branch 
of the Zhou royal house.63  Not long after this, however, Wu was conquered and 
supplanted by Yue, another Man kingdom from Zhejiang. 
 
 Confucius, who began his career around 525 BC, apparently had little to say 
about barbarians, but what he did say ensured that Zhongguo and the Four Yi would 
form an enduring dichotomy of civilized/barbarian and superior/inferior in classical 
Confucian discourse. In Lunyu (Analects) Confucius is shown commenting that Guan 
Zhong, premier of Qi in the seventh century BC, more than made up for any moral 
failings by convincing his lord to repel several major barbarian incursions: If not for 
him, we might now be wearing our hair down and folding our robes to the left  
features associated with western barbarians, in contrast to Zhongguo men who 
gathered their long hair in a headdress and folded the left side of their robes over the 
right.64 Confucius is even blunter about the cultural inferiority of barbarians in Lunyu 
3:5: Yi-Di with rulers are not equal even to Zhuxia without. Confucius did seem to 
believe that barbarians had a rudimentary sense of goodness and could be improved 
morally by the influence of someone virtuous like himself, but left no doubt that they 
were a long way off from even the most morally degenerate Zhongguo states.65  
                                                
62 For recent studies of Chu culture and identity, see Constance A. Cook and John S. Major (eds.), 
Defining Chu: Image and Reality in Ancient China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999). 
63 Wang. Huaxia bianyuan, 255-287. 
64 Lunyu, 14:18. 
65 Lunyu, 9:15, 13:5, 15:5. Lunyu, 3:5 was often interpreted by nineteenth-century and twentieth-
century commentators, including Kang Youwei and Arthur Waley, to mean the Yi-Di are now in a 
better state than Zhuxia, since they still have rulers. This was not the original meaning of the passage, 
and the reinterpretation would seem to be a product of these commentators preference for the 




 On the surface, Mencius (c. 370  c. 290 BC) seems to express similar 
assumptions about the superiority of Zhuxia civilization: I have heard of the ways of 
Xia being used to change those of the Yi (yongxia bianyi用夏变夷), but never of 
them being changed by the Yi. He goes on to relate how Chen Liang, a man of Chu, 
admired the teachings of Confucius, came north to Zhongguo to study them, and 
eventually surpassed Confucian scholars in the north. But Mencius primary intent 
was to rebuke two of Liangs disciples for having, after their masters death, 
converted to some non-Confucian doctrines brought north by another Chu man. The 
passage may have had a normative character in the specific context of competition 
between Zhongguo and Chu philosophical schools, but it carried no general assertion 
about the necessity of converting barbarians to Xia ways.66 The yongxia bianyi slogan 
was eventually used by Confucians to justify efforts at changing the customs of 
barbarian peoples, but there is no record of this being done during the period 770 
BC  AD 581.67 
 
 In another passage Mencius observes that although the legendary sage-king 
Shun was a man of the eastern Yi, and Ji Fas father King Wen (Ji Chang), who laid 
the foundations for the Zhou conquest of Shang, was a man of the western Yi, they 
became former and latter sages of Zhongguo.68 Later commentators to Mencius, as 
                                                
66 Mencius [Mengzi], 3a. Di Cosmos assertion that the passage reflects an ideology of civilization, or 
a mission civilizatrice, that postulates a dialectic relationship, indeed, a struggle, between the Hua-Hsia 
[Huaxia] peoples and the Yi... [which] ended in favour of the Hua-Hsia because of their moral 
superiority seems to me to be an incorrect projection of later sinificationist attitudes onto Mencius. 
Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 105. 
67 The earliest use of the yongxia bianyi concept (in the form bianyi congxia, changing the Yi to follow 
the Xia) that I have found is at JS, 105:2956, in an early Tang historians assessment of the fourth-
century Dī ruler Fu Jian (on whom see Chapter 4). 
68 Mencius, 3a, 4b.  
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well as modern historians trying to trace the ethnic origins of the earliest Chinese 
rulers, tended to interpret this passage as evidence of Shun and the Zhou kings having 
originally been barbarian. But all Mencius was saying is that Shun spent part of his 
life in Shandong, while King Wen was born in Guanzhong  areas that lay on 
opposite ends of the civilized world. It is likely that in this context, Yi means 
borderlands, and is a variation on the homophonous word Yì裔. As Crossley argues: 
It is clear from the context that Mencius intended not to emphasize any barbaric 
origins for Shun or [King Wen] but the fact that they were widely separated by time 
and geography but were able to unite the country by their adherence to basic 
principles of governance.69 Indeed, the passage seems to have later become badly 
distorted in popular usage: King Wen became an eastern Yi, while the western Yi was 
now Yu. The culprits for this rewriting of Mencius were apparently early third-
century scholars from Sichuan, seeking to raise the prestige of their homeland vis-à-
vis Zhongguo and Guanzhong. They fabricated a legend that Yu was born at a place 
called Shiniu in Wenshan prefecture (Wenchuan, Sichuan), and then transplanted 
King Wen to the east to replace Shun.70 The legend seems to have spread rather 
quickly - in the 280s, the south Chinese scholar Hua Tan used the argument King 
Wen was born among the eastern Yi, and the great Yu emerged from the western 
Qiang to rebut a northern scholar who dismissed him as a man of Wu and Chu and 
questioned his worthiness for public office.71 
                                                
69 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 260-261. Crossley shows that the passage was eventually used by 
Qing emperors to legitimize their right to rule Zhongguo despite their foreign origins. 
70 Wang, Yingxiong Zuxian, 87-109; SJ, 2:49-50, 15:686; SGZ, 38:975. Hinsch mistakenly assumes a 
much older origin to the Yu was a western Yi legend  see Bret Hinsch, Myth and the Construction 
of Foreign Ethnic Identity in Early and Medieval China, Ancient Ethnicity 5.1 (2004), 81-103. 
71 JS, 52:1452. The Qiang羌 ethnic group in northern Sichuan, whose identity as Qiang was imposed 
on it by the PRC, now uses passages like this to claim that Yu was clearly a Qiang too. Qiang 
communities in Wenchuan and nearby Beichuan are engaged in a bitter dispute over the actual location 





 After the dramatic territorial expansion of the Qin and Western Han empires in 
the late-third and late-second centuries BC respectively, the Four Yi categories were 
redeployed to label peoples on the new frontiers of the empire, many of whom were 
not even known to the Eastern Zhou. 72  This convention was followed by all 
subsequent Chinese empires and only abandoned in the nineteenth century, when the 
British empire forced the Qing court to stop labeling it as Yi.73 But what happened to 
the identities of the original Yi, Rong, Man, and Di under Qin and Han rule? Creel 
expressed a typical view on this question 45 years ago:  it seems clear that, 
however the Chinese treated them, the barbarians in general developed a good deal of 
admiration for Chinese culture  so much so that the great majority of them ended by 
becoming Chinese. Creel conceded that more or less forcible conversion took 
place in many situations of conquest by Zhou states, but maintained that wholly 
voluntary acculturation was also present, notably in the case of Chu. He further 
claimed: It was the process of acculturation, transforming barbarians into Chinese, 
that created the great bulk of the Chinese people.74  
 
 One major problem with Creels argument is his use of terms like 
acculturation and Chinese without defining what they mean. But a far bigger 
problem than terminology is that contrary to Creels claim, nothing really seems 
clear when it comes to what the barbarians thought or experienced. The near-
                                                
72 See SJ, chapters 113-116, 123 and HS, chapters 70, 89, 94b, where Rong-Di and Di are used for 
Xiongnu; Yi-Di for Central Asians; Man-Yi for Xiongnu, Central Asians, Hundred Yue, Koreans, 
and Sichuan peoples; southwestern Yi for Yunnan-Guizhou peoples; and Hundred Man for the 
nomadic steppe peoples. 
73 See the fascinating discussion of this dispute in Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention 
of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), chapters 2-3. 
Liu correctly notes that in Qing times the assumed correspondence between the Chinese word Yi and 
the English word barbarian was a super-sign that did not necessarily reflect reality, but I would 
argue that in the Eastern Zhou discursive context the super-sign yi/barbarian is entirely appropriate. 
74 Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 197, 228. 
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complete absence of any texts written from the Yi, Rong, Man, or Di point of view, or 
even any proper ethnographic analysis of them from the Zhongguo perspective, means 
that we can at best only make educated guesses about what sort of ethnic identity they 
had, how long they retained separate identities from the people of Zhongguo, and 
whether their loss of these identities had anything to do with admiration for Chinese 
[i.e. Zhongguo] culture.75 We do know that the last Wu kings successfully claimed to 
be distant elder cousins of the Eastern Zhou kings, and that the Western Han historian 
Sima Qians monumental Shiji (completed c. 90 BC) wove this claim and other 
purported genealogies from the ruling houses of major Eastern Zhou states, including 
Chu and Yue, into a coherent narrative of common descent from the Yellow Sage-
king (Huang Dì黄帝). Sima Qian even recorded, or possibly invented, a tradition that 
the nomadic Xiongnu 匈奴 of Mongolia were an offshoot of the Xia kingdom. Shiben 
(written c. 235-228 BC), one of Sima Qians key sources for the sage-king legends, 
also contains a statement that the rulers of the barbarian Shu kingdom in Sichuan 
(conquered by Qin in 316 BC) claimed descent from the Yellow Sage-king  a claim 
that was added as fact into Shiji by the commentator Chu Shaosun around 39-29 BC.76  
 
 Creel suggests that when the fabric of early Chinese history was 
elaborated,  the reputed progenitors of a very large number of groups were worked 
into the tapestry. The tradition was full of inconsistencies. But in China, where 
                                                
75 While the celebrated Chuci (Songs of Chu) reflect elements of Chu religion, they shed no light on the 
nature of Chu ethnic and cultural identity and what happened to it under Qin and Han rule. 
76 Wang, Yingxiong zuxian , 68-109, 205. The Xiongnu were bitter enemies of the Han empire in Sima 
Qians time, so there was little apparent reason to assert a common origin with them. The most likely 
explanation for Qians attempt to link them to a fictitious Xia aristocrat is the same lack of information 
on the early history of the Xiongnu that forced him to pad the first part of the chapter with a long 
historical narrative of Zhongguo relations with the Rong and Di. In other words, he created a myth to 
cover up the Han courts embarrassing ignorance of where the Xiongnu came from. See SJ, 110:2890, 
but also Hinschs alternative explanation in Myth and the Construction of Foreign Ethnic Identity, 
87-92. Hinschs theory is crippled by unfounded speculation that the Xiongnu had an indigenous myth 
of descent from wolves, and the total absence of evidence for the Xia ancestry myth being used to 
pacify the Xiongnu by assimilating them into Chinese culture and kinship. 
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tradition and family and long association have been of the highest importance, this 
interweaving of genealogies produced a united people with a sense of solidarity that 
could, perhaps, have been brought about in no other way.77 Many other historians 
have adopted similar interpretations of Shijis genealogical myths as an instrument in 
uniting Zhongguo, Guanzhong, and the Four Yi into a single ethnic group - an 
impression no doubt strengthened by more recent uses of those myths by ROC 
historians to portray all ethnic groups in China as a single nation descended from the 
Yellow Sage-king.78 But this is clearly a case of reading too much from the evidence. 
Shiji merely identifies certain southern royal families as descendants of the Yellow 
Sage-king, but makes it clear that this honour did not extend to their Man subjects, 
who as far as Sima Qian was concerned had been barbarians from the beginning of 
known history. So if the original Four Yi were indeed ethnically assimilated with their 
conquerors in Zhongguo and Guanzhong, it does not seem to have happened through a 
simple interweaving of genealogies. The origins, cultures, history, and ultimate fate of 
Chinese historys first barbarians remain shrouded in mystery, despite their 
profound impact on over two thousand years of Confucian discourse on foreigners. 
 
Huaxia or Hua as the ethnic identity of Zhongguo people? 
 Huaxia is frequently described by historians as an ethnonym used by the 
people of Eastern Zhou Zhongguo79, but the evidence for this is almost non-existent. 
The concept of an ancient Huaxia ethnicity can be traced to ROC historiography in 
the 1940s, when historians investigating the earliest origins of the ethnic group now 
known as Han addressed the question of what this group called itself before the two 
                                                
77 Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 226. 
78 Pulleyblank, Zou and Lu, 51; Leibold, Competing Narratives; Wang, Yingxiong zuxian, chapters 
3 and 10. 
79 E.g. Li, Landscape and Power, 286-293; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 188-189. 
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Han empires gave a much larger meaning to the name of the Han River in Shaanxi-
Hubei. They presented Huaxia as the answer, simply because this was a popular 
alternative name for China and the Chinese that was believed to have existed long 
before Western Han.80 Although there were later disagreements over when exactly the 
Huaxia ethnic identity emerged (with answers ranging from Xia to late Eastern 
Zhou81), the theory of its pre-Han existence has become such orthodoxy in the PRC 
and Taiwan that few realize the term Huaxia appears in only one of numerous extant 
pre-Han texts  namely, Zuoshi Chunqiu. In fact, Huaxia only appears once in Zuoshi 
Chunqiu, in a conversation that is dated 547 BC but probably apocryphal. 82 
Interestingly, the term is used by a Chu minister to refer to the Zhou states of Henan, 
and by extension to Zhongguo in general. In other words, it is a variant of Zhuxia and 
refers to a region and the states controlling it, not the ethnicity of people in those 
states. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Huaxia only became a popular synonym for 
Zhongguo sometime in the third century AD  it does not occur in any existing Han-
period text. This would suggest that the Huaxia ethnicity of Eastern Zhou is nothing 
but a modern myth. 
 
 Even the key word Hua only appears in a possibly ethnic context in several 
Zuoshi Chunqiu records pertaining to the period 569-500 BC. In 569 BC, a minister in 
the feudal state of Jin urged his lord to make peace with the Mountain Rong so as to 
concentrate on competing with Chu for dominance over the Zhongguo states, saying, 
The various Hua [states] (Zhuhua诸华) will surely rebel against us [if we do not 
protect them from Chu.] The Rong are just animals. How could we conquer the Rong 
                                                
80  See Ye Linsheng, Huaxiazu zhengyi, Minzu yanjiu 2002(6), 60-63. Liu Bang, who founded 
Western Han, was earlier made King of Han by his lord (and later rival) Xiang Yu. The Han kingdoms 
name was derived from its location at Hanzhong prefecture on the upper Han River. 
81 Ibid.; Zhou, Zhouren, Qinren, 11.  
82 ZS, Xiang 26. 
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while losing [the support of] Hua?83 In 562 BC, the Jin ruler thanked this minister for 
his past advice to restore stability to Zhuhua by making peace with the various Rong-
Di.84 In 559 BC, the same ruler accused a Rong chieftain, his vassal, of having 
leaked secrets to other states. The chieftain denied this, saying, We Rong people eat 
and dress differently from Hua, we do not trade with you and even our languages are 
mutually unintelligible. What harm could we do? 85  In 512 BC, a Chu minister 
observed that Wu has grown strong enough to be a political equal to Zhuhua.86 Finally, 
in 500 BC, the Qi ruler attempted to use Yi prisoners to kidnap the Lu ruler during 
peace talks between the two states. Confucius, who was chairing the conference, 
shamed the Qi ruler into halting the kidnapping by saying, The borderlands (Yì裔) 
should not plot against Xia, Yi should not bring disorder to Hua (luanhua 乱华), 
prisoners should not disrupt a conference, and violence should not be used against 
friends!87  
 
 Was Hua an ethnonym, a toponym, or a political designation to the writer of 
Zuoshi Chunqiu? With only five examples from the same text to go by, no one knows 
for sure, although the label does seem to distinguish the Zhongguo states politically, 
culturally, linguistically, geographically, and even racially from the barbarians. 
Since the original ideograph for Hua 華 was also the original form of the word 
flower (hua, now written as花), many scholars interpret it as an ethnonym reflecting 
the flowery, beautiful, or glorious civilization of Zhou. But this interpretation 
was first made by classical commentators around 650, over a thousand years later than 
                                                
83 Ibid., Xiang 4. 
84 Ibid., Xiang 11. 
85 Ibid., Xiang 14. 
86 Ibid., Zhao 30. 
87 Ibid., Ding 10. 
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Confucius time. 88  Not all scholars have accepted the flower etymology. Some 
adopted a linguistic explanation: For example, Schafer proposed that Hua and Xia 
were simply ablaut forms of the same old ethnic name, but gave no evidence 
besides their rather similar pronunciations in reconstructions of the spoken language 
of ancient Zhongguo.89 Others looked to geography: In 1907, Zhang Binglin argued 
that Hua was originally a name for the Western Zhou homeland (Guanzhong), derived 
from Mount Hua, while in 1940 Qian Mu theorized that Hua was once an alternative 
name for Mount Song, just south of Luoyi, and therefore represented the whole 
Eastern Zhou realm. 90   The unfortunate truth is that we simply have no reliable 
evidence of where the label Hua came from, nor can we be sure that it was a 
commonly used ethnonym in Eastern Zhou. The earliest that we can confidently speak 
of an emerging Hua ethnic identity would be the Jin empire (266-316), and this 
identity was the result of a combination of political and intellectual developments that 









                                                
88 Specifically, in the Wujing Zhengyi commentary to ZS, Ding 10, edited by Kong Yingda. 
89  Edward H. Schafer, The Vermilion Bird: Tang Images of the South (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), 7. 
90  Zhang Binglin, Zhonghua Minguo jie, in Zhang Taiyan quanji, Vol. 4 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Renmin, 1985), 252-254; Qian Mu, Guoshi dagang (Hong Kong: Shangwu, 1989 revised edition), 8. 




Changes in Han and Wei-Jin Discourses on Ethnicity and Ethnic Difference 
 
Li (ethics) and de (virtue): The universalist Confucian measure of ethnicity 
 During the Cultural Revolution, PRC historiography stridently condemned 
Confucianism as a backward and reactionary ideology of the feudal ruling class. But 
in the 1980s, the government began a rehabilitation of Confucianism that has 
continued to this day. As part of this about-face, historians began promoting the Sage 
as a positive and progressive thinker on ethnicity - in particular, they cited certain 
passages from the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries to the Confucian classic 
Chunqiu (Annals) as evidence that from Eastern Zhou times, Chinese (or, to Chinese 
historians, Huaxia) identity was always based on culture and not biological ancestry 
(i.e. race or blood), and any foreigner seen to have assimilated into Chinese 
culture (however defined) could be considered ethnically Chinese (Huaxia).91 This 
interpretation has now been enshrined in Chinese historiography as the pseudo-
Confucian saying Yi-Di who enter [the civilization] of Zhongguo are regarded as 
[part of] Zhongguo (Yi-Di jinyu Zhongguo ze Zhongguo zhi夷狄进于中国则中国
之 ).92  Since the traditional image of Confucians as chauvinistically disdainful of 
barbarians would be incompatible with modern Chinas image as a multi-ethnic state, 
a belief that Confucian thought is inherently non-racist and inclusive is of great 
importance to the PRC governments promotion of Confucianism. However, this 
belief ignores the context of the Gongyang/Guliang passages, which arguably reflect 
the nature of Western Han imperial Confucianism rather than Confucius own ideas. 
 
                                                
91 For a seminal article in the rehabilitation of Confucian ethnic discourse, see Miao, Luetan Wuhu 
Shiliuguo, 8-9. For similar positions in recent Chinese scholarship, see Chen, Yixia xinbian; Zhu 
Dawei, Rujia minzuguan yu Shiliuguo Beichao minzu ronghe jiqi lishi yingxiang, Zhongguoshi 
yanjiu 2004(2), 37-39. 
92 In reality, the first known statement to this effect was only made in mid-Tang times, in the famous 
essay Yuandao by Han Yu (768-824). 
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 Chunqiu was a Confucian classic containing a laconic and at times cryptic 
account of Eastern Zhou history from 722 BC to 481 BC, written from the perspective 
of Confucius native state, Lu. Its authorship was attributed to Confucius himself, thus 
giving it considerable importance as a window into the sages interpretation of history. 
Two commentaries on Chunqiu  the Gongyang and Guliang  were written in 
Western Han but spuriously attributed to much older oral traditions. Dong Zhongshu, 
the driving force behind the elevation of the Confucian classics as the basis of Han 
imperial ideology in 136 BC, established the Gongyang commentary as the standard 
interpretation, while the Guliang commentary gained prominence between 73 BC and 
6 BC. Neither commentary added new information to the text  both focused 
exclusively on analysing its unusually sparse language to determine where Confucius 
stood regarding various events and people. It was believed he had encoded moral 
judgments and even prophecies about the future into subtle words with great 
meaning, but the commentators tried so hard to read hidden meanings from 
individual words and phrases, while using these meanings to support their political 
agenda, that their interpretations often came out unconvincing or downright wrong. 
 
 The normal Chunqiu treatment of barbarians (Yi-Di), as understood by the 
Gongyang/Guliang commentators, was to portray them as politically, culturally, and 
morally inferior to Zhongguo.93 This was supposedly done through the language used 
in recording interactions between Zhongguo states and barbarians. For example, even 
when barbarians captured a Zhongguo ruler or minister, this could not be stated 
outright because it violated the principle of barbarian inferiority. When Lu interacted 
                                                
93  Interestingly, the term Yi-Di is not found in ZS or even Chunqiu, but is the standard 
Gongyang/Guliang term for barbarians. The Gongyang commentator probably derived it from 
Confucius reference to Yi-Di with rulers in Lunyu 3:5, and turned it into a generic term for 
barbarians; this was imitated by the later Guliang commentary. 
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with other Zhongguo states, the other states were portrayed as outsiders, but when Lu 
and other Zhongguo states had a conference with a barbarian state, the barbarian was 
portrayed as the outsider. Also, a barbarian ruler could not be referred to by the 
aristocratic title he had received from the Zhou court (usually zi子, viscount), and 
instead was just the man (ren 人)  for example, the Wu king should be Wuren 
(the man of Wu), not Wuzi (the viscount of Wu).94 
 
 But for each rule the commentators tried to establish, there were always 
glaring exceptions. Sometimes a barbarian ruler was called a zi, sometimes a 
Zhongguo ruler was called a ren, sometimes barbarian and Zhongguo states were 
portrayed as equals, and so on. Chunqiu terminology seemed riddled with 
inconsistencies, but the commentators decided that Confucius could not possibly have 
been inconsistent  he was just choosing his terminology case by case. So for every 
instance when Zhongguo was lowered to the barbarian level (Yi-Di zhi 夷狄之 , 
literally regarded as barbarians) or the barbarian was raised to the Zhongguo level, 
commentators looked for evidence of bad behaviour on the Zhongguo side or good 
behaviour on the barbarian side.  
 
 The yardstick for assessment was often li 礼, the Confucian code of ethical 
and proper conduct  this is the standard most historians notice and emphasize.95 For 
example, bad Zhongguo behaviour that violated li involved waging unjust wars, even 
against barbarians, while barbarians could abide by li by following the rules of 
warfare. At other times, the standard was simply the enemy of my enemy is my 
                                                
94 GY, Yin 7, Zhuang 10, Xi 21, Cheng 15, Xuan 15, Ding 4, Ai 13. 
95 Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 197. 
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friend, and good barbarian behaviour involved supporting Zhongguo states against 
other barbarians  such as Wu helping the state of Cai against Chu in 506 BC.96 But 
these rationalizations tended to be tedious and arbitrary. The Chu king was labeled a 
Yi-Di, but was also usually called a zi except when he did something unethical like 
capturing Zhongguo rulers. When Wu inflicted a famous defeat on Chu while helping 
Cai, the Wu king was named as Wuzi; but his title was not stated when he captured the 
Chu capital ten days later, so he was back to being Yi-Di  the commentator 
speculated that he must have done something barbaric like making the Chu kings 
mother his concubine. 97  Once, the Gongyang commentary concluded that six 
Zhongguo states had become new barbarians (xin Yi-Di新夷狄) in 519 BC, without 
explaining why  it was just the only way to make sense of a particularly inconsistent 
use of terminology.98 
 
 Contrary to what the commentators believed, there is no consistent pattern in 
Chunqiu terminology after all. While the exegetical contortions they introduced may 
seem laughable to us, these contortions were somehow misunderstood by later 
Confucians and historians as representing Confucius own belief (and by extension, 
his contemporaries) in civilized ethical and cultural norms (i.e. li) as the only valid 
indicator of difference between Zhongguo and Yi-Di  a misunderstanding still 
perpetuated in numerous recent studies of ethnicity in ancient China. Di Cosmo, for 
example, argues that the flexible use of the Yi-Di label in the Gongyang and Guliang 
commentaries raises [d]oubts about the reality of hard-and-fast cultural boundaries 
between the Chou [Zhou] community of states and the foreigners, but misses the 
                                                
96 GY, Zhuang 30, Xi 33, Xuan 12, Ding 4. 
97 Ibid., Zhuang 10, 23, Xi 4, 21, 27, Xuan 11-12, Ding 4. 
98 Ibid., Zhao 23. 
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crux of the problem: not the absence per se of rigid ethnic or cultural boundaries in 
Eastern Zhou times, but rather the absence of any correspondence between these 
boundaries and the terminology employed by Chunqiu. He recognizes that Gongyang 
and Guliang reflect ethical positions that were held much later than the events they 
comment on, but does not take this fact to its logical conclusion.99 
 
 Chinese historians have also been much influenced by a theory expressed in 
the late Eastern Han Gongyang subcommentary by He Xiu (129-182), periodizing the 
events recorded in Chunqiu into three epochs  chaos, ascending peace, and great 
peace. He Xiu claimed that in the epoch of great peace, the difference between 
Zhongguo and the barbarians disappeared, and barbarians became worthy to bear 
aristocratic titles.100 This theory was, in more recent times, popularized by the Qing-
period Gongyang scholars Liu Fenglu (1776-1829) and Kang Youwei (1858-1927).  
Liu was primarily concerned with using Gongyang teachings to legitimize Manchu 
rule over Zhongguo, while Kang hoped to use Gongyang ideas to justify his political 
reforms. 101  Both reinterpreted He Xius theory as representing Confucius own 
utopian vision of the future: Liu held that the Qing empire had achieved that epoch of 
great peace where there were no longer any barbarians, while Kang believed it had not 
yet been attained and identified it as the ultimate goal of his reforms. In a 1985 article 
written in the middle of Confucianisms official rehabilitation, the veteran historian 
Miao Yue also used He Xius theory as evidence to argue that Confucius was actually 
                                                
99 Similarly, Dikotter wrongly assumes that Chunqiu itself hinged on the idea of cultural assimilation 
- Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies, 99-102; Frank Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern 
China (London: Hurst and Company, 1992), 2-3. 
100 Wang Gaoxin, Lun Handai Gongyangxue de yixia zhibian, Nankai xuebao (Zhexue shekeban), 
2006(1), 87-92. 
101 For Liu Fenglu, see Liu, The Clash of Empires, 8-9. For Kang Youwei, see Wing-tsit Chan, A 
Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 723-727. For 
both, Huang Cuifen, Zhang Taiyan Chunqiu Zuozhuanxue Yanjiu (Taipei: Wenjin, 2006), 75-77, 81-89. 
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open-minded, forward-looking, and free of racism on the question of ethnic relations. 
Miao saw the epoch of great peace concept as representing the Sages belief in the 
ability of backward barbarians to become part of the superior Huaxia civilization 
by embracing its culture. According to Miaos student Zhu Dawei, this sinificationist 
argument has since been widely accepted among PRC historians (including Zhu 
himself).102 But in reality, Liu Fenglu, Kang Youwei, and Miao Yue were all guilty of 
misusing He Xius theory for their own agendas. The theory was no more than a 
belated attempt to create a more systematic Gongyang approach to Chunqiu 
inconsistencies in the treatment of the Zhongguo/Yi-Di boundary, and tells us nothing 
about Confucius own ideas. 
 
 Despite the flimsy foundations of the Gongyang/Guliang reading of Eastern 
Zhou ethnicity, it did reflect two important characteristics of the Western Han period 
 namely, the use of Confucianism as an ideological basis for imperial expansion, and 
the blurring of ethnic boundaries as a result of such expansion. Han imperial 
Confucianism, founded on Gongyang principles, saw the emperor as radiating a 
civilizing influence to the Four Yi, thus gaining their submission and bringing peace 
to Tianxia. Barbarians had a new place in this civilized world order as loyal vassals 
or subjects, and as students of li. The Gongyang commentator clearly anticipated 
objections to a line in his commentary to Cheng 15 (576 BC) about regarding Zhuxia 
as compatriots [nei 内 , literally insiders] and the Yi-Di as foreigners [wai 外 , 
literally outsiders], since a true sage-king should aspire to unify Tianxia and not 
just settle for ruling over Zhuxia. He explained that it was merely a problem of 
                                                
102 Miao, Luetan Wuhu Shiliuguo, 8-9; Zhu, Rujia minzuguan, 39n. 
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distance  the sage-king must of course start unifying nearby regions before 
proceeding to distant ones.  
 
 Chunqiu Fanlu, a work by members of the Gongyang school, further 
elaborated that since the Yi-Di in Cheng 15 was the king of Wu, and since he and 
the ruler of Lu were both related to the Zhou kings, the only reason he was treated as 
an inferior barbarian was because he behaved like a barbarian. 94 years later, however, 
the Wu kingdom had improved its behaviour so much that the Wu king was qualified 
to chair a conference with the rulers of Lu and Jin. This, the text argued, proved that 
only the virtuous (de 德) are our kin. 103  Liu Che, the famously expansionistic 
Emperor Wu (reigned 140-87 BC) of Western Han, personally demonstrated that 
principle by asking his ethnically Xiongnu minister Jin Midi to serve as regent to his 
heir. Midi, a former prisoner of war who had earned the emperors trust by saving him 
from an assassin, declined the honour to avoid giving the Xiongnu empire a perfect 
piece of propaganda.104 His case was not unique: For example, Liu Ches general 
Gongsun He had ancestors from the Hu胡 (i.e. Xiongnu) race (zhong种)105, and 
the Ban clan, which was highly influential in early Eastern Han, proudly claimed 
descent from the Chu royal family.106 Overall, it seems that ethnicity was relatively 
irrelevant in Han politics, and personal loyalty to the emperor was what counted. 
 
                                                
103 Chunqiu Fanlu, 33. On the question of the authenticity of this texts traditional attribution to Dong 
Zhongshu, see Sarah A. Queen, From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and 
Autumn Annals according to Tung Chung-shu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
104 HS, 68:2959-2962. 
105 SJ, 111:2941. 
106 HS, 100a:4197. There is a strong possibility that the Ban actually originated from nomads living on 
the edge of the steppe in northern Shanxi, and later fabricated a story that their ancestors moved there 
after the Qin conquest of Chu. The Ban account of their clans putative progenitor, a Chu aristocrat 
who was suckled by a tigress as an infant, was probably lifted from ZS, Xuan 4, with the addition of a 
fictitious claim that ban meant tiger in the Chu language. 
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Hua: The ethnic identity of the literati 
 As far as we can tell from textual evidence, subjects of the two Han empires  
probably regardless of ethnic origin - called themselves Hanren (people of Han). 
Those living in Zhongguo also called themselves Zhongguoren (people of 
Zhongguo), which can probably be classified as an ethnonym derived from a 
toponym.107 After the last Eastern Han emperors abdication to Cao Pi, who founded 
the Wei or Cao-Wei regime (220-266), Hanren was replaced by Weiren as a self-
identification.108 Subjects of the warlord Liu Beis legitimist Han state in Sichuan 
(221-263, now known as Shu-Han) probably still identified themselves as Hanren, 
while subjects of the Wu regime (222-280), based at Jianye (Nanjing, Jiangsu), called 
themselves Wuren. 109  In 280, Wu was conquered by the Jin regime, which had 
usurped the throne from Cao-Wei in 266. So the Hanren of Sichuan became Weiren in 
263, and then (together with all other Weiren) became Jinren in 266. To continue 
labeling oneself as a Hanren or Weiren could amount to treason, and the same 
principle applied to the Wuren who officially became Jinren in 280.110 
 
 We can well imagine that in such conditions of political division and turmoil, 
identifying oneself by the name of the regime to which one was currently a subject 
was no great source of pride or emotional security. This was particularly the case for 
the literati, descendants of prominent Han officials who became a political oligarchy 
and social aristocracy under the Wei and Jin regimes, dominating both government 
                                                
107 SGZ, 1:29, 30:858-861; HHS, 87:2878, 89:2957-2958. There is some evidence that Zhongguo and 
Guanzhong people were also known by the label Qinren (Qin people) in the Western Han period, 
especially among the Xiongnu, but Jia Jingyans assumption from this that Western Han subjects were 
always called Qinren and never Hanren is surely untenable. Zhou, Zhouren, Qinren, 17; Jia Jingyan, 
Hanren kao, in Fei Xiaotong (ed.), Zhonghua minzu duoyuanyiti geju (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu 
Xueyuan, 1989), 137-138. 
108 SGZ, 30:838-839. 
109 E.g. ibid., 47:1131. 
110 For the use of the label Jinren, see SLG, 1:5, 5:40. 
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positions and local society. Most literati were highly versed in the Confucian classics 
and the arts of literary composition, calligraphy, and music. Besides being Jinren, the 
literati of the late third century had a more prestigiously exclusive social identity as 
shi士 (scholars/literati) and yiguan衣冠 (wearers of robes and stiffened hats  a 
reference to their distinctive costume). The majority was from Zhongguo and could 
therefore call itself Zhongguoren; there was also the option of identifying oneself 
ethnically as Xia, since the Shuowen Jiezi dictionary written in 100 had redefined the 
term to mean man of Zhongguo (Zhongguo zhi ren) rather than just Zhongguo as a 
geographical region.111 But the Jin literati apparently came to prefer the relatively 
obscure term Hua as an ethnonym. This was a result, I would suggest, of trends in 
Chunqiu scholarship. 
 
 In Eastern Han, scholars had begun paying attention to the hitherto-neglected 
Zuoshi Chunqiu. This was previously considered a historical text in its own right, but 
because it provided a wealth of background information on the events of 722-481 
BC112, as well as some passages of Chunqiu exegesis, a growing number of classical 
scholars argued that it was really the first and therefore most authoritative Chunqiu 
commentary. Disputes and debates over the relative legitimacy and value of the three 
commentaries continued up to the end of Eastern Han, but the overall trend was 
clearly declining interest in the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries and a turn 
towards Zuoshi Chunqiu.113 In the third century, most literati studied Zuoshi as part of 
their basic education in history, and this became much easier after Du Yu collated 
                                                
111 Xu Shen, Shuowen Jiezi (Shanghai: Shijie Shuju, 1963), 112. 
112 ZSs coverage extended to 468 BC and alluded to events in 453 BC, indicating it was completed 
much later than Confucius death in 479 BC.  
113 As a result, Zuoshi Chunqiu became commonly known as Zuozhuan (the Zuo commentary). See 




Chunqiu and Zuoshi into a single text in the early 280s. As a result, the Zuoshi 
passages where Hua appears became widely known among the elite for the first time. 
 
 The famous Treatise on Expelling the Rong, written by the Jin official Jiang 
Tong in 299, contains the first known use of the ethnonym Huaren (Hua people), in 
reference to Eastern Han subjects in Guanzhong around AD 35-36  specifically, to 
differentiate them from immigrant tribes of Qiang羌 barbarians. We can therefore 
infer that Huaren was still a neologism at the beginning of the fourth century. But our 
sources suggest that it then gradually became a common ethnic self-identification for 
the literati in both north and south China, as did the plural form Zhuhua (all the Hua) 
borrowed from Zuoshi Chunqiu.114 
 
 English-language historiography tends to translate all instances of Hua in the 
sources as Chinese, a concession to reader familiarity that obscures the constructed 
and evolving nature of the label, as well as its key differences from Zhongguo and 
Han, two other words that are loosely translated as Chinese. In this dissertation, I 
leave Hua untranslated to avoid the linguistic monstrosity of the super-sign 
described (in excessively dense semiotics jargon) by Lydia Liu  in simple terms, a 
super-sign is a standard translation that simplifies and fixes the originally complex 
and variable meaning of a word and thereby deprives it of background and context.115 
It should also be noted that our understanding of subscription to the Hua ethnic 
identity is limited to the literati elite, just as our knowledge of Eastern Zhou and Han 
discourses is limited to the elites of those times. We have little information on how 
                                                
114  JS, 56:1531-1532, 95:2487; SS, 95:2358; NQS, 54:931-934. While in ZS Zhuhua apparently 
referred to a number of states that shared a similar geographical, cultural, and possibly ethnic identity, 
Zhuhua in the Age of Fragmentation probably denoted all members of a Hua ethnic group. 
115 Liu, The Clash of Empires, 12-13. 
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illiterate or semi-literate commoners (including peasants, artisans, merchants, soldiers, 
and clerical personnel) perceived themselves, but local identities, interests, and 
networks would seem to have been far more important to them than any sense of 
ethnicity, and those living on the frontiers of Zhongguo and Guanzhong probably 
acted out of pragmatic calculations of self-interest rather than ethnic affinity.116 
 
Hu: A label for foreigners from the north or west 
 Around the same time when Hua evolved into an ethnic identity, the opposite 
was happening to another term. Hu 胡, originally an ethnic self-identification used by 
steppe peoples like the Xiongnu, was increasingly misused by Zhongguo people as a 
generic label for people from far northern or far western lands beyond Tianxia, 
including India, Parthia, and Central Asia, as well as a prefix in names for languages, 
food crops, or commodities (such as the folding chair) introduced from these lands.117 
  
 Historians who consistently translate Hu as barbarian convey the impression 
that it had a derogatory connotation  yet another case of the super-sign problem.118 In 
fact, Hu may be related to Kūn/Hūn (person) in modern Mongolian and Turkish, and 
therefore mean the same thing as ren in the language of Zhongguo. This could also be 
the etymology of the famous ethnonyms Hunni and Huna (conventionally rendered in 
English as Huns) from Roman and Indian history; indeed, Xiongnu itself could be 
                                                
116 See Jonathan Karam Skaff, Survival in the Frontier Zone: Comparative Allegiance in Chinas Inner 
Asian Borderlands during the Sui-Tang Transition (617-630), Journal of World History 15.2 (2004), 
117-153. 
117 For an early attempt at analysing the expanding meaning of Hu, see Lu Simian, Hu kao, in Lu 
Simian shuo shi (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 2000), 76-93. 
118 For example Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 126-127. For a recent debate on whether there 
was any derogatory sense to Hu, see Yang Jidong, Replacing hu with fan:  Change in Chinese 
Perception of Buddhism during the Medieval Period, Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies 21.1 (1998), 157-170, and Daniel Boucher, On Hu and Fan again: the Transmission 




just a newer pronunciation for ideographs that originally read Huna.119 Xiongnu and 
Hu were practically synonyms in the Han period, and the label Hu was only extended 
to include the Lu River Hu卢水胡 of Gansu, remnants of the ancient Yuezhi月氏
people who had mostly been driven into Central Asia by the Xiongnu in the second 
century BC.120 By the early Wei-Jin period, the category Hu also included the Jie羯
of Shanxi, a former subject people of the Xiongnu empire who possibly originated 
from Sogdiana, as well as South Asians, West Asians and Central Asians. However, 
some northern or western peoples were usually excluded from the Hu category: The 
Qiang and Dī氐 of Guanzhong and Gansu were never thus labeled, and the Xianbi of 
the Mongolian and Inner Mongolian steppe only rarely.121  
 
 There is thus no direct equivalence between the labels Hu and Yi, and no 
indication that there was any original connotation of barbarism attached to the Hu 
label. One reason why historians tend to think there was, is that when the Jie warlord 
Shi Le founded the Later Zhao regime in 319, he supposedly tabooed the word Hu, 
even in the names of western products like sesame buns (hu[ma]bing, Hu[-hemp] 
buns) and peas (hudou, Hu beans). The taboo is conventionally interpreted as 
reflecting Shi Les sense of embarrassment and inferiority at being called a Hu, but 
(as I have argued at length elsewhere122) this policy was actually aimed at changing 
Hua literati perceptions of the Jie as foreign immigrants, rather than reflecting any 
                                                
119 Liu, Xianbi shilun, 7-8; Edward H. Schafer, The Yeh Chung Chi, Toung Pao LXXVI (1990), 
152-153. 
120 Edwin G. Pulleyblank, The Consonantal System of Old Chinese: Part II, Asia Major Volume IX 
(1962), 246-248; Tang, Weijin zahu kao, 398-411; HHS, 87:2899. 
121 The only known Wei-Jin cases of Xianbi possibly being called Hu are JS, 47:1322, 49:1364 - the 
Hu maid mentioned in the latter passage is indicated in Liu Yiqing, Shishuo Xinyu, 23: Rendan to 
have been Xianbi. 
122 Yang Shao-yun, Race War and Ethnic Cleansing in Fourth-century China?  Reassessing the role 
of ethnicity in the fall of the Later Zhao (AD 319-351) and Ran-Wei (350-352) regimes (Paper 
presented at the Tenth Harvard East Asia Society Conference, 2007). For the earliest primary sources 
on the taboo see TPYL, 26, 841, 860. 
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sense of insult in the Hu label itself. It was also related to an official effort to 
popularize a new identity for the Jie, as Guoren (compatriots, literally people of the 
country), and a new identity for the Hua, as Zhaoren (people of Zhao), so as to put 
the two peoples on a level of equality that would be impossible within the prevailing 
ethnic discourse. Neither identity outlasted the Later Zhao regimes collapse in 349-
351. But they were deemed necessary in 319 because, as the rest of this chapter will 
explain, a more rigid perception of ethnicity had gradually emerged among the literati 
elite  a perception which I have termed proto-racism. 
 
Zulei (race) and xin (heart): The proto-racist Confucian measure of ethnicity 
 The people of ancient Zhongguo are not known to have had any taboo against 
intermarriage with barbarians  the emphasis in marriage relations was instead on 
class and lineage, with the literati being notoriously unwilling to have kinship ties 
with families of social status and ancestry inferior to their own. Nor is there any 
indication of discrimination on the basis of physical differences - in fact, ancient 
textual descriptions of the physical appearance of barbarians are so rare that we have 
little idea of what ancient barbarian peoples such as the Yi, Rong, Di, Xiongnu, and 
Xianbi looked like.123 The proto-racism referred to therefore had nothing to do with 
purity of blood or physical appearance; instead, it was a xenophobic reaction against 
high rates of barbarian immigration into core regions of north China, notably 
Guanzhong and Shanxi. These literati did not believe the immigrants could be 
                                                
123 TPYL, 645 and SLG, 17:137, 19:151 indicate that the Jie had deep-set eyes, pronounced noses, and 
bushy beards; SuiS, 83:1849 describes the Sogdians of Samarkand in the same way, and historians 
have therefore proposed a Sogdian origin for the Jie. Besides this, only a fragment of the lost Qinshu at 
TPYL, 363 contains some information about how the Jinren of Guanzhong characterized the 
strange appearances of various foreign peoples in the late fourth century. For a recent study of 
depictions of barbarian features in Tang-period sculpture and painting, see Marc Samuel Abramson, 
Deep Eyes and High Noses: Physiognomy and the depiction of barbarians in Tang China, in Nicola 
Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt  (eds.), Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies 
in Chinese History (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 119-159. 
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successfully integrated into their host society, or that they would ever be truly loyal to 
any authority but their own tribal leaders. They should therefore be segregated from 
the native populace or even repatriated to their homelands where possible. 
 
 This anti-immigration sentiment was to a large extent the consequence of two 
centuries of seemingly insoluble problems in managing resettled barbarian 
communities, beginning with the Qiang wars of the second century AD. The Eastern 
Han government had moved tens of thousands of Qiang tribesmen from Qinghai-
Gansu into Guanzhong and the Hetao河套 region (Ningxia, northern Shaanxi and the 
Ordos124) in the first century, in order to stop them from raiding the western border 
and also to employ them as auxiliary troops. These resettled Qiang suffered various 
kinds of mistreatment by local officials and residents and finally rebelled in 108, 
occupying Hetao and joining forces with tribes in Qinghai to pillage Guanzhong. The 
government took sixty years to defeat all the rebel tribes, at great expense and with 
relentless brutality  in the final battles, over 38,000 Qiang were killed.125 But Hetao 
remained effectively a Qiang domain, since the Han government chose not to bring it 
back under prefectural administration. Guanzhong, too, remained heavily populated 
by Qiang tribes, and even more moved in when the region was taken over by rebels 
during the collapse of the Eastern Han empire.126 The powerful Han prime minister 
Cao Cao retook Guanzhong in 212, only to add to its immigrant problem by moving 
                                                
124 This region is now known as Hetao (river bend) but was not thus called in the ancient period, 
when it had various names like Henan, Shuofang, and Hexi. It lies within the great bend of the Yellow 
River, bounded by Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Guanzhong. 
125 HHS, 65:2129-2154, 87:2878-2898; Rafe de Crespigny, The Chiang Barbarians and the Empire of 
Han: A Study in Frontier Policy (Parts 1 and 2), Papers on Far Eastern History 16 (1977), 1-25 and 
18 (1978), 193-245. On the origins and changing meanings of the ethnic label Qiang, see Wang, 
Huaxia bianyuan, 227-253; also his Searching for Qiang Culture in the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century, Inner Asia 4(2002), 131-148. 
126 HHS, 72:2320-2322, 87:2898. 
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Dī tribes in from Hanzhong (southwestern Shaanxi) and Wudu (southern Gansu) to 
keep them out of Liu Beis hands.127  
 
  Another immigrant community seen as a source of trouble was the Xiongnu 
population of Bingzhou (Shanxi), a remnant of a steppe empire that had once been 
Western Hans most formidable enemy. When the Xiongnu empire split into two 
warring factions in 48, one of them submitted to Eastern Han rule and was allowed to 
move into the Ordos region to receive Han protection; the other faction was destroyed 
by Han armies in 89-91, and the steppe was then taken over by Xianbi tribes formerly 
subject to Xiongnu suzerainty. After the withdrawal of Han control from Hetao, the 
Ordos Xiongnu expanded to share the region with the local Qiang tribes. During the 
Eastern Han civil war (190-220), they also began migrating into Shanxi, and Han 
officials began to be alarmed at the possibility of them raiding into Hebei and Henan. 
In 216, Cao Cao placed the Xiongnu Chanyu (king) under house arrest in Hebei and 
reorganized his people into five divisions, each under a Xiongnu aristocrat supervised 
by a Han official.128  
 
 In the 250s and 260s, the Xiongnu divisions grew too big for the comfort of 
the Cao-Wei and Jin governments and were further subdivided into fifteen, then 
twenty subdivisions. But this strategy of dispersing populations only worked 
temporarily  Xiongnu migration from the Ordos to Shanxi, often in whole bands of 
tribes, continued into the 280s; meanwhile, the Shanxi Xiongnu maintained an 
exceptionally high birth rate. As the migrant population boomed, so did its aspirations 
for independence. In 271 the Xiongnu aristocrat Liu Meng rebelled and declared 
                                                
127 SGZ, 30:858; JS, 56:1531. 
128 HHS, 89:2939-2965; JS, 56:1534, 97:2584; SLG, 1:1-2. 
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himself Chanyu, but the Jin government had him assassinated by a turncoat a year 
later. The assassination scared the Xiongnu into obedience for a while, but also 
deepened their resentment towards Jin rule. In 280, an official named Guo Qin 
pointed out that if the Shanxi Xiongnu should happen to rebel again, they could reach 
the imperial capital Luoyang within three days. He proposed reestablishing the Han 
prefectures in Hetao and slowly resettling the Shanxi Xiongnu there as a 
precautionary measure.129 This proposal was ignored  the government had no desire 
to try governing the intractable Xiongnu and Qiang tribes of Hetao, nor did it dare to 
risk provoking the Shanxi Xiongnu into revolt by forcing them to move. 
 
 Immigrant problems exploded into violence in the 290s: A Xiongnu chief 
rebelled in Shanxi in 294, killing a prefect; he later surrendered and was executed, but 
his brother fled to Guanzhong and incited the Qiang and Dī tribes to rebel. Not that 
these tribes needed much incitement  they were already seething with rage after Sima 
Lun, the regional military commandant, had a large group of their chiefs beheaded 
without any legitimate reason. The resulting insurrection, led by a Dī chief who 
declared himself emperor, ravaged Guanzhong from 296 to 299.130  
 
 Jiang Tong submitted his Treatise on Expelling the Rong to the throne soon 
after the rebels were quelled. He estimated that half of the million or more inhabitants 
of Guanzhong were barbarians, and argued that they did not belong there at all: 
Barbarians were different from Zhongguo people in every respect, and were greedy 
and cruel by nature; they were never meant to live in the civilized world. The western 
and northern barbarians (Rong-Di) were the worst, and the Zhou states and Qin 
                                                
129 JS, 3:60-61, 56:1534. 
130 JS, 4:92-95, 97:2550; Ma Changshou, Dī yu Qiang (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin, 1984), 46-47. 
54 
 
empire had conquered or expelled them only with great difficulty. Tong asserted that 
the Han government and Cao Cao made a terrible mistake moving the Qiang and Dī to 
Guanzhong, and the Jin government should now move them back. He also warned 
that the Shanxi Xiongnu population surpassed even the Qiang in numbers and military 
strength and had every means of seizing control of the whole province someday. He 
included a detailed proposal about how and where to move the Qiang and Dī, but 
offered no ideas about moving the Xiongnu. While the government lacked the 
political will to implement Tongs proposal, it gave no indication that it disagreed 
with him on principle.131 
 
 Jiang Tong peppered his treatise with quotations from the Confucian classics, 
used to prove the necessity of keeping Zhongguo barbarian-free. He began with the 
Gongyang line regarding Zhuxia as compatriots and the Yi-Di as foreigners, 
distorting its context to imply that the Yi-Di should be kept out of the empire. This 
was immediately followed by two Zuoshi quotations, both also taken out of context. 
The Rong chieftains we do not trade with you and even our languages are mutually 
unintelligible, meant as a protestation of innocence, was now used to imply the 
impossibility of meaningful interaction with barbarians. A Chu ministers statement 
that ideally, the Son of Heaven should only need to defend himself from the Four Yi 
and not from his own feudal lords, was taken to mean a Son of Heaven should never 
admit the Four Yi into his lands.132  
 
 Even more disingenuous was the insertion of this Zuoshi quotation halfway 
through the treatise: Those who are not our kind will surely have different hearts 
                                                
131 JS, 56:1529-1534. 
132 Ibid.; ZS, Zhao 23. 
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from ours; the ambitions and attitudes of the Rong-Di are therefore different from the 
Hua (feiwo zulei, qixin biyi, rongdi zhitai, buyu Hua tong 非我族类，其心必异, 戎
狄志态, 不与华同). This was actually two quotations in one, with rongdi zhitai 
inserted as a bridge between them. As we saw earlier, buyu Hua tong was originally 
an observation about differences in diet and clothing  not ways of thinking. 
Furthermore, the original context of feiwo zulei, qixin biyi was a Lu ministers 
argument that his ruler should maintain an alliance with Jin, rather than switch to 
allying with Chu  the rationale was that the Lu and Jin rulers were relatives, while 
the Chu king was from a different lineage altogether and could not be expected to care 
as much about Lu.133 Thus zulei in this context means kin, and not ethnicity or 
even race. But since Chu was arguably a barbarian state, third-century literati began 
to read and use the feiwo zulei quotation as authoritative evidence that barbarians and 
Zhongguo people would never get along.134  
 
 Jiang Tong may not have been the first literatus to do so: In the late 270s, 
Kong Xun reportedly used the quotation to argue successfully against letting the 
Shanxi Xiongnu aristocrat Liu Yuan - who was in Luoyang as a hostage to ensure the 
loyalty of the division commanded by his father - lead a planned invasion of Wu, 
warning that Yuan, being a talented barbarian, would surely rebel and keep south 
China for himself. Around 279, when rebelling Xianbi of the Tufa tribe came close to 
capturing the whole Gansu corridor, the Jin emperor contemplated sending Liu Yuan 
and the Shanxi Xiongnu to quell them, but was again dissuaded by Kong Xuns 
                                                
133 JS, 56:1531-1532; ZS, Cheng 4. 
134 The impact of this third-century misreading has been so enduring that even Dikotter was misled to 
take it as evidence that at least some degree of racial discrimination existed during the early stage of 
Chinese civilization. Lydia Liu correctly points out the anachronism of rendering zulei as a concept 
of race, but incorrectly assumes that this same anachronism was never committed in the millennia-
long commentarial traditions surrounding the Confucian text. Dikotter, The Discourse of Race, 3; Liu, 
The Clash of Empires, 72-73. 
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prediction that this would merely deliver Gansu into the hands of an even more 
formidable rebel. So persuasive were Xuns accusations, it is said, that Liu Yuan 
began to fear for his life.135 
 
 Anti-barbarian literati thus established an absolutely rigid ethnic boundary 
separating themselves from the Xiongnu, Dī, Qiang, and Xianbi, predicated on the 
assumption that people of different zulei inevitably had different hearts. Lest there be 
any doubt that the difference was inborn and therefore permanent, these literati further 
defined just how different barbarian hearts were: Barbarians had human faces but 
bestial hearts (renmian shouxin人面兽心), making them no more than animals in 
disguise. This dehumanizing discourse on barbarian hearts was proto-racist in the 
sense of postulating a biological basis for barbarian inferiority and depravity, but it 
was not true racism in todays sense because no attempt was made to classify people 
based on their physical features.136  Interestingly, it also made no attempt to speculate 
whether intermarriage would produce children with only semi-human hearts, or lead 
ultimately to the barbarization of the Zhongguo population, which suggests that 
literati intermarriage with barbarians was still too rare to be a cause for concern. 
 
                                                
135 SLG, 1:3. The Tufa rebellion, which began in 270, was finally crushed by another general in early 
280  see JS, 3:59-70, 57:1554-1555. The whole story of Kong Xuns calumny may be apocryphal, 
however  SLG probably copied it from He Baos Han-Zhao Ji, an official history commissioned in the 
320s by Liu Yuans kinsman Liu Yao, who ruled the Zhao regime (318-329) in Guanzhong. Liu Yao 
regarded Liu Yuan as his imperial ancestor, and therefore had Yuans biography embellished with 
accounts of a virtuous, talented man being driven to his destiny as the restorer of Xiongnu 
independence by persecution from the narrow-minded Jin court. Yuans more reliable biography in WS 
omits these accounts. See WS, 95:2044; Zhang Zexian,  
Liuchao shixue fazhan yu minzushi de juexing (2004), at http://www.jianwangzhan.com/cgi-
bin/index.dll?page1?webid=jianwangzhan&userid=147978&columnno=11&articleid=4671 (accessed 3 
May 2007). 
136 A similar recent argument that proto-racism existed in classical Greek and Roman discourses on 
foreigners can be found in Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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 The phrase renmian shouxin was borrowed from the Eastern Han historian 
Ban Gu, whose Hanshu (completed c. 80), contained the following depiction of the 
Xiongnu:  
Yi-Di people are greedy and opportunistic, wearing their hair down and 
folding their robes to the left, with human faces and bestial hearts. They differ 
from Zhongguo in clothing, customs, and diet, and their language is 
unintelligible to us.  They are separated from us by mountains and valleys, 
and hidden by curtains of sand, because Heaven and Earth intend them to be 
cut off from us.137 
Ban Gus original inspiration probably came from the Zuoshi passage where the Jin 
minister dismisses the Rong as just animals who are not worth conquering. 138  
Similarly, Gus intent was to demonstrate the futility of trying to conquer the nomads 
and convince the emperor that passive defence against them was sufficient. This was 
the standard position of the Han court at the time, although Ban Gu changed his mind 
for political reasons in 89 and joined his patron General Dou Xian on the military 
expedition that finally destroyed what remained of Xiongnu power on the steppe.139 
But it was hardly his intention to make a larger racist point about barbarians in general, 
especially since his supposed Chu ancestors would have been Yi-Di from both 
Gongyang/Guliang and Zuoshi perspectives. 
 
 Ban Gus words were misapplied to a completely different situation in the 
third century, when the barbarians had themselves come to live in the civilized 
world. In a memorial to the Cao-Wei emperor in 251, Deng Ai asserted that because 
barbarians had bestial hearts incapable of true loyalty, they would always submit to 
                                                
137 HS, 94b:3834.  
138 ZS, Xiang 4. 
139 HHS, 23:814-820, 25:875-877, 40b:1385, 45:1519-1521. 
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Zhongguo when weak but rebel when they became strong again. He used this 
argument to warn about the growing strength of the Shanxi Xiongnu, and advocate 
gradually moving barbarian immigrants out of mixed communities. Ironically, Fu 
Xuans 268 memorial to the Jin emperor condemned Deng Ai for placing Gansu in 
peril by recklessly admitting large numbers of Xianbi immigrants during his term as a 
military commander there. Xuan declared, Hu barbarians have bestial hearts and are 
[therefore] different from the Hua, and the Xianbi are the worst (Hu-Yi shouxin, buyu 
Hua tong, Xianbi zuishen 胡夷兽心, 不与华同, 鲜卑最甚). Although the Gansu 
Xianbi had been well-behaved recently, one can never make guarantees about their 
bestial hearts. Ai had already been executed on a false charge of treason in 263 and 
was therefore unable to defend himself, but the outbreak of the Tufa rebellion in 270 
seemingly proved his accusers point, just as Liu Mengs 271 revolt seemed to 
confirm his own warnings made twenty years before.140 
 
 Another Xiongnu rebellion, launched by Liu Yuan in 304, destroyed the Jin 
empire by conquering Zhongguo and Guanzhong in 311-316  an event that marks the 
beginning of the Age of Fragmentation.141 Some scholars in the early Tang concluded 
that the Jin court made a fatal mistake by disregarding its officials repeated requests 
for the expulsion of barbarians142; that conclusion has been repeated by numerous 
others to the present day, but there is little substance to it. The Xiongnu only made a 
bid for independence after the Jin aristocracy and military tore themselves to pieces in 
a series of extremely vicious civil wars, and the empire had already descended to a 
general state of anarchy and disintegration when Xiongnu armies began attacking 
                                                
140 SGZ, 28:776; JS, 47:1322. 
141 Liu Yuan died in 310, after which the rebellion was led by his son. For a summary of the Jin 
collapse, see David A. Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare 300-900 (London: Routledge, 2002), 45-50. 
142 XTS, 215:6037; JS, 101:2643. 
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Luoyang in 309. Furthermore, the Qiang and Dī took no part in the Xiongnu rebellion, 
and were even relatively hostile towards Xiongnu attempts to gain control over 
them.143 Had the Jin government pushed them into another rebellion by attempting to 
expel them from Guanzhong, the empires demise would have come even sooner.144 
Rather than vindicating the xenophobia of the literati, the Jin empires self-destruction 
simply exposes the short-sightedness of their attempts to blame foreigners for its ills. 
 
 Historians analyzing Confucian attitudes towards foreigners are sometimes 
puzzled by the contradiction and, at times, competition between the fluid ethnic 
boundaries of Gongyang/Guliang discourse and the rigid race-based boundary of 
feiwo zulei. For example, Dikotter contrasts what he sees as the Gongyang emphasis 
on cultural assimilation with what he sees as the Zuoshi emphasis on racial difference, 
and comments that Chinese attitudes towards foreigners were fraught with 
ambivalence between universalism and xenophobia.145  The reason is really that both 
represent artificial impositions of meaning on the language of Eastern Zhou texts, 
made in different times and social contexts. Gongyang/Guliang reflects the worldview 
of an expansionist Han empire with universal pretensions, while the proto-racist 
interpretation of feiwo zulei reflects a divided Wei-Jin society feeling threatened by 
outsiders and seeking to erect a clearer ethnic boundary between us and them.  
 
 But Dikotter also argues that the idea of a conceptual dichotomy between 
culture and race in Confucian discourse is so far not supported by the historical 
evidence. Lydia Liu goes much further, describing the discourse of yi as a 
classical theory of sovereignty, never a proto-racial [concept], and accusing 
                                                
143 SLG, 6:46-48. 
144 This argument was, in fact, already expressed in JS, 56:1547. 
145 Dikotter, The Discourse of Race, 2-3, 29. 
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Dikkoter of mistranslating zulei as race and thereby misrepresenting the classical 
commentarial traditions. 146  It seems neither scholar was aware of the Wei-Jin 
reinterpretations of renmian shouxin and feiwo zulei; had they been, they would likely 
have found that an alternation between cultural universalism and proto-racism did 
occur in the third century. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, a return to 




































                                                




Northern Wei and the Supra-ethnicization of the Hua/Yi Dichotomy 
 
Fourth-century barbarian regimes in Zhongguo  
 Within 80 years from the collapse of the Jin empire in 311-316, every part of 
Zhongguo passed through the hands of at least four out of six regimes ruled by 
barbarians: Han (308-318), Later Zhao (319-351), Yan (352-370), Qin (370-385), 
Later Yan (384-397), and Western Yan (386-394).147 Han was established by the 
Xiongnu Liu Yuan in 304, Later Zhao by the Jie rebel-warlord Shi Le in 319, Qin by 
the Dī chieftain Fu Jiàn in 351, and the three Yans by members of the Xianbi Murong 
tribe in 337, 384, and 385 respectively. Historians tend to call these regimes foreign 
or non-Chinese, but none of their rulers was completely alien to the people of 
Zhongguo. The Xiongnu and Jie had lived in Shanxi for over a century, and Fu Jiàns 
tribe was from southern Gansu but had lived in northern Henan in 333-350 under a 
Later Zhao resettlement policy. The Murong were originally based in Liaoning and 
had never lived in Zhongguo before the 350s. But they had great familiarity with the 
culture of the literati, having taken in waves of literati refugees in the 310s and 
employed them to build a bureaucratic state. 
 
 In 318, the Jin aristocrat Sima Rui restored his familys dynasty by declaring 
himself emperor in south China, with his capital at Jiankang (Nanjing, previously 
Jianye). This southern Jin regime lasted until 420, and is usually called Eastern Jin to 
distinguish it from the earlier empire of 266-316. Entire clans of literati escaped the 
Xiongnu rebels by fleeing across the Huai and Yangzi rivers to settle on Eastern Jin 
territory, but other clans, or branches of clans, stayed behind in the defensive forts 
                                                
147 The dates given reflect the establishment and loss of effective control over Hebei and/or Shanxi, not 
the formal founding and end of each regime. Guanzhong passed through five barbarian regimes 
during the same timeframe: Han (316-318), Zhao (318-329), Later Zhao (329-350), Qin (350-384), and 
Later Qin (384-417). Zhao and Later Qin were ruled by Xiongnu and Qiang families respectively. 
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they had built and gradually made arrangements for co-existence and even 
collaboration with their conquerors. The literati who stayed initially found it difficult, 
if not impossible, to accept that a barbarian could rule Zhongguo as Son of Heaven.148 
Shiliuguo Chunqiu, a history of sixteen barbarian states that rose and fell between 
304 and 439, depicts Liu Yuan in 304 and the Xianbi leader Murong Yiluohuan (also 
known as Murong Wei) in 319 using the pseudo-Mencian line the great Yu emerged 
from the western Rong/Qiang, and King Wen was born among the eastern Yi to 
argue that a barbarian of superior ability and virtue had as much right to rule 
Zhongguo as a man of Zhongguo did. 149 But neither man seemed to enjoy significant 
success with this argument. Yiluohuan had to continually pledge allegiance to the 
distant Eastern Jin court in exchange for official titles with which to impress his 
literati subjects. And Liu Yuan was forced to attract Jinren (Hua) supporters by hiding 
his Xiongnu origins and posing as a legitimate heir to the Han empire - hence the 
choice of Han as the name of his regime.150 
 
 Thirty years (319-349) of stable Later Zhao rule in Shanxi-Hebei gradually 
changed literati attitudes. Later Zhao had a strong government modelled on Jin 
institutions, a significant political role for the literati, and a formidable multi-ethnic 
army which succeeded in conquering Henan, Shandong, and Guanzhong in the 320s. 
Perhaps most importantly, it actively sponsored a restoration of the classical 
                                                
148 SLG, 11:83, 12:89, 23:183; cf. JS, 63:1704-1705, 104:2715, 2721, 108:2813. 
149 SLG, 1:5, 23:183. There is a good chance that both accounts are apocryphal, but they show that a 
new pro-barbarian reading of the Mencius passage (in its distorted form) had appeared by the early 
500s when SLG was written. For another (also possibly apocryphal) instance of the pseudo-Mencian 
passage, see JS, 63:1705, where the literatus Shao Xu uses it to assert that Shi Les unworthiness to 
hold the Mandate of Heaven is a matter of insufficient virtue, not his barbarian origins. JS original 
source for Shao Xus words is unknown. 
150 SLG, chapters 1-2, 23. Most historians take at face value the SLG depiction (later reproduced in JS) 
of Liu Yuan and several other Xiongnu aristocrats as exceptionally literatus-like polymaths, and thus 
conclude that they were heavily sinified despite being ethnically Xiongnu. But these details can again 
be traced to He Baos Han-Zhao Ji (see Chapter 3, note 135) and are therefore of doubtful reliability, 
although they do reflect how the Xiongnu aristocracy hoped to be seen by the literati. 
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scholarship and education so prized by the literati. Although the regime was 
sometimes oppressive and eventually collapsed in a cataclysmic civil war151 , the 
Xianbi, Dī, and literati alike came to regard its accomplishments as sufficient proof 
that Heavens favour was not reserved for the Hua. By 370, the Yan and Qin regimes 
both saw Later Zhao as the first non-Hua regime to have held the Mandate of Heaven, 
and each considered itself to have received that Mandate in 352. This is reflected in 
their employment of the Five Phases cycle, an important cosmological component of 
the Mandate of Heaven doctrine. This cycle had two versions, in either of which a 
regimes possession of the Mandate was reflected by its representing the phase or 
element succeeding that of the previous legitimate regime.152 The version used since 
the first century AD was Fire!Earth!Metal!Water!Wood!Fire, and Jins phase 
was Metal. In 330 Later Zhao had staked a claim to direct succession from Jin by 
adopting Water as its phase. Qin now saw itself as succeeding Later Zhao, with Wood 
as its phase; Yan initially claimed to represent Water, but later (in 366) recognized 
Later Zhaos legitimacy and changed its phase to Wood.153 
 
 The result of literati acceptance was that northern regimes from Yan and Qin 
onward could confidently claim to represent Zhongguo and denounce Eastern Jin as 
an illegitimate rebel regime that must be conquered for the sake of reunifying Tianxia. 
Southern literati meanwhile continued to denigrate the northern rulers as rebel savages, 
and the literati who served them as either unwilling or immoral collaborators. This 
ideological contestation reached its first climax during the reign of the Qin ruler Fu 
                                                
151 Millions of Later Zhao subjects from various ethnic groups are said to have perished in the famine 
and anarchy of 349-352, and more than 200,000 Jie were massacred during a seizure of power by the 
general Shi Min. For a detailed discussion of this much-misunderstood massacre and other issues of 
ethnic relations in Later Zhao, see Yang, Race War and Ethnic Cleansing. 
152 See Gu Jiegangs authoritative study of the cycles history, Wudezhongshi shuo xia de zhengzhi he 
lishi, in Gushibian zixu, 430-645. 
153 Luo Xin, Shiliuguo Beichao de wude liyun wenti, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 2004(3), 47-56. 
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Jian.154 In the 370s Fu Jians army conquered the Yan regime, followed by Sichuan 
and Gansu, apparently giving him an unshakeable conviction of his destiny as unifier 
of Tianxia. That belief led him into a disastrous invasion of Eastern Jin in 383, after 
which the Murong aristocracy rose in rebellion and his empire rapidly fell apart.155  
 
 Rival branches of the Murong founded Later Yan and Western Yan, 
occupying Hebei-Liaoning and Shanxi respectively. The Xianbi Tuoba tribe of Inner 
Mongolia, which Fu Jian had conquered in 376, also seized this opportunity to rebel 
and restore its kingdom of Dai.156 This was soon renamed Wei - historians now call it 
Northern Wei to distinguish it from the third-century Cao-Wei regime. An uneasy 
peace between these three Xianbi-ruled states lasted for eight years as each focused on 
consolidating itself. But Later Yan finally invaded and conquered its western 
counterpart in 394, and went to war with Northern Wei the following year. Northern 
Wei was initially the underdog, but the death from illness of the Later Yan emperor 
Murong Chui in summer 396 turned the tide of the war. Five months later, Wei armies 
were able to sweep through Shanxi and Hebei to encircle the Yan capital Zhongshan 
(Dingzhou, Hebei), which fell in winter 397 after a grueling year-long siege.157 
 
 
                                                
154 Not to be confused with his uncle Fu Jiàn, who conquered Guanzhong and founded the Qin regime. 
I have differentiated the two men by adding of a tone mark to the elder Jians name. 
155 Fu Jians apparent failure to build a sustainable multi-ethnic empire on Confucian universalist 
principles has generated a large body of literature in the PRC. Unfortunately, the few surviving primary 
sources on the Qin regime, on which PRC historians are forced to rely, are of questionable accuracy. 
Most of the regimes historical records were destroyed by Fu Jian himself, and its history was 
reconstructed based on the subjective memory of a former Qin official in the early 400s. LQ contains 
an early criticism of bias in this reconstructed record - see LQ, 2: Chengdong. Also Zhang, Liuchao 
shixue; Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 64-69. 
156 For the history of Dai, see Jennifer Holmgren, Annals of Tai: Early To-pa history according to the 
first chapters of the Wei-shu (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982); Tian Yuqing, 
Tuoba shitan (Beijing: Sanlian, 2003); Zhang Jihao, Cong Tuoba dao Beiwei  Beiwei wangchao 
chuangjian lishi de kaocha (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2003). 
157 For a concise account of this war, see Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 70-71. 
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Adoption of classical Eastern Zhou and Five Phases discourses 
 The siege of Zhongshan had stretched the Tuoba, nomads with no experience 
of siege warfare and no supply train, nearly to the limits of their endurance. They next 
turned their attention to the equally unfamiliar challenge of using Zhongguo concepts 
to legitimize and govern their new empire. The Tuoba chieftains had led a semi-
nomadic tribal confederation from Shengle (near Hohhot, Inner Mongolia) since the 
250s, and had borne the title King of Dai since 315  a title conferred by the Jin 
government as a reward for military assistance against the Shanxi Xiongnu rebellion. 
But unlike the Murong forty years before, the Tuoba had remained almost untouched 
by the political culture of Zhongguo until their conquest of Shanxi-Hebei. Only after 
397 did the King of Wei, Tuoba Shegui (also known as Tuoba Gui) begin disbanding 
many Xianbi tribes in the confederation and commanding them to give up nomadism 
so they could be more easily registered, taxed, and monitored by his government.158 
Henceforth, the former tribespeople were collectively known as Dairen (people of 
Dai), and the hereditary authority of their chiefs was replaced by that of a 
bureaucratic State Secretariat, modeled on the Wei-Jin administrative system and 
staffed mainly by literati. 
 
 Tuoba Shegui captured Zhongshan with much of its administrative apparatus 
intact, including the imperial library, the treasury, and thousands of ministers and 
officials. But instead of moving his own court to Zhongguo, he decided to transport 
over 100,000 Later Yan officials, artisans, and peasants north to populate a brand new 
capital at Pingcheng (Datong, northern Shanxi)  an area more familiar to the Tuoba, 
but to the literati a mere frontier outpost best known as the place where Liu Bang, the 
                                                
158 BS, 80:2672. 
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first Western Han emperor, was humiliatingly besieged by the Xiongnu for a week in 
200 BC.159 Hebei and Shanxi would be controlled by provincial governors, normally 
Tuoba aristocrats, and their armies. From 405, a system of power-sharing was used to 
check separatist ambitions among local officials: Each province would have three 
governors, and likewise prefectures would have three prefects and counties, three 
magistrates. Indeed, the prefects (more than half of whom were literati) were not 
allowed to reside in their prefectures at all, and may have been stationed in the 
provincial capitals where the governors could watch them closely.160 
 
 The reason for this semi-colonial policy of ruling Zhongguo from Pingcheng 
was lucidly expressed in 415 by the literatus Cui Hao: In response to a proposal to 
move the capital to Ye (Linzhang, southern Hebei) during a particularly bad harvest at 
Pingcheng, he pointed out that this could fatally destabilize the state. The people of 
Zhongguo had an exaggerated idea of the Tuoba population, and this kept them in fear 
of the Northern Wei military. Should the Tuoba move south to settle in Zhongguo, 
their inferiority in numbers would become evident, and they would start suffering and 
dying from local diseases. This would encourage the conquered populations to rebel, 
and the regimes numerous enemies would also seize their chance to attack. Keeping 
the majority of the Tuoba out of sight, and only sending cavalry south to quell 
rebellions, was (in Cui Haos words) the correct way for the state to control Zhuxia 
through awe.161 For much of the fifth century, therefore, the character of Northern 
Wei rule in Zhongguo differed significantly from earlier barbarian regimes. 
 
                                                
159 WS, 1:7-9, 2:31-33. 
160 Ibid., 113:2974. For the proportion of Hua prefects (63% in 385-420), see Kenneth Klein, The 
Contributions of the Fourth Century Xianbei States to the Reunification of the Chinese Empire (PhD 
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1980), 112. 
161 WS, 35:808. 
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 In the sphere of ideology, however, the Northern Wei emperors engaged in 
exactly the same ideological discourses, primarily for the purpose of winning over the 
literati. Cui Haos father Cui Hong, formerly a minister in the Qin and Later Yan 
governments, oversaw four other literati in standardizing the Zhongguo-style rituals, 
ceremonial music, laws, and administrative structures to be used by the new imperial 
court. Hong also played an instrumental role in creating the regimes ideological 
foundations. When in mid-398 Shegui opened a court discussion over whether Dai or 
Wei should be the permanent name of his dynasty, the majority of his ministers 
preferred Dai as having more continuity with the Tuoba past. However, Cui Hong 
argued that Wei, originally the name of an Eastern Zhou state in Shanxi-Henan, 
appropriately represented the fact that Shegui, unlike his ancestors, had received 
Heavens mandate to govern Zhongguo. Shegui readily agreed with Hongs view, and 
had him draft an edict proclaiming:  
My distant ancestors ruled the northern frontier and controlled distant 
kingdoms, and while they assumed the title of King, they could not restore 
peace to the Nine Provinces. Tianxia was fragmented and the Hua people 
(Zhuhua) were without a lord. Though the customs of my people are different 
from theirs, it is through virtue that they should be governed. Therefore I 
personally led my army to restore order to Zhongtu, until the rebellious were 
destroyed and places far and wide submitted to my authority. It is thus fitting 
to continue using the name Wei.162  
On 24 January 399 Tuoba Shegui formally ascended the imperial throne and ordered 
his ministers to determine the dynastys place in the Five Phases cycle. Cui Hong led 
the ministers in proposing Earth, most likely based on recognition of the legitimacy of 
                                                
162 WS, 2:20, 32-33, 24:620-621; Luo, Shiliuguo Beichao de wude liyun wenti, 53. 
68 
 
three earlier regimes: Later Zhao, Yan, and Qin. Rather than dismiss either Yan or 
Qin as illegitimate - which would have been unsettling to the many literati clans 
(including Cui Hongs) that had served both - the Northern Wei ministers rewrote 
history so that Qin, by conquering Yan in 370, actually represented Fire succeeding 
Wood. Earth came after Fire in the cycle, so Northern Wei, succeeding Qin in 386, 
was Earth.163 
 
 Over the next forty years, Sheguis successors conquered three rival regimes 
in Shaanxi-Ningxia, Gansu, and Liaoning, and also sent armies across the Yellow 
River to establish footholds in Henan and Shandong. In 467, defections by southern 
provincial governors allowed Northern Wei to take the entire Shandong peninsula and 
occupy the northern bank of the Huai River. These successes eventually led to a 
reassessment of the regimes place in the Five Phases cycle. Whereas recognizing the 
legitimacy of Later Zhao, Yan, and Qin was previously seen as advantageous, some 
literati ministers now felt that Northern Wei had far surpassed the achievements of 
these earlier regimes and could only lose prestige from being associated with them. In 
490-491, they persuaded the emperor and their colleagues to change the regimes 
phase to Water and thus assert that the Tuoba inherited the Mandate of Heaven 
directly from the Jin empire.164 
 
 Northern Wei emperors consistently presented themselves as legitimate Sons 
of Heaven and masters of Zhongguo, and there is no indication that this status had 
failed to gain recognition among the northern literati. But that did not necessarily 
                                                
163 Luo, Shiliuguo Beichao de wude liyun wenti, 52-54. Western and Later Yan were, however, 
rejected as bogus, since remnants of the Murong were still holding out in northeastern Hebei, Liaoning, 
and Shandong, and no possibility of them having a claim to the Mandate could be entertained. 
164 Ibid., 53-56.  
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translate into enthusiasm for reunifying Tianxia and the Nine Provinces through a 
conquest of south China. Only Tuoba Hong (reigned 471-499), a fervently Confucian 
emperor best known for moving the Northern Wei capital city from Pingcheng to 
Luoyang in 493-495, displayed any significant ambition to invade and conquer the 
south. Indeed, his choice of Luoyang as a new capital was probably based on its 
reputation as the political and cultural centre of Zhongguo in the first three centuries 
AD  he hoped that this would give his court a huge boost in ideological and cultural 
legitimacy over the Southern Qi regime (479-502), thus undermining the loyalty of Qi 
subjects and making a southern conquest relatively easy and bloodless. 165  This 
aspiration is reflected in his complaint that Pingcheng was only a place for military 
pursuits and had no cultural prestige, making it unsuitable as a capital from which to 
[standardize] written scripts and axles and change habits and customs  clear 
allusions to classical and historical models for reunifying Tianxia and civilizing the 
world.166 
 
 Tuoba Hong justified the change of capital to senior Xianbi aristocrats by 
pointing out that Pingcheng lay to the north of Mount Heng, the northernmost point of 
the Nine Provinces, and was therefore not part of the civilized world. Qiumuling Pi, 
an aristocrat then serving as governor of Yanzhou (Zhuolu, northern Hebei) pointed 
out that according to legend, the illustrious Yellow Sage-king had sited his capital at 
                                                
165 Southern Qi was the second of four successive Southern Dynasties (420-589) in south China, the 
first being Song (or Liu-Song) which replaced Eastern Jin. The aims and impact of Tuoba Hongs 
famous attempt to force the Xianbi aristocracy in Luoyang to give up the use of the Xianbi language 
and traditional steppe clothing, among other reforms that are frequently described as sinifying, remain 
subjects of considerable debate in China because they go to the heart of sinificationist thinking about 
the desirability and inevitability of nomadic peoples being first acculturated and then assimiliated by 
the Hua or Han civilization. However, this issue is much too complex to be discussed within the 
scope of the present thesis.  
166 WS, 19b:464. The Qin empire imposed a standardized writing script and a uniform axle length for 
carriage wheels, in order to erase differences among the former Zhou states. Changing habits and 
customs (yifeng yisu移风易俗) is a common Confucian expression for the civilizing influence of a 
sage-king on his subjects. 
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Zhuolu despite it being north of Mount Heng as well  In that case, the ancient sage-
kings did not all have to reside in Zhongyuan. Tuoba Hong countered this by 
claiming the Yellow Sage-king only used Zhuolu as a temporary capital until order 
was restored in Tianxia, after which he moved to Henan. This claim was not 
supported by any evidence, but Qiumuling Pi lacked either the erudition or the 
courage to continue the argument.167 
 
 Even prominent literati ministers felt unease over Tuoba Hongs impatient and 
rather impractical obsession with reunification. After his poorly-planned first attempt 
at invading Southern Qi ended in humiliating failure in 495, his trusted advisor Li 
Chong noted (with some exaggeration) that Northern Wei now had eight of the Nine 
Provinces and 90% of the worlds people, with the Rouran柔然 nomads and Southern 
Qi constituting the remaining 10%. Why, then, the hurry to conquer the south in a 
matter of days? The empire should take its time to expand the army and accumulate 
supplies before striking a decisive blow against Southern Qi.168 Gao Lu, who had 
earlier supported the invasion plans, also began urging Hong to concentrate on 
developing Luoyang and use cultural and moral charisma to win the south over: For 
example, he could perform the prestigious feng and shan sacrifices to Heaven and 
Earth at Mount Tai, which were normally the exclusive privilege of a Son of Heaven 
presiding over an age of great peace and prosperity. Tuoba Hong replied that he was 
not qualified to perform the feng and shan as long as the south remained independent; 
Gao Lu then observed that people of the two Han empires never considered the south 
to be part of Zhongguo, and that the Xia, Shang, and Zhou kingdoms could not have 
                                                
167 Ibid., 14:359; cf. BS, 15:554. 
168 WS, 53:1184-1185. For the history of the Rouran, see Zhou Weizhou, Chile yu Rouran (Guilin: 
Guangxi Shifan Daxue, 2006), 65-155. 
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been much larger than Northern Wei now was. To this, Tuoba Hong retorted that two 
of the Nine Provinces (Yangzhou and Jingzhou) lay in the south, so how could they 
have nothing to do with Zhongguo?169 
 
 Tuoba Hongs ambitions remained unrealized at the time of his premature 
death in 499, but it was to a considerable extent this constant tension between the 
Zhongguo-centric worldview and the Tianxia concept that provided the ideological 
conditions for the eventual reunification of north and south China into a single empire 
under the Sui regime. Zhongguo was the centre of the civilized world, but ambitious 
emperors could assert that ruling the centre was not enough  their virtue and power 
were supposed to spread peace, order, and civilization even to the Four Yi. When 
non-Hua rulers like the Tuoba successfully overcame their literati subjects 
perception of them as barbarians, they usually felt compelled to participate in this 
classical discourse as well and identify other peoples on the empires frontiers as the 
barbaric (Yi) other. To borrow the words of Cavafys famous poem Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1904), which used Roman attitudes towards barbarians as a metaphor, 
the image of inferior and exotic foreigners to civilize or guard against was some kind 
of solution to the need for a common civilized identity in an increasingly multi-
ethnic but still Zhongguo-centric Tianxia.170 
 
Adoption of the labels Hua and Hu 
 An interesting aspect of Hua as an ethnonym is that, like Zhongguo and Xia, it 
retained an oppositional or dichotomic relationship with Yi and Yi-Di (which were no 
                                                
169  Ibid., 54:1209. For the background and negative consequences of Tuoba Hongs fixation on 
southern conquest, see Yi Yicheng, Beiwei de nanjin zhengce yu guoshi de xiaozhang, in Zhang 
Guogang (ed.), Zhongguo zhonggushi lunji (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji, 2003), 442-473. 




longer used as ethnonyms), implying that ethnic groups other than the Hua were 
assumed to be barbaric inferiors. This implication made Hua an inappropriate 
ethnonym in a multi-ethnic society, and eventually led to periodic efforts by 
politically powerful non-Hua peoples to convert it from an ethnonym to a supra-
ethnic label (i.e. one that transcended ethnic differences). The first such effort that we 
know of took place in the late fifth century, when Northern Wei emperors and 
aristocrats began positioning themselves on the Hua side of the Hua/Yi dichotomy 
and labelling peoples and regimes outside the empire as Yi. From this point of view, 
the Four Yi who had yet to submit to the Son of Heaven were: The Rouran kaghanate 
of the northern steppe (i.e. northern Di), the Koguryo kingdom in north Korea and 
the Liaodong peninsula (i.e. eastern Yi), the Tuyuhun吐谷浑 kaghanate of Qinghai 
(i.e. western Rong), and the Southern Dynasties (i.e. southern Man).171 The ethnic 
dimensions of the Hua/Yi dichotomy were thus replaced by a geographical concept of 
Hua as anyone who lived in Zhongguo, the centre of the civilized world. A Xianbi 
resident of Zhongguo, especially of Luoyang, was therefore both geographically Hua 
and ethnically Xianbi at the same time.  
 
 The Northern Wei court engaged enthusiastically in this new supra-ethnic 
Hua/Yi discourse: To the south of Luoyang, for example, it built the Hostels of the 
Four Yi (Siyi Guan), four separate residences for defectors from the north, south, east, 
and west of the empire. 172  In response to the southern regimes claim to be the 
legitimate rulers of Zhongguo or Zhonghua, the Xianbi aristocracy and northern 
literati made a point of calling southerners Nanren (people of the south) or Wuren or 
                                                
171 E.g., WS, 14:359, 21:546, 24:617, 34:803, 78:1725; BS, 16:612-613, 47:1715. Interestingly, the 
Tuyuhun rulers were a branch of the same Xianbi Murong tribe that founded Yan. 
172 LQ, 3: Chengnan. 
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Wuer (both meaning people of Wu), but never Zhongguoren or Huaren.173 Pei Zhi, 
a haughty literatus who had defected from the south in 500 and failed to adapt to 
northern sensitivities, incurred the aristocracys wrath in 515 for writing a memorial 
in which he inadvertently insinuated that only the literati were Hua and thereby 
entitled to high office in the empire.174 Even after the traumatic break-up of Northern 
Wei into two warring halves in the 530s, northern literati continued to exalt it as the 
epitome of civilization and dismiss the south as a jungle of bestial savages, banished 
convicts, and colonists who had gone native - the oft-quoted anti-southern tirade put 
into Yang Yuanshens mouth by Yang Xuanzhis 547 work Luoyang Qielanji reflects 
Xuanzhis fervent belief that no matter what straits the Northern Wei government was 
in, southerners had absolutely no claim to the Mandate of Heaven and no right to 
belittle Northern Wei as a barbarian regime.175  
 
 In the fourth and fifth centuries, the southern literati took to labeling all 
northern barbarian peoples as Hu - an anecdote from the early fifth-century Houqin 
Ji (now lost), suggests that by the 350s Eastern Jin literati were using Hu as a 
mocking label for all northerners, regardless of their ethnicity. Interestingly, the 
northerner thus mocked, who was serving a Qiang warlord as a staff officer, chose to 
return the insult by deliberately misunderstanding Hu as the homophonous word for 
fox (狐) and observing that southerners were colloquially known in the north as He 
                                                
173 WS, written around 550, goes further by labeling the Song, Qi, and Liang emperors as Daoyi 
(island barbarians), a term for southern barbarians borrowed from the Yugong chapter. 
174 WS, 71:1570-1571. 
175 LQ, 2: Chengdong. It is doubtful that Yang Yuanshen actually said these words to the southern 
general Chen Qingzhi in 529  the story seems instead to be apocryphal, a projection of Yang 
Xuanzhis desire for some form of psychological victory over the southern Liang regime. For similar 
anti-southern stereotypes, see WS, 96:2093. 
74 
 
貉 (racoon-dogs).176 Northern Wei emperors and aristocrats, however, reserved Hu 
as a neutral label for the Xiongnu, Jie, Lu River Hu, and Buluoji步落稽 peoples, as 
well as Central Asians and Indians. They did not even apply it to the nomadic Rouran 
and Chile敕勒, and they certainly did not identify themselves as Hu.177 The habit of 
grouping the Xiongnu, Jie, Xianbi, Dī, and Qiang together as the Five Hu (wuhu) is 
frequently seen in writings on the Age of Fragmentation, especially in a traditional 
Zuoshi-inspired term for that period: The Five Hu bringing disorder to the Hua 
(wuhu luanhua 五胡乱华).178 This, however, was a relatively late convention first 
used in fifth-century writings from the Southern Dynasties; the appearance of Five 
Hu in Shiliuguo Chunqiu and Luoyang Qielanji (only once in either text) may simply 
reflect the influence of southern writings on the northern literati in Luoyang.179 
 
 The increasingly vague and supra-ethnic nature of the Hu label caused it to be 
abandoned as an ethnonym for peoples of nomadic origin. In the Sui and Tang 
empires, Hu referred only to Central Asians and the surviving Buluoji tribes of Shanxi, 
and the new label Fan 蕃 (possibly derived from 藩, vassals) was used for nomadic 
northern peoples like the Turks, Uyghurs, and Khitan. Hu has since fallen out of use 
                                                
176 This anecdote is preserved in TPYL, 909. WS, 96:2093 also states: The literati of Zhongyuan 
referred to all southerners as hezi, meaning that they were of the same kind as foxes and raccoon-dogs. 
177 E.g. WS, 50:1113-1114. Historians disagree about whether the Buluoji (also known as Ji-Hu) of 
Shanxi and northern Shaanxi were descended from Xiongnu, Chile, or the Di of Eastern Zhou times. 
The Chile people (also known as Gaoche or Dingling) hailed from the Lake Baikal area in Siberia and 
spoke a Turkic language. Many Chile tribes were vassals of the Rouran kaghanate; several surrendered 
to Northern Wei during the frequent wars between the two powers, and were resettled along the 
northern border and in Hetao for military service as cavalrymen. See Lin Meicun, Ji-Hu shiji kao  
Taiyuan xinchu Suidai Yu Hong muzhi de jige wenti, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 2002(1), 71-84; Zhou, 
Chile yu Rouran, 3-62; E.G. Pulleyblank, The High Carts: A Turkish-Speaking People Before the 
Turks, Asia Major 3.1 (1990), 21-26. 
178 Derived from ZS, Ding 10. 
179 SS, 67:1773, 95:2358; SLG, 38:303; LQ, 2: Chengdong. The same may be true of SLGs use of the 
generic liuyi (six barbarians) to refer to Xiongnu, Jie, Qiang, and Dī - see SLG, 4:26, 14:106, 19:150, 
20:154, 31:237, 49:377-378. The earliest known occurrence of liuyi as a label for northern barbarian 
peoples is SS, 95:2352, where a Liu-Song general calls a Northern Wei army liuyi in 451. 
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as a self-identification in China, and only survives as a label for new western 
products like the carrot (huluobu, Hu radish)  in the same way as Fan now survives 
(in the modified form番) in the names of crops introduced from the Americas, like 
the tomato (fanqie, Fan brinjal) and sweet potato (fanshu, Fan yam). Since the 
early twentieth century, Chinese historians have tended to use Hu as a generic label 
for all northern barbarians of the Age of Fragmentation, but this is an ethnocentric 
anachronism that should have been discarded long ago. Certainly it is no less obsolete 
or ethnocentric than the old European habit of referring to Chinese as Orientals. 
 
Adoption of Gongyang/Guliang and Zuoshi discourses  
 No historian has yet explored the question of whether the Gongyang or 
Guliang commentary played any role in the conversion of Hua from an ethnic identity 
to a supra-ethnic identity in Northern Wei. As mentioned earlier, northern Hua literati 
in the fourth century, particularly the generation that grew up under Later Zhao rule, 
came to not only accept barbarian regimes as legitimate, but also serve them with 
commendable devotion. Holcombe attributes this acceptance to an essential 
universalism that transcended ethnicity in the Chinese identity of the literati, and 
claims that because the Jin empire itself [transcended] ethnic barriers, it was 
possible for non-Chinese conquerors to claim its mandate. Zhu Dawei similarly 
assumes that Kang Youweis brand of Gongyang universalism was already the 
essence of Confucian ethnic discourse when the Age of Fragmentation began. But we 
have seen that Jin literati identity was actually marked by a form of proto-racism, not 
supra-ethnic universalism, and this would suggest that any such sense of universalism 
had to be cultivated through the efforts of the barbarians themselves.180  
                                                




 Unfortunately, just how this was done remains a mystery. There is, 
understandably, very little discussion of ethnic issues in historical texts of the period, 
whether from the Gongyang/Guliang or the Zuoshi perspective. But an edict issued by 
Tuoba Shegui on 19 January 401 makes a clear reference to the concept of da yitong
大一统 (affirming the greatness of unification) mentioned in the first passage of the 
Gongyang commentary, suggesting that Shegui was already being exposed to 
Gongyang ideas through his literati advisors. The relevant part of the edict is an 
assertion of Sheguis heavenly Mandate against Eastern Jin claims to the same: The 
message of Chunqiu is the goodness (mei 美) of da yitong  that is why it constantly 
condemns Wu and Chu for usurping the title [of King]. Men of noble character have 
always dismissed these fake titles as no better than dirt.181 In Han-period Gongyang 
discourse, the da in da yitong had evolved from a verb to an adjective, and da yitong 
thereby became a phrase describing the great unification brought to the world by the 
Son of Heaven. In Qing-period Gongyang scholarship, it was further explicated as the 
condition of the world during the epoch of great peace.182 Unfortunately, we are given 
no other clues about how da yitong was understood in Northern Wei Confucianism. 
 
 Chen Hung-sen has demonstrated that contrary to past assessments, there was 
a noticeable revival of Gongyang scholarship in the Northern Dynasties, and that the 
standard Gongyang edition used was He Xius subcommentary. Gao Yun, a highly 
influential literatus minister who advised three emperors from the 450s to the 480s, is 
known to have been partial to the Gongyang commentary and wrote his own 
subcommentary to it. He also penned an essay revisiting the famous debate between 
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He Xiu and Zheng Xuan over the authority of Zuoshi Chunqiu, but the old rivalry 
between the Gongyang and Zuoshi schools had died down almost entirely after nearly 
three centuries of Zuoshi ascendancy, and the trend was now for classical scholars to 
be versed in all three Chunqiu commentaries.183 In the early 500s, the classical expert 
Liu Lan was particularly fond of Zuoshi Chunqiu (reading it five times everyday) and 
had several thousand students, but was widely ridiculed for his vehement criticism of 
the Gongyang commentary.184 As yet there is no evidence from Northern Dynasties 
sources of imperial patronage of Gongyang scholarship for the purpose of legitimizing 
barbarian rule. Evidence for such patronage may have been suppressed when the 
Gongyang commentary again lost popularity after the Age of Fragmentation, to be 
overshadowed by Zuoshi Chunqiu until the Qing period. Newly discovered epigraphic 
material may eventually fill the gap, but until then the nature of Confucian discourse 
on ethnicity in the Northern Dynasties remains a major lacuna in studies of the period. 
 
 It should also be noted that the proto-racist Wei-Jin discourse did not fade 
away entirely  like the concept of the Four Yi, it was instead redeployed against the 
empires nomadic enemies. By the early 520s, Xianbi aristocrats of Northern Wei 
were denigrating the Rouran as renmian shouxin and stereotyping them as naturally 
rapacious barbarians who wore furs, drank blood, and lived in the wild like 
animals.185 These aristocrats seemed completely oblivious to the irony that the Xianbi 
were disparaged in a similar way by the literati centuries before. A key question, 
however, is whether their adoption of the classical and Hua/Yi worldviews had any 
significant long-term assimilatory effect on their ethnic identity. Most Chinese 
                                                
183 Chen Hung-sen, Beichao jingxue de ersan wenti, The Bulletin of the Institute of History and 
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historians hold that as a result of identifying culturally and ideologically with 
Zhongguo or Huaxia, the Xianbi (as well as other barbarian peoples like the 
Xiongnu, Jie, and Dī) inevitably gave up their separate ethnicity within a few 
generations to assimilate completely into the Hua or Han people of Zhongguo. But 
this assessment is far too simplistic. It wrongly assumes a consistently ethnic 
definition of Hua identity, and also overlooks the probability that it was the Xianbi 
themselves who introduced to Zhongguo an ethnonym now carried by more than a 






































The Xianbi Construction of Han Ethnic Identity 
 
A new hypothesis on the origins of Han as an ethnonym 
 In the early twelfth century, scholars living under the Northern Song regime 
(960-1127) sometimes mused over the fact that the northern Khitan people referred to 
Zhongguo and its people as Han, despite the fact that the Han empire had ended long 
before.186 The Khitan had lived as nomads along the Western Liao River for more 
than 500 years before suddenly building themselves the vast steppe-based empire of 
Liao in the tenth century, thereby becoming Northern Songs most formidable rival. 
Besides calling north China Han, the Khitan also labelled the Zhongguo people in 
their empire, mostly living in the northernmost parts of Hebei and Shanxi, as Haner
汉儿 (men of Han).187  
 
 At least two Song scholars found these labels strangely anachronistic, and felt 
compelled to find an explanation for them. Ma Yongqing (flourished c. 1115-1136) 
pointed to records of Xiongnu calling Zhongguo people Qinren (Qin people) in the 
Western Han period188, and speculated that old habits simply die hard among the 
barbarians. The Khitan must have known Zhongguo as Han in the time of the 
Eastern Han empire, and grown so used to it that the practice had continued for over 
900 years. Zhu Yu, on the other hand, suggested around 1105 that the Han empire had 
made the greatest impact on the western and northern frontiers (Central Asia and the 
steppe), leading the people there to permanently associate Zhongguo with Han. He 
observed that in the same way, the barbarians of the east and west (Japan and 
                                                
186 Chen Shu, Haner Hanzi shuo, Shehui kexue zhanxian 1986.1, 291, 295. 
187 For recent studies of the Khitan Liao empires use of the Haner label, see Chen, Haner Hanzi 
shuo,  290-297; Liu Pujiang, Shuo Hanren  Liao-Jin shidai minzu ronghe de yige cemian, Minzu 
Yanjiu 1998(6), 57-65. 
188 See Chapter 3, note 107. 
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Southeast Asia) tended to still refer to Zhongguo as Tang. He also noted that 
sometime in 1102-1106, some Song ministers had advised the emperor that all 
references to Zhongguo as Han or Tang  for example, the terms Tang clothing and 
Han laws - in official letters from foreign countries should be changed to Song. Zhu 
Yu proposed a more universalistic alternative: Why not change Han and Tang to Hua? 
[Peoples from] the eight distant corners of the world enter our land, and all have 
become [His Majestys] subjects; therefore the real distinction is between Hua and 
Yi  and not between subjects of Song and subjects of some other government.189 
 
 Both Ma Yongqing and Zhu Yu were only partly correct about the origins of 
the label Han; their mistake lay in assuming it was unique to the Khitan. In fact, the 
Tang-period historiographer Liu Zhiji (661-721) observed in his day that Zhongzhou 
(i.e. Zhongguo) was known colloquially by the name Han, and explained that the 
roots of this strange custom could be found in the exceptional amount of colloquial 
speech recorded in Qizhi  a history of the Northern Qi regime (550-577), written by 
Wang Shao around 581-590.190 Qizhi is no longer extant, but we can tell what Liu 
Zhiji meant from the incomplete text of another Northern Qi history, Li Baiyaos 
Beiqi Shu (completed in 636), as well as lost parts of the same text preserved in Li 
Yanshous Beishi (completed in 659). These texts reveal that in the sixth century, the 
Xianbi  who were culturally and linguistically cousins of the Khitan  were already 
referring to the native people of Zhongguo as Haner or Han, rather than Hua.  
 
 There is a considerable amount of confusion regarding this Haner/Han label. 
The majority of Chinese historians, having grown up under ROC or PRC 
                                                
189 Chen, Haner Hanzi shuo, 291, 295. 
190 Shitong: Zashuo (Zhong), 8. For Wang Shao and Qizhi, see SuiS, 69:1601-1610. 
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governments that used Han as the official name of their ethnic group, assume that 
this name was directly inherited from the Western Han empire and was therefore used 
as an ethnonym no later than Eastern Han times, replacing the earlier ethnonym 
Huaxia. 191  In this paradigm, therefore, the Xianbi and Khitan Haner was just a 
modification of the pre-existing ethnonym Hanren. We have seen that such an 
explanation is untenable. Firstly, there is no evidence of Huaxia being an ethnonym 
either in the Han period or before; secondly, there is no evidence of Hanren being an 
ethnonym in the third and fourth centuries, suggesting that even in Eastern Han it was 
a supra-ethnic state-based identity - like American in the United States or 
Singaporean in my own country. The evidence points instead to Huaren becoming 
an ethnonym in the Wei-Jin period and gradually displacing other forms of 
identification that were either state-based (e.g. Jinren) or ethnic (e.g. Zhongguoren).  
 
 A small number of Chinese historians have recognized that Haner first 
appears as an ethnonym in Beiqi Shu and Beishi, with its earliest recorded use being 
by the warlord Gao Huan in 532. Gao Huan clearly labels as Haner the native 
population of Hebei, as distinct from himself and the Xianbi soldiers under his 
command.192 The two texts contain several other occurrences of Haner and Han (and, 
in one case, Hanzi) between 550 and c. 575, seemingly as colloquial labels for the 
literati and more generally, the native people of Zhongguo.193 An anecdote in Beishi 
suggests the Xianbi language even had its own word for Han: Rangan. 194 
                                                
191  See for example Zhou, Zhouren, Qinren, 17. For another, very recent, example of this 
misconception see Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, 254-256, 296. Chang theorizes that the 
Western Han empire absorbed all surrounding ethnic groups into a common national identity as 
Zhongguoren, but finally adopted Hanren as its new national identity as a result of contact with the 
peoples of Central Asia. This theory does not seem to be supported by any evidence. 
192 BQS 21:294; BS, 6:215. 
193 Chen, Haner Hanzi shuo, 291-293; also BS, 7:262, 32:1186, 41:1506-1507, 51:1858, 51:1867, 
53:1918, 54:1966. 
194 BS, 24:884. 
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Accordingly, these historians suggest that Han became an ethnonym sometime in the 
Northern Dynasties.  The late Qing scholar Li Ciming (1830-1894) dated the origin of 
Hanren as an alternative name for Zhongguoren to the end of [Northern] Wei (i.e. 
the late 520s or early 530s), while in 1988 the PRC historian Chen Liankai concluded 
from the available evidence that Hanren became an ethnonym no later than the 
490s.195 But most others in this school of thought have opted to be deliberately vague 
with dates because of the lack of conclusive evidence. 
 
 The main problem here is that unlike Wang Shao, the Northern Qi court 
historian Wei Shou omitted all forms of colloquial speech from his official history of 
Northern Wei, Weishu. This text is by far the most comprehensive record of Northern 
Wei history still extant, yet it does not contain a single case of Haner, Han, or 
Hanren as an ethnonym. The closest it gets is an anecdote about Cui Hao, the literatus 
mentioned in Chapter 4. Hao was apparently an excellent calligrapher, and frequently 
wrote copies of the childrens literacy primer Jijiu Zhang for his friends. The primer 
contained a list of fictional peoples names, each made up of three commonly-used 
words; one of these was Feng Hanqiang, but because Hanqiang also means Han is 
strong, Cui Hao always corrected it to Daiqiang (Dai is strong) to avoid causing 
offence to the state.196 This story indicates that in early Northern Wei, Han already 
signified an identity that was the opposite of Dai. Dairen, as we saw in Chapter 4, was 
the supra-tribal identity Tuoba Shegui created for the Xianbi members of the original 
Dai confederation  does this imply that Cui Hao knew Dairen and Hanren as labels 
for the Xianbi and Hua? 
                                                
195 Chen Liankai, Zhongguo · Hua/Yi · Fan/Han · Zhonghua · Zhonghua Minzu  Yige neizai lianxi 
fazhan bei renshi de guocheng, in Fei Xiaotong (ed.), Zhonghua minzu duoyuanyiti geju (Beijing: 
Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan, 1989), 97; for the quotation from Li Ciming, see Jia, Hanren kao, 139. 




 Two lines in a chapter about Northern Wei in the early sixth-century Nanqi 
Shu, written in the southern Liang regime (502-587), provide another clue: They 
contain the terms Han language (Hanyu) and person of Han (Hanren), in contexts 
that clearly indicate Han was used as a synonym for Zhongguo.197 Since these terms 
were not current in the Southern Dynasties (where the respective equivalents were 
Hua speech [Huayan] and Hua person [Huaren]), there is a strong likelihood they 
reflect northern terminology that was recorded by Southern Qi or Liang embassies to 
Northern Wei. Based on this circumstantial evidence, as well as the theories proposed 
by Ma Yongqing and Zhu Yu, I wish to propose a new hypothesis: The Xianbi, 
having replaced the Xiongnu as the pre-eminent steppe power in the first century AD, 
naturally referred to the region of Zhongguo by the name of two regimes that had 
ruled it for nearly three centuries  Han. This practice continued into the fourth 
century despite changes of regime in Zhongguo, which the Xianbi cannot be expected 
to have kept track of. When the Tuoba conquered Zhongguo in 396-397, they still 
knew this region as Han and its native inhabitants as Han, Haner, or Hanren.198 The 
Murong may well have done the same before this, but evidence for this is lacking. 
 
 In the ancient world, the slow pace of communications and information 
exchange meant that people tended to go on calling a foreign country by a well-
known name even after it had changed names several times. In the early eighth 
century, the Turks (Tujue) still referred to the Tang empire as Tabghach, a name 
apparently derived from Tuoba. This is probably because the Turks replaced the 
                                                
197 NQS, 57:985-986  see also 59:1023 where a prime minister of the Rouran kaghanate is described 
as conversant in both the Hu and Han languages (Hu, Han yu). 
198  Chen Liankai came close to making this argument in 1988; however, he vaguely traced the 
continued use of Hanren to the various frontier peoples and not to the Xianbi in particular. Chen, 
Zhongguo · Hua/Yi · Fan/Han · Zhonghua · Zhonghua Minzu, 97. 
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Rouran kaghanate as the dominant power on the Mongolian steppe in the 550s, and 
simply followed the Rouran practice of identifying Zhongguo with the Tuoba 
emperors of Northern Wei. Turkish influence on Central Asia, the Arab-Persian world, 
and the East Roman (Byzantine) empire was so great that the variant Taugas remained 
a common name for China in these regions for several centuries. Similarly, the Khitan 
Liao empire fell in 1125, but the Mongol empire that arose nearly a century later still 
referred to Zhongguo and its people as Kitat (derived from Khitad, the plural form of 
Khitan) and spread this name to Russia during its western conquests  with the result 
that Russians today still know China as Kitai.199 We may also recall that the name 
China itself is commonly believed to originate from the Qin empire, and was never 
superseded in India or Western Europe by the names of more illustrious empires like 
Han, Tang, and Ming. In that sense, it is hardly surprising that the Xianbi stuck with 
Han rather than switch to Wei, then to Jin, then back to Han, and finally to Zhao 
within a century from 220 to 319. 
 
 Because Wei Shou considered Han and Haner to be inappropriate 
colloquialisms, the first chapter of Weishu refers to Zhongguo by the rather literary 
Nanxia (southern Xia), and to its people as Jinren.200 Much use is also made of 
Zhongyuan, Zhongzhou, Zhongtu, Huaxia, and Zhuhua throughout the text. But 
because of the official supra-ethnicization of the label Hua under the late Northern 
Wei emperors, which presumably still applied in Northern Qi, Wei Shou noticeably 
avoids using Hua or Huaren as an ethnonym that excludes the Xianbi. To complicate 
                                                
199 Kitat is also the original form of Marco Polos Cathay. Jia, Hanren kao, 141, 144; Sanping Chen, 
A-gan revisited  The Tuobas Cultural and Political Heritage, Journal of Asian History 30/1 (1996), 
46-47. See also Jia Jingyan, Qidan  Hanren zhi bieming, in Fei Xiaotong (ed.), Zhonghua minzu 
duoyuanyiti geju (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan, 1989), 153-158 for an argument that the use of 
Khitad as a synonym for the people of Zhongguo began under the Jurchen Jīn regime in the twelfth 
century. 
200 WS, 1:1-10. 
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matters further, there are two famous passages in Beishi that seem to show a Xianbi 
being labeled as Han or Haner in the 570s. These passages have generated two 
contradictory theories on the use of ethnonyms in Northern Qi, both of which I will 
now address.  
 
When is a Xianbi a Han but not a Haner?  
 In 571 Gao Yan, a brother of the Northern Qi emperor Gao Wei (reigned 565-
577), murdered the powerful State Secretary He Shikai and seemed poised to launch a 
coup detat with 3,000 troops. The Chile general Hulu Guang advised Gao Wei to 
confront Gao Yan alone, predicting that the coup army would lose its nerve. Sure 
enough, Yans troops scattered the moment the emperors arrival was announced. Gao 
Yan was left helpless and did not dare to move when Gao Wei called him over. Hulu 
Guang then went up and mocked him, saying, Youre the Son of Heavens younger 
brother and killed a Han, thats all  what are you afraid of?201 
 
 A few years later, Prime Minister Gao Anagui, a poorly-educated Xianbi 
military man who first entered in politics as one of Gao Weis personal bodyguards, 
had a conversation with State Secretarial Attendant Yuan Shimin regarding a 
sacrificial rite to pray for rain. Shimin inadvertently exposed Anaguis ignorance of an 
astronomical constellation that Zuoshi Chunqiu mentioned in connection to the rite, 
and the deeply-embarrassed Anagui tried to save face by scoffing, The Haner tries 
to understand the stars  how useless is that!202 
 
                                                
201 BS, 52:1891. 
202 BS, 28:1032-1033, 92:3049-3051. Anaguis name was written in ideographs reading Anagong, but 
was commonly pronounced as Anagui. A passage from the now-lost Sanguo Dianlue, preserved in 
TPYL, 210, contains the same story. For the astronomical reference, see ZS, Huan 5. 
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 Neither He Shikai nor Yuan Shimin was Han in the modern ethnic sense of 
the term. Yuan Shimin was descended from the Xianbi Tufa tribe.203 Shikais Beishi 
biography mistakenly states his ancestry as Sogdian, but Zhang Jihao has recently 
proven from tomb epitaphs that he was actually a Xianbi from the Bai tribe. His great-
grandfather Suhe Du was among the Dairen aristocrats who moved to the new capital 
at Luoyang in 495, and like most of these aristocrats, the Suhe family changed its 
multisyllabic surname to a monosyllabic Zhongguo-style one by order of the 
emperor Tuoba Hong.204 Numerous historians have therefore tried to explain why 
these two men were apparently referred to as Han or Haner. The first one of whom 
we know was Hu Sanxing (1230-1302), whose influential commentary to Zizhi 
Tongjian gave the following explanation of the Yuan Shimin-Gao Anagui incident: 
The Yuan family originated from the Xianbi Tufa tribe. The Gao family grew 
up among the Xianbi and regarded itself as Xianbi, making no effort to hide 
this. The Xianbi therefore declared themselves an aristocracy (guizhong), and 
labelled the Huaren as Haner as a form of insult. The Yuan family had served 
the [Northern] Wei court in high positions for generations, and was versed in 
ceremonies and rites. Thus [Yuan Shimin] proposed a sacrificial prayer for 
rain, hoping to gain favour [from Anagui]. But he received an insult instead.205 
 
 Hu Sanxing made a serious mistake in assuming Gao Anagui was a member of 
the Northern Qi imperial clan. Gao Weis grandfather Gao Huan, the warlord who 
seized control of the Northern Wei court in 532 and laid the foundations for the 
                                                
203 Yuan Shimins name is given as Yuan Shi in BS, due to the Tang-period taboo on the min word in 
the name of the Tang emperor Li Shimin. JTS follows BS, and only XTS preserves Shimins real name; 
as a result, nearly all historians still call him Yuan Shi. WS, 41:919-936; BS, 92:3049-3051; JTS, 
98:3070; XTS, 127:4450. 
204 BS, 92:3042; WS, 28:681-682; Zhang, Cong Tuoba dao Beiwei, 35-41. 
205 ZZTJ, 171: Taijian 5 (Hu Sanxing commentary). 
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Northern Qi regime, is said in his Beishi biography to have been the grandson of a 
literatus who was exiled to the frontier garrison town of Huaishuo (Guyang, Inner 
Mongolia). The biography further claims that having grown up among Xianbi soldiers 
in Huaishuo, Gao Huan practiced the [northern frontiers] customs and became like 
the Xianbi.206 Gao Anaguis father Shigui was a general in Gao Huans army from 
532 onwards, but there is no indication that Shigui had non-Xianbi ancestry or had 
any kinship ties with Gao Huan.207 So Hus suggestion that Anagui was a Huaren 
who adopted a Xianbi identity is simply incorrect. 
 
 Hus error notwithstanding, his explanation that the Xianbi originally used 
Haner as an insulting label for the Huaren, and later began using it to insult each 
other as well, has been accepted with some modifications by at least three Chinese 
scholars. Chen Yuan (1880-1971) used the cases of He Shikai and Yuan Shimin to 
argue, The word Han was probably used to insult the Han [people] in the beginning, 
but was later broadened to be used as an insult against any person, and was no longer 
reserved for the Han. He also raised the example of the Northern Qi minister Han 
Feng (a Xianbi) using such labels as Han dogs and Han crooks on his political 
enemies, most of whom happened to be Haner civil officials from a literati 
background. 208  Chen Shu (1911-1992) made a similar argument in 1986, but 
suggested that the Huaren themselves chose Han as an ethnonym in Northern Wei, 
and it only became a general insult later on because the Xianbi elite of Northern Qi 
discriminated against the Han (i.e. the Huaren literati). He believed that the Han in 
Han dogs and Han crooks was used in this general sense, and not in its ethnic 
                                                
206 BS, 6:209. 
207 BQS, 19:254. 
208 Jia, Hanren kao, 140. Chens argument appeared in his monumental Tongjian Huzhu biaowei (A 
Study on Superficial and Profound Aspects of the Hu Commentary on Zizhi Tongjian), completed in 
1945. For Han Feng, see BS, 32:1186, 92:3053. 
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sense.209 Recently, Huang Yongnian (1925-2007) went further and argued that before 
Northern Qi, the ethnonym Han had already changed into a slang word used to belittle 
a man regardless of his ethnicity, and almost all the occurrences of Han in a 
derogatory context in Beishi and Beiqi Shu - including Han dogs and Han crooks, 
and Hulu Guang calling He Shikai a Han - actually reflect this non-ethnic usage 
rather than any anti-Han ethnic discrimination. Huang believes Haner was still used 
mainly as an ethnonym in Northern Qi, but also evolved into a general label for civil 
officials since so many of them were literati  hence Yuan Shimin being called a 
Haner. Unfortunately, Huang did not suggest any explanation for why Han acquired 
a derogatory meaning while Haner did not.210  
 
 The other school of interpretation on this issue originated from Chen Yinke 
(1890-1969), a renowned expert on Fragmentation-period and Sui-Tang cultural 
history whose 1944 works Tangdai Zhengzhishi Shulungao (Draft for a Narrative 
Study of Tang Political History) and Suitang Zhidu Yuanyuan Luelungao (Draft for a 
Concise Study of the Origins of Sui-Tang Institutions) have now attained the status of 
historical classics. In both books, Chen criticized as inadequate Hu Sanxings 
explanation for Yuan Shimin being called a Haner, and used Shimins case to make 
the sweeping assertion that in the Northern Dynasties, ones ethnic identity depended 
entirely on ones cultural orientation: in the Northern Dynasties period, culture 
(wenhua) was much more significant than ancestry (xuetong) in the difference 
between Hanren and Huren (i.e. Xianbi). Any sinified (Hanhuà) person was regarded 
as a Hanren, and any Xianbified (Huhuà) person was regarded as Huren (Xianbi); 
their ancestry did not matter. This point is crucial to studying the medieval history 
                                                
209 Chen, Haner Hanzi shuo, 291-292. 
210 Huang Yongnian, Liuzhijiu shiji Zhongguo zhengzhishi (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 2004), 35-38. 
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of our country; if it is not understood, pointless disputes would surely arise. 
According to Chen Yinke, Yuan Shimin was regarded as a Haner because his family 
was heavily influenced by Han culture, that is, the literati culture of Zhongguo. 
Likewise, Gao Huan supposedly had Hanren ancestry but regarded himself as a 
Xianbi because he was culturally Xianbified.211   
 
 Chen Yinkes theory has been extremely influential in recent PRC 
historiography, mainly because Chen, who died miserable, blind, and ostracized at the 
height of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, underwent an enthusiastic posthumous 
rehabilitation in the 1980s and is now widely hailed in China as the greatest historian 
of his era.212 Another likely reason for the theorys present popularity is that it bears 
the unmistakable influence of Gongyang Confucianism, which (as we saw in Chapter 
3) is the version of Confucian ethnic discourse that has been in favour since the 1980s. 
However, the theory rests on extremely shaky ground  namely, two pieces of 
evidence that can be interpreted in more than one way.213 I will address the Yuan 
Shimin case first, and assess the question of Gao Huans ancestry later in this chapter.  
 
 Whereas Chen Yinke believes Yuan Shimins family had been sinified to 
become ethnically Han, it is highly possible that, as Hu Sanxing, Chen Yuan, and 
                                                
211 Chen Yinke, Tangdai zhengzhishi shulungao (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1994 [original publication 
1944]), 19-20; Suitang zhidu yuanyuan luelungao (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1994 [original publication 
1944]), 39, 43, 74. Chen, like many other Chinese historians, had the habit of indiscriminately labeling 
the Xianbi and all other steppe peoples as Hu or Huren. 
212 See Wen-hsin Yeh, Historian and Courtesan: Chen Yinke and the Writing of Liu Rushi Biezhuan 
(public lecture delivered in 2003), at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ccc/morrison/morrison03.pdf (accessed 24 
May 2007). For an example of the theory’s influence in recent English-language historiography, see 
Chen, “A-gan revisited”, 62; Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 142-143. 
213 In 1983, Chen Yinkes former student Wan Shengnan extended the theory to He Shikai’s case by 
characterizing Shikai as a ‘sinified’ (Hanhuà) Sogdian. He later tried to claim Chen’s authority for this 
and other interpretations by forging and publishing a set of ‘notes’ from lectures Chen delivered at 
Qinghua University in 1947-1948; this forgery has deceived many historians, and I intend to expose it 
in a future article. See Wan Shengnan, Weijin Nanbeichao shilungao (Taipei: Zhaoming, 1999 [original 
publication 1983]), 341; Chen Yinke Weijin Nanbeichao shi jiangyanlu (Taipei: Zhaoming, 1999 
[original publication 1987]), 331. 
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Chen Shu believed, Gao Anagui was actually insulting Yuan Shimin without making 
any statement about his ethnic identity. Besides, the Beishi account of Anaguis words 
is ambiguous in both authenticity and meaning. A roughly contemporaneous version 
of the incident in Suishu (completed in 636) does not contain the word Haner - 
Anagui instead says, Why should we needlessly try to understand the stars? Chen 
assumes that the Beishi version is accurate and the Suishu version is a distortion, but 
there is really no way to be sure.214 Furthermore, the Haner need not be a reference 
to Yuan Shimin at all  it could just as easily be a plural and general reference (i.e. 
the Haner [collectively] try to understand the stars) to the Zhongguo people who 
came up with those arcane astronomical constellations and theories. In the classical 
form of the Chinese (i.e. Zhongguo or Hua) language, singular and plural forms are 
often differentiated by context alone, but Beishi simply does not provide sufficient 
context to ascertain who Anagui meant by the Haner. 
 
 The lack of conclusive evidence for either interpretation of the Han/Haner 
question means that the verdict must remain open until more material on Northern 
Wei and Northern Qi ethnicities is (hopefully) found. But my own tentative 
assessment at present inclines towards Huang Yongnians position. While there is no 
clear case of Haner being used as anything but an ethnonym, circumstantial evidence 
suggests that in Northern Qi, Han had two possible meanings: One that was the same 
as Haner, and one that simply meant man in a colloquial and mildly deprecating 
way. We can infer this from a confrontation that occurred between two of Gao Huans 
generals in 538. Liu Guizhen was an old Xianbi friend of Gao Huan from Huaishuo215, 
                                                
214 SuiS, 66:1552-1553. 
215 BQS, 19:250 gives his name as Liu Gui, but his epitaph (discovered in the Qing period) states that 
his given name was Yi and his zì (self-styled/courtesy name) was Guizhen. The most likely explanation 
is that Guizhen was his original name, and he used the more elegant Yi or the abbreviated Gui in 
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while Gao Ang was a literatus with a fiery temper who had chosen a military career 
and proven to be one of Gao Huans toughest generals - his Beiqi Shu biography states 
that the Xianbi [generals] all regarded the court literati of Zhonghua with contempt, 
and only feared and respected Ang.216 According to Beishi, Gao Ang offended Liu 
Guizhen by killing one of his messengers for interrupting Angs game of chess. The 
next day, the two were sitting together when a messenger arrived reporting that many 
corvee labourers had drowned in the Yellow River. Guizhen remarked, These Han 
are worth only a coin each  let them die! Ang flew into a rage, drew his sword, and 
tried to kill Guizhen. Guizhen escaped, but Ang then ordered an attack on his troops. 
The situation was only defused through mediation by two other generals.217 While 
most historians have assumed that Liu Guizhen was bold enough to make a directly 
racist slur in Gao Angs presence, Huang Yongnian believes he made a slip of the 
tongue, using Han in the sense of men but forgetting that Gao Ang might interpret it 
in the sense of Haner. 218  I would suggest that Guizhen actually seized the 
opportunity to direct a thinly-veiled insult at the Haner Gao Ang, deliberately 
playing on the dual meaning of Han. Unfortunately for him, Ang reacted more 
violently than he had anticipated. 
 
 Chen Shu, Huang Yongnian, and Chen Dengyuan (1900-1975) have all used a 
text by the Southern Song (1127-1276) scholar-poet Lu You (1125-1209) as evidence 
that Han was used as a colloquial, derogatory word for man in Northern Qi.219 Lu 
                                                                                                                                       
formal settings only. Many Xianbi and Chile in this period adopted new literati-style names and/or 
abbreviated single-word versions of their names, while retaining their original names as zì. See Huang, 
Liuzhijiu shiji, 35-36; He Dezhang, Weituo wangzu yu maoxi xianzu: Yi Beizu ren muzhi wei 
zhongxin, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi ziliao 17 (2000). 
216 BQS, 21:295. 
217 BS, 31:1146-1147. 
218 Huang, Liuzhijiu shiji, 36. 
219 Chen, Haner Hanzi shuo, 296; Huang, Liuzhijiu shiji, 38; Chen Dengyuan, Guoshi jiuwen (Taipei: 
Mingwen, 1984), 345. 
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You cites the single appearance of the term Hanzi in Beiqi Shu  where the Northern 
Qi emperor Gao Yang (reigned 550-559) angrily remarks, What sort of Hanzi is 
this! when a literatus snubs him by turning down a promotion to provincial 
governor220 - and speculates that this is why people of our time call a man of lowly 
status (jian zhangfu) a Hanzi. He then recounts the story of a Northern Song 
aristocrat named Zhao Zonghan who enforced the taboo on his name by ordering his 
subordinates to say bingshi (soldier) in place of Hanzi, presumably because soldiers 
were considered men of lowly status in the Song period and often labeled as Hanzi. 
But Zonghans subordinates carried the order too far by replacing every occurrence of 
the word Han with bingshi, with hilarious results. Lu Yous story does tell us 
something about Northern Song colloquialisms and society, but I would argue that his 
theory about the origins of the term Hanzi rests on as slim a sliver of evidence as 
Chen Yinkes theory about culturally-defined ethnic identity. Since only one Northern 
Qi example of Hanzi has survived, there is really no basis for interpreting what the 
term meant at the time. This is the essential problem scholars face when studying 
ethnic issues in pre-Tang Chinese history: The dearth of textual evidence tends to 
leave us grasping at straws, and indeed trying to build whole theories out of straws. 
 
 Another such straw further illustrates the frustrating character of the sources, 
and also leads on to the last part of this chapter. In one passage of his masterwork of 
historiographical analysis, Shitong, Liu Zhiji mentions a line (now lost) from Wang 
Shaos Qizhi in which Gao Huans warlord rival Yuwen Tai  a Xianbi whose sons 
later founded the Northern Zhou regime in Guanzhong - calls Huan a Haner. We 
know from Beiqi Shu and Bei Shi that Gao Huans family saw itself as ethnically 
                                                
220 BQS, 23:332. 
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Xianbi, not Haner. Liu Zhiji knew this too, and noted that Gao Huans accent and 
vocabulary had not changed from Hu [i.e. Xianbi] customs. He therefore inferred 
that Yuwen Tai labeled [Gao Huan] as a Huaxia [man] only because Tais Xianbi 
speech patterns were so much more pronounced that Huan seemed like a native of 
Zhongguo by comparison.221  One wishes Liu Zhiji had quoted the Qizhi passage 
directly, thus giving us some context for interpretation - his own explanation seems 
far from satisfactory. I suspect that the real reason why Yuwen Tai called Gao Huan a 
Haner was because he had been fooled by Huans claim to be descended from the 
same prestigious literati clan (the Bohai Gao) as Gao Ang. If so, Tai was probably not 
the first person to be thus deceived, and definitely not the last. It is to the thorny 
problem of Gao Huans genealogy, and its implications for ethnicity in the Northern 
Dynasties, that we must now turn.  
 
The myth of Xianbified Han and sinified Xianbi 
 As a result of Chen Yinkes emphasis on culture-based ethnicity over 
ancestry-based ethnicity, Chinese historians have tended to identify two groups of 
ethnically assimilated people as key players in the politics of sixth-century north 
China: A group of Xianbified Han (Xianbihuà Hanren) descended from literati 
exiled or resettled to northern frontier garrisons like Huaishuo in the late fifth century, 
and a group of sinified Xianbi (Hanhuà Xianbiren) descended from elite Xianbi who 
moved from Pingcheng to Luoyang and there adopted the mores of the literati. The 
first group is represented by Gao Huan and his sons, while the second includes Yuan 
                                                
221 Shitong: Zashuo (xia), 9. Zhou Yiliang and Yao Weiyuan, citing passages from WS and BS, argued 
that Yuwen Tais ancestors were Xiongnu aristocrats who became Xianbified in Eastern Han times. 
However, the claim of aristocratic Xiongnu ancestry was only made (probably spuriously) by another 
branch of Yuwen that moved to Luoyang after 495, while Yuwen Tais branch always maintained its 
Xianbi identity. It is thus premature to postulate Xiongnu ancestry for Tai in the absence of direct 
evidence. See Zhou Yiliang, Lun Yuwen-Zhou zhi zhongzu, in Weijin Nanbeichao shilunji (Beijing: 
Beijing Daxue, 1997), 239-255; Yao Weiyuan, Beichao huxing kao (Beijing: Kexue, 1958), 166. 
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Shimin and most of the Tuoba aristocracy. It is conventionally supposed that in either 
group, extensive acculturation vis-à-vis the dominant ethnic group in its social 
environment led ultimately to assimilation into that ethnic group  for example, a 
Xianbified Han retains knowledge of his literati ancestors (as reflected in his 
genealogical records) but perceives himself and is perceived by others as a Xianbi, 
while a sinified Xianbi retains knowledge of his Xianbi ancestors but believes (as 
reflected in his genealogical records) that their ancestors migrated to the steppe from 
Zhongguo in the first place and that he is therefore just a Haner who has come home. 
 
 However, a more critical examination of the sources reveals that the 
genealogies usually cited as evidence of literati Xianbification and Xianbi 
sinification would be better seen as proving the existence of widespread 
genealogical falsification by the Xianbi elite for purposes of social prestige, a practice 
also commonly seen in Zhongguo families of this and later periods. Falsified 
genealogies generally claimed descent from the legendary sage-kings of Zhongguo, 
the royal/imperial or aristocratic families of past Zhongguo regimes (especially Xia, 
Zhou, or Han), literati clans, or the Western Han general Li Ling (or one of his 
officers) who famously surrendered to the Xiongnu in 99 BC. In Xianbi families, such 
claims were sometimes facilitated by the adoption of a common Zhongguo surname 
like Li, Liu, Luo, Duan, or Dou.222 In the literati-dominated society of the Age of 
Fragmentation, where entitlement to elite status was primarily based on lineage, 
illustrious but counterfeit ancestors were in great demand, and were a staple element 
in the opening lines of clan records, personal autobiographies, and tomb epitaphs. 
Their popularity among the Xianbi indicates that class distinctions were taking 
                                                
222 For examples, see He, Weituo wangzu; Yao, Beichao huxing kao, 175-182; Luo Xin and Ye Wei, 
Xinchu Weijin Nanbeichao muzhi shuzheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2005), 269-273, 295-298, 368-369, 
428-429, 449-451, 454-456. 
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precedence over ethnic boundaries, and therefore reflects a certain degree of inter-
ethnic integration. But there is no evidence at all that genealogical falsification was 
accompanied by a change in ethnic identity. In other words, there is no genuine record 
of a literatus descendants turning into Xianbi, or (as mentioned earlier) of a Xianbi 
calling himself a Han or Haner. 
 
 Let us now look at Gao Huans purported literati ancestry. Chapter 32 of 
Weishu contains biographies of Huans great-grandfather Hu, grandfather Mi, and 
father Shusheng. Gao Hu, a member of an eminent literati clan from Bohai prefecture 
(Jing, Hebei), is described as a Later Yan general who defected to Northern Wei in 
397. Gao Mi was a well-respected Court Librarian and Censor who died in Pingcheng 
in 472, while Gao Shusheng was a heroic, musically-inclined general who led armies 
against the Rouran and the infamous Six Garrisons mutinies before his death in 526. 
Chapter 6 of Beishi (probably based on the lost first chapter of Beiqi Shu) modifies the 
story somewhat  Gao Mi was a Censor, but was exiled to Huaishuo for an 
unspecified crime. Gao Shusheng is no longer a general, but rather an undistinguished 
Huaishuo soldier who lived in poverty and had no interest in learning. Beishi further 
states that Gao Huan practiced the [northern frontiers] customs and became like the 
Xianbi, that he began his career as a junior officer and then a courier, and that in 
525-526 he joined the Six Garrisons mutineers in Hebei.223 
 
 The Japanese historian Hamaguchi Shigekuni was the first to question this 
genealogy, arguing in 1938 that the information in Weishu chapter 32 actually 
                                                
223 WS, 32:751-756; BS, 6:209-210. 
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indicates Gao Hu was a Xianbi from Gansu, not a Hebei literatus.224 In a late-1930s 
article, the young Chinese historian Zhou Yiliang (1913-2001)  then fresh out of 
Yenching University  also presented some evidence suggesting that Gao Huan was 
Xianbi rather than Han and the genealogy was fake, but this was only a minor point 
in his argument and he did not pursue it further. Chen Yinke was rather ambivalent 
about Gao Huans ancestry in his classic works of 1944  for the purpose of his 
argument about culture-based ethnicity, he maintained that Huan was a Xianbified 
Han, but for another argument he implied that Huan could be a sinified Xianbi with 
a falsified genealogy. The question of Gao Huan was not brought up again until 1949, 
when Miao Yue of Sichuan University followed up on Zhou Yiliangs article and 
argued that inconsistencies in Gao Huans supposed genealogy showed that the 
literatus Gao Mi and the soldier Gao Shusheng were not father and son, and that Gao 
Huan forged his descent from Gao Mi for prestige reasons. The historical geographer 
Tan Qixiang responded to Miaos article with a suggestion that Gao Huans real 
ancestors were from Koguryo. These skeptical assessments culminated in 1958 with 
Chen Yinkes former student Yao Weiyuans conclusion that both Gao Hu and Gao 
Mi were Xianbi.225 
 
 I do not think the ethnicity of Gao Hu and Gao Mi, or their relation (if any) to 
Gao Huan, can be established beyond doubt with the evidence currently available, but 
it does seem likely at least that Huan was a Xianbi originally named Heluhun who 
claimed kinship with the Bohai Gao clan in 531 to cement a military alliance with it, 
thus securing a base of operations in Hebei from which to challenge his former lord 
                                                
224 See Leu Chuen Sheng, Beiqi zhengzhishi yanjiu  Beiqi shuaiwang yuanyin zhi kaocha (Taipei: 
National Taiwan University, 1987), 19-20. 
225 Zhou Yiliang, Lingmin Qiuzhang yu Liuzhou Dudu, in Weijin Nanbeichao shilunji, 201-202; 
Chen, Tangdai zhengzhishi, 19; Suitang zhidu, 45 ; Miao Yue, Dongwei Beiqi zhengzhishang Hanren 
yu Xianbi zhi chongtu, in Dushi cungao (Beijing: Sanlian, 1963); Yao, Beichao huxing kao, 134-135. 
97 
 
Erzhu Zhao.226 This false lineage was further embellished in Weishu (completed just 
seven years after Huans death), while the less flattering details about Gao Mis 
exile to Huaishuo and Gao Huan becoming like the Xianbi were probably invented 
in the 580s by the former Northern Qi court historian Li Delin, whose Qishi provided 
much of the biographical material for his son Baiyaos Beiqi Shu. There is still no 
consensus about Gao Huans ancestry in PRC academia. For example, Wan Shengnan 
firmly believes in the authenticity of the genealogy, and Li Peidong has also 
attempted to explain its alleged inconsistencies and prove the skeptics wrong.227 
Neither of them has made a strong case, but a much more important reason why the 
characterization of Gao Huan as a Xianbified Han cannot be sustained is that the 
growing body of evidence from tomb epitaphs shows how common a practice 
claiming a sage-king or literatus ancestor had become among elites of all ethnic 
backgrounds.228 Scholars have tended to interpret the sage-king claims as marks of 
sinification while accepting the literatus claims as authentic, not realizing that they 
were simply different strategies in the same activity of accumulating social prestige. 
 
 Ebrey and Hinsch have argued that creating false genealogies was a Chinese 
strategy for absorbing and assimilating foreign groups. Wang Ming-ke, however, sees 
it as a strategy used by marginalized frontier peoples to sinify (Huaxiahuà华夏化) 
                                                
226 BS, 31:1140-1145. Huan is probably an abbreviated form of Heluhun. Gao Huans original 
surname is unknown; Yao Weiyuan uses WS, 113:3010 to argue that it was Shilou, but the 
opportunistic nature of Huans forged kinship with the Bohai Gao suggests that his choice of Gao as a 
new surname was made only in 531 and had nothing to do with official surname changes of the 490s. 
227 Wan, Weijin Nanbeichao shilungao, 341; Li Peidong, Gao Huan zushu jiashi bianyi, in Weijin 
Nanbeichao shiyuan (Shanghai: Xuelin, 1996), 85-94. See also Wans attempt to support his position 
using Chen Yinkes forged lectures (see note 213) in Wan, Chen Yinke, 328. 
228 Recent studies of such epitaphs include He, Weituo wangzu; Wei Hongli, Beichao muzhi suojian 
beifang shaoshu minzu zhi Hanhuà, Xian Dianzikeji Daxue xuebao (Shehuikexueban) 16.3 (2006), 
100-104; Luo Xin, Xinjian Beiqi Fengluo muzhi kaobian, in Yin Xian and Liu Chi (eds.), 
Beichaoshi yanjiu (Beijing: Shangwu, 2004), 168-169; Luo and Ye, Xinchu Weijin Nanbeichao muzhi. 
Note that none of these scholars has departed from the traditional perception of genealogical 
falsification by non-Han families as a sure sign of sinification (Hanhuà, Huahuà, or Huaxiahuà). 
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themselves and become part of the Chinese (Huaxia) world. Holcombe similarly 
claims this premodern mythology of common descent made assimilation easy. New 
arrivals were simply long-lost kin who despite obvious ethnic distinctions, were 
often accepted without objection into the Sinic fold.229  But considering that in the 
Fragmentation period these genealogies were usually created by non-Hua elites 
already enjoying some degree of power and acceptance in Zhongguo society, they 
would be better interpreted as an aspect of social competition within a multi-ethnic 
elite circle; ethnic assimilation, or a foreigners need to fit in, had little or nothing to 
do with it. Gao Huans children and grandchildren continued to perceive themselves 
as ethnically distinct from the Haner despite their official membership in the Bohai 
Gao clan. Similarly, Han Feng of the notorious Han dogs remark has often been 
cited as an extreme example of a thoroughly Xianbified Han but turns out to also 
have been a Xianbi whose father falsely claimed descent from an eminent literati clan 
from Changli prefecture (Yi county, Liaoning).230 Many Han Chinese families in the 
present day retain a traditional concern with genealogies and ancestral homes and 
graves, tied up as these are with the Confucian stress on filial piety and ancestral rites. 
They therefore find it hard to see the adoption of a completely fictional family history 
as anything but a total change of identity.231 But steppe peoples traditionally did not 
maintain genealogies and ancestral graves (not to mention permanent homes), and 
                                                
229 Patricia Ebrey, Surnames and Han Chinese Identity, in Brown (ed.), Negotiating Ethnicities, 26-
30; Hinsch, Myth and the Construction of Foreign Ethnic Identity; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 279-284; 
Yingxiong zuxian, 203-240; Charles Holcombe, Immigrants and Strangers: From Cosmopolitanism to 
Confucian Universalism in Tang China, Tang Studies 20-21 (2002-2003), 85; Re-imagining China, 
6. 
230  For the traditional Xianbified Han classification of Han Feng, see Wan, Weijin Nanbeichao 
shilungao, 350. As recently as last year, Wang Yichen wrote:  since we presently have no way of 
ascertaining where [Han Fengs father] was born, our only answer is [that he was] a native of Changli, 
and there is tentatively no need to be suspicious [of his ancestry]. But, thanks to Luo Xins study 
(published that same year) of the epitaphs of Han Fengs grandfather and father, we now know he was 
a Xianbi with false ancestral claims  just like Gao Huan. See Wang Yichen, Dongwei Beiqi de tongzhi 
jituan (Taipei: Wenjin, 2006), 341; Luo Xin, Beiqi Han Changluan zhi jiashi, Beijing Daxue xuebao 
(Zhexue shehuikexueban) 43.1 (2006), 149-153. 
231 Many Han clans do, however, have the habit of incorporating famous historical figures bearing 
their surname into the family tree, without any evidential basis whatsoever. 
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tended to remember ancestors only in the form of mythology, if at all. To them, 
creating new myths to suit a new environment had little bearing on their identity in the 
real world.232  
 
 In sixth-century north China, there were indeed many Xianbi aristocrats who 
actively emulated  or at least tried to be seen as emulating  the cultural refinement 
and erudition of the literati, or claimed famous ancestors from Zhongguo, or (where 
possible) did both.233 Many also changed their names and clothing styles to be more 
like the literati, and became so comfortable speaking the language of the Haner that 
they nearly stopped using the Xianbi language altogether.234 A large number of them 
had mothers or wives from literati clans. But there is no evidence that these aristocrats 
thereby ceased to see themselves as Xianbi and became ethnically Han, save for the 
highly moot cases of He Shikai and Yuan Shimin. There were also some real literati 
who deviated from the conventional northern literati lifestyle of civil officialdom and 
high scholarship and entered the world of military command typically dominated by 
Xianbi and Chile men. But in ethnic terms, they were never regarded as anything but 
Haner. 235  I would therefore argue that scholars studying the Northern Dynasties 
should step out from the flawed paradigm of a purely culture-based Han ethnicity, 
and focus on uncovering more evidence regarding the complex but poorly understood 
evolution and use of Han and Haner as ethnonyms in this period. 
 
 
                                                
232 See for example the case of Gao Huans general Hou Jing, who could not even remember his 
grandfathers name and eventually had to rely on a literatus to fabricate a genealogy consisting of 
famous Han and Jin ministers with the surname Hou. LS, 56:859-860. 
233 He Dezhang, Beiwei qianluo hou Xianbi guizu de wenshihua, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi 
Ziliao 20 (2003); also the references in note 226. 
234 SuiS, 32:947. 






 This dissertation has argued that contrary to much twentieth-century 
historiography, Huaxia was not used as an ethnonym in Eastern Zhou or, for that 
matter, in any period of Chinese history up to AD 581. While Zhongguoren, 
Hua/Huaren, and Hu/Huren were used as ethnonyms in certain periods, they 
eventually changed into broader supra-ethnic labels based strictly on geography. It is 
thus misleading to consistently translate Zhongguoren and Hua/Huaren as Chinese 
without clarifying whether Chinese is being meant in an ethnic or geographical 
sense, and equally misleading to translate Hu/Huren as barbarian or use it to label 
peoples like the Xianbi, since it was neither derogatory in connotation nor used as an 
ethnonym by the Xianbi themselves. The labels Yi, Rong, Man, and Di may have 
been true ethnonyms in Eastern Zhou, but after their bearers ceased to be perceived as 
barbarians  a crucial development about which we unfortunately have no 
information at all - they were thereafter used as generic labels for other frontier 
peoples in the classical Zhongguo and the Four Yi worldview that persisted in 
Confucian discourse until the nineteenth century. 
 
 Han, an ethnonym now used by the worlds largest ethnic group and often 
mistakenly translated as Chinese, has cast a long shadow of misconception over 
twentieth-century studies of ancient Chinese history. The Han ethnic identity is 
conventionally believed to have originated from the Han empires and defined the 
dominant cultural complex of Zhongguo and Guanzhong for about two millennia. 
That Han cultural complex, it is further believed, expanded to its present size and 
geographical extent through the ethnic assimilation (Hanhuà) of numerous less 
culturally advanced peoples, with the first major round of this assimilation (or, in 
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PRC terminology, amalgamation of nationalities  minzu ronghe) taking place in the 
Age of Fragmentation. However, this narrative of the history of Han ethnicity is an 
ethnocentric myth and a modern construct. Before the 1900s, Han (or Haner) only 
became the official ethnonym for the native ethnic majority of Zhongguo in regimes 
ruled by certain barbarian peoples  the Xianbi, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols, and 
Manchus. I have proposed that the Han ethnonym actually originated from the Xianbi, 
who continued to know Zhongguo as Han after the end of Eastern Han in 220 and 
reintroduced this label in the fourth and fifth centuries to a Zhongguo where it had 
been out of use for one to two centuries. This Xianbi-constructed Han ethnonym was 
again abandoned in Zhongguo by late Northern Song times, but not before spreading 
to the Khitan. It was next transmitted from the Khitan to the Jurchen, and finally from 
the Jurchen to the Mongols and Manchus.  
 
 Left to their own devices, the native elite of Zhongguo generally preferred to 
know itself as Hua, a term with a more prestigious classical pedigree from Zuoshi 
Chunqiu. But Hua is problematic as an ethnonym in a multi-ethnic Confucian society 
- the classical Hua/Yi dichotomy implied whoever was not a Hua was a Yi (barbarian) 
and held that barbarians had no place governing the civilized world. Xianbi, Khitan, 
Jurchen, Mongol, and Manchu rulers understood that the Han could not be allowed 
to monopolize the Hua identity and denigrate them as Yi  Hua therefore had to be 
suppressed as an ethnic self-identification and given a new supra-ethnic definition.236 
The Manchu Qing dynastys Yongzheng emperor (Aisingioro Yinzhen, reigned 1723-
1735), for example, argued that the Han did not have exclusive rights to the Hua 
                                                
236  Chen Liankai made a similar argument that the ethnonym Hanren arose from the politically-
motivated supra-ethnicization of the term Zhongguoren by the fourth-century barbarian regimes and 
the Northern Wei regime. However, this argument is undermined by Chens failure to recognize that 
Huaren was a far more important ethnonym than Zhongguoren in the Wei-Jin period. Chen, 
Zhongguo · Hua/Yi · Fan/Han · Zhonghua · Zhonghua Minzu, 97-99. 
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identity: Hua and Yi were merely geographical designations, and the Manchus were 
also Hua now that they resided in Zhongguo.237 This redefinition was so successful 
that in the process of overthrowing Qing rule, anti-Manchu ethnic nationalists 
embraced Han, not Hua, as their self-identification, leading the ROC government to 
choose Han as the official name of the ethnic group then internationally known as 
Chinese.238 With the adoption of Zhonghua as the official name of the multi-ethnic 
nation-states of ROC and PRC, the supra-ethnicization of Hua was perpetuated 
throughout the twentieth century. It is largely for this reason that today, over one 
billion PRC and ROC citizens know themselves ethnically as Han and use Hua only 
as a non-ethnic name for China as a state, whereas millions of Overseas Chinese 
(Huaqiao, Huayì, or Haiwai Huaren) worldwide - descendants of nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth-century Han emigrants from China - use Hua and not Han as an 
ethnonym due to their not having to share the label Hua with any other ethnic group 
in their new home countries. I would further argue that the supra-ethnicization of Hua 
explains why Huahuà as a concept of ethnic assimilation was gradually superseded by 
Hanhuà in ROC scholarship and has never found acceptance among PRC scholars. 
   
 These terminological complexities suggest that a comprehensive reassessment 
of ethnonyms used throughout Chinese history is long overdue. In particular, much 
more attention needs to be paid to heavily multi-ethnic regimes in which Zhongguo 
and Hua were deliberately supra-ethnicized for political reasons, leading to increasing 
usage of the ethnonym Han  such regimes would arguably include the Northern 
Dynasties, Liao, Jīn, Yuan, Qing, the ROC, and the PRC. Further research may 
confirm whether the Sui and Tang empires continued the Northern Dynasties supra-
                                                
237 Liu, The Clash of Empires, 82-88. 
238 Gao Qiang, Hanzu zucheng de qiyuan yu liubian, in Chuai Zhenning and Yang Jingchu (eds.), 
Han wenhua  Duoyuan wenhua yu xibu dakaifa (Beijing: Minzu, 2005), 257-260. 
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ethnic usage of Hua, but my reading of Liu Zhijis observation, as well as numerous 
Tang imperial edicts that have been preserved239, suggests that the Tang empires use 
of the label Han does not fit the usual pattern. Instead, Han was also supra-ethnicized 
into a synonym for Zhongguo, and was commonly used in a dichotomy with Fan 藩 
(a new Tang term for foreigners, as mentioned in Chapter 4) in settings where the 
more chauvinistic Hua/Yi dichotomy was inappropriate. So common was this 
Fan/Han dichotomy in Tang times that it is indeed puzzling that the late Northern 
Song scholars Ma Yongqing and Zhu Yu would have no knowledge of it, and thus 
perceive equating Zhongguo with Han to be just a strange Khitan habit. In fact, 
eleventh-century writings by the prominent Northern Song officials Fan Zhongyan, Su 
Zhe, and Wang Anshi clearly employ the Fan/Han terminology as well. 240  The 
apparent contrast between their acceptance of the Han label and the subsequent 
generations unease with it is an important problem that calls for further analysis. 
 
 Any such analysis will probably have to start with efforts to establish how 
ethnicity worked in the context of the Tang empire  a topic that was recently 
reassessed through the doctoral research of Marc Abramson at Princeton 
University. 241  While Abramsons sophisticated and groundbreaking work will 
undoubtedly serve as an excellent starting point for future studies on what he terms 
the discursive construction of ethnic identity and ethnic difference in Tang China, 
he did not problematize the relationship between Hua identity and the ethnonym Han, 
instead choosing to use Han as a convenient synonym for Hua and interpreting both 
                                                
239 For examples, see Li Xibi (ed.), Tang dazhaolingji bubian Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 2003), 
chapter 33. 
240 Chen, Zhongguo · Hua/Yi · Fan/Han · Zhonghua · Zhonghua Minzu, 102; Gao, Hanzu zucheng 
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terms as ethnic rather than supra-ethnic labels. 242  Hopefully, my thesis has 
demonstrated adequately why such a usage can be misleading, and why a clear 
distinction between Hua and Han is necessary.  
 
The standard narrative of the Age of Fragmentation continues to be that 
millions of non-Han people in Zhongguo and Guanzhong became ethnically Han 
by 581 through an inexorable process of assimilation and amalgamation, resulting in 
an ethnically homogeneous north China and thereby making possible its prolonged 
reunification with the Han-ruled south.243 As there is no record of anyone being 
called a Xiongnu, Jie, or Lu River Hu in the late sixth century or thereafter, it may be 
reasonable to infer that these peoples had already assimilated with other ethnic groups. 
But the sources do reveal that in the 580s, there were still ethnically Qiang and Dī 
people in Guanzhong and southern Gansu, ethnically Buluoji (Ji-Hu) people in Shanxi 
and northern Shaanxi, and ethnically Xianbi and Chile people all over north China.244 
Any notion that the Sui empire was ethnically much less diverse than the Northern 
Dynasties is therefore unfounded. The real difference only came later: During the 289 
years of the Tang empire, the Xianbi, Qiang, Dī, Chile, and Buluoji within its borders 
somehow lost their distinct ethnic identities, as seen from the absence of their 
ethnonyms from Northern Song texts. But if, as the sources suggest, Han was not 
used as an ethnonym in the Tang empire, what did these peoples become in ethnic 
terms? Did they revert to using Hua as an ethnonym? These intriguing questions, as 
well as the poorly understood Fan/Han dichotomy, lie beyond the scope of this study, 
but will be explored thoroughly in my future doctoral dissertation. 
                                                
242 Ibid., 2-3, 189. Abramson also overlooks the ubiquity of the Fan/Han dichotomy and mistakenly 
identifies adichotomy between Fan and Hua instead. 
243 Zhu, Rujia minzuguan, 55. 
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Bai (tribe) 白 
 
Ban (clan) 班 
 






































Cao Cao 曹操 
 




















Chu Shaosun 褚少孙 
Appendix: Glossary of names, terms, and phrases 
from the Chinese (Zhongguo/Han/Hua) language 
 
All items in this glossary are listed in alphabetical order according to their Hanyu Pinyin 
romanization, with no distinction drawn between the first and second words in a name or term
(e.g. Hexi comes before He Xiu; Jiangsu comes before Jiang Tong). Ideographs used are the 
simplified (jianti 简体) form introduced by the PRC. Where relevant, I provide the original 





Chunqiu Fanlu 《春秋繁露》 
 
Cui Hao 崔浩 
 




























Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 
 
Dou (surname) 窦 
 




Eastern Han 东汉 
 
Eastern Jin 东晋 
 
Eastern Zhou 东周 
 
Emperor Wu 武帝 
 








Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 
 
feiwo zulei, qixin biyi 非我族类，其心
必异 
 
feng and shan 封禅 
 
Feng Hanqiang 冯汉强 
 
Fu Jian 苻坚 
 
Fu Jiàn 苻健 
 




Gao Anagui 高阿那肱 
 




Gao Hu 高湖 
 
Gao Huan 高欢 
129 
 
Gao Lu 高闾 
 
Gao Mi 高谧 
 
Gao Shigui 高市贵 
 
Gao Shusheng 高树生 
 
Gao Wei 高纬 
 
Gao Yan 高俨 
 
Gao Yang 高洋 
 
Gao Yun 高允 
 
ge minzu de biran ronghe 各民族的必
然融合 
 























Haiwai Huaren 海外华人 
 


















Han Yu 韩愈 
 








he (racoon-dog) 貉 
 






















Hou Jing 侯景 
 




hu (fox) 狐 
 
Hua (ethnic or supra-ethnic identity) 华, 
originally 華  
 










Huang Dì (Yellow Sage-king) 黄帝 
 



































Hu Sanxing 胡三省 
 
Hu-Yi shouxin, buyu Hua tong, Xianbi 























Jin (feudal state/empire) 晋 
 
Jīn (Jurchen-ruled empire) 金 
 








Kang Youwei 康有为 
 
King Wen 文王 
 
Kong Yingda 孔颖达 
 
Later Qin 后秦 
 
Later Yan 后燕 
 
Later Zhao 后赵 
 










Li Baiyao 李百药 
 
Li Chong 李冲 
 
Li Ciming 李慈铭 
 
Li Delin 李德林 
 




Li Shimin 李世民 
 
Liu (surname) 刘 
 
Liu Bang 刘邦 
 
Liu Bei 刘备 
 
Liu Che 刘彻 
 
Liu Fenglu 刘逢禄 
 
Liu Gui 刘贵 
 
Liu Guizhen 刘贵珍 
 




Liu Yao 刘曜 
 




Liu Yuan 刘渊 
 














Lu You 陆游 
 


















minzu chabie xiaowang 民族差别消亡 
 
minzu da ronghe 民族大融合 
 
minzu ronghe 民族融合 
 
Mountain Rong 山戎 
 
Mount Heng 恒山 
 
Mount Hua 华山 
 
Mount Song 嵩山 
 




Murong Chui 慕容垂 
 
Murong Wei 慕容廆 
 














Northern Qi 北齐 
 
Northern Song 北宋 
 
Northern Wei 北魏 
 
Northern Zhou 北周 
 




























Red Di 赤狄 
ren 人 
 



































Shi Le 石勒 
 




















Sima Lun 司马伦 
 
Sima Qian 司马迁 
 






Siyi Guan 四夷馆 
 
Song (Southern Dynasty/imperial 
regime) 宋 
 
Southern Qi 南齐 
 
Southern Song 南宋 
 

























Tuoba Gui 拓跋珪 
 
Tuoba Hong 拓跋宏 
 






Wang Anshi 王安石 
 
Wang Shao 王劭 
 
Wei (river) 渭 
 


















Western Han 西汉 
 
Western Liao River 西辽河 
 
Western Xia 西夏 
 
Western Yan 西燕 
 
Western Zhou 西周 
 
White Di 白狄 
 


























Xianbihuà Hanren 鲜卑化汉人 
 
xiandai minzu 现代民族 
 


















Yang Xuanzhi 杨衒之 
 
















Yi-Di jinyu Zhongguo ze Zhongguo zhi 
夷狄进于中国则中国之 
 
Yi-Di zhi 夷狄之 
 




yixia zhibian 夷夏之辨 
 










Yuan Shi 源师 
 













































Zhou (kingdom/people) 周 
 








Zhu Yu 朱彧 
 
zi (viscount) 子 
 
zì (self-styled/courtesy name) 字 
 




Zuoshi Chunqiu 《左氏春秋》 
 
Zuozhuan 《左传》 
 
zuqun 族群 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
